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Foreword
The study of international law has been an element of the curriculum of the Naval War
College since the founding of the College, and it was to fill the need for textbooks fo-
cusing on practical, law-related naval issues that the College published its first book, in
1895. That work—a collection of edited and expanded lectures given in Newport by
Freeman Snow, professor of international law at Harvard, published as International
Law: A Manual Based upon Lectures Delivered at the Naval War College—was seminal in
two ways. First, it was for its compiler, Commander Charles Stockton of the Naval War
College’s faculty, that the College’s prestigious chair in international law is named. Sec-
ond, the book itself, which was soon canonical, was the forerunner of the International
Law Series, of which seventy-nine volumes by, or collecting the work of, major scholars
have appeared, with more in preparation.
The Naval War College Review in its time took up the challenge. In the May 1949 issue
(Information Service for Officers, as it was first known, having been founded only in Oc-
tober 1948), its editors published “Legal Foundations of International Relations,” by
Manley O. Hudson. At this writing, the index of the journal contains seventy-one en-
tries under the heading “International Law,” and the continual flow of manuscripts
from international lawyers testifies that the Review is well established in that field. It is
no surprise, then, that when the Naval War College Press established the Newport Pa-
pers monograph series in the early 1990s, international law quickly found a place
there. The third Newport Paper, published in October 1992, was Horace B. Robertson,
Jr.’s, The “New” Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea; the eleventh, by
Frank Gibson Goldman, was The International Legal Ramifications of United States Counter-
Proliferation Strategy: Problems and Prospects (April 1997), and number fifteen was In-
ternational Law and Naval War: The Effect of Marine Safety and Pollution Conventions
during International Armed Conflict, by Dr. Sonja Ann Jozef Boelaert-Suominen (De-
cember 2000).
So it is with particular satisfaction that we sustain that commitment with this New-
port Paper, the twenty-fifth in the series, and the first of our 2006 program. James P.
Terry—a former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State; former legal counsel to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then General
Colin Powell; a retired colonel, U.S. Marine Corps; and today chairman of the Board
of Veterans’ Appeals, in the Department of Veterans Affairs—is familiar to Press sub-
scribers as the author of four articles (going back to 1986) in the Review. In The
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Regulation of International Coercion Colonel Terry has undertaken a major task, an
assessment—from a U.S. policy perspective and in an international-law framework—
of “representative instances where force has recently been used in international rela-
tions, the circumstances under which it was used, the instructive international policy
and legal constructs that can be applied, and the relationship of these policies to the
minimum world order system established in . . . the United Nations Charter.” He is em-
inently fitted to meet the challenge, and the value of his argument befits the century-
long tradition of publishing in international law at the Naval War College.
C A R N E S L O R D
Editor, Naval War College Press
Newport, Rhode Island
V I T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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Introduction
The most significant discourse about serious threats to U.S. national security in the
twenty-first century will likely concern the military capabilities and intentions of
nonstate actors, acting either for themselves, for religious elites, or as surrogates for
state sponsors. This preoccupation results not from any inordinate fear of “terrorism”
but from a recognition of objective military and political realities. While prior to 1991
only the Soviet Union possessed the capacity to inflict catastrophic military destruction
on the United States, today that threat is vested in terrorist cells and religious sects that
seek to destroy the fabric of the United States through unconventional military and
paramilitary means. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 bear this out.
During the Cold War, the major threat to the United States was clearly the fear of miscal-
culation by the Soviets. Today, that threat has been recharacterized in terms of deliberate
aggression against the United States by nontraditional actors willing to take suicidal risks
to inflict premeditated, brutal savagery on innocent civilians in a manner designed to
force not so much regime change directly as policy changes that affect regime change.
Commitment to national security is only as valid as the policies and plans, military,
economic, and political, that shape the areas and people from which these threats origi-
nate. The problem always has been to determine which policies, and how applied, make
the greatest contribution to countering the threat—a threat now represented by social
and religious systems that foster or at least condone aggressive response to differing re-
ligious and social values. This has never been more true than in Afghanistan and in
Iraq. Security, then, means more than simply protecting the land on which we live; it
embraces a comprehensive understanding of the appropriate response to human aspi-
rations for improved conditions of life, for equality of opportunity, and for justice and
freedom. Where these interests are thwarted for peoples or groups within a particular
state or region by armed protagonists representing narrow, restrictive interests, our re-
sponse must be one measured by the effective institutionalization of order.
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This monograph first examines the relationship between law and the use of force, to in-
clude a review of the principles of legal justification, the legal criteria for self-defense, and
the policy of deterrence followed by the United States. It then examines the characteristic
differences between the interpretive approaches taken by national and nonnational enti-
ties in their respective claims and counterclaims during international crises.
Chapter 2, which concludes Part I, is focused on the historical aspects of the minimum
world order system, which today comprises the prohibition against the use of force by
one state against another embodied in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations
Charter, with the exception inherent in customary international law and in Article 51
of the Charter that every state is authorized to use force in self-defense. A review of the
pre-Charter system focuses on the development of the nation-state and the threads of
international law development leading to multilateral agreements vice solely bilateral
accords. The period following World War I, with the emergence of the League of Na-
tions, is examined for its significance as an important source of the Charter of the
United Nations. The structuring of the Charter is then addressed in terms of the con-
cept of aggression and lawful response to aggression. Chapter 2 concludes with a re-
view of the law of self-defense as defined first under customary international law and
then under the UN Charter.
Part II addresses lesser conflicts. Chapter 3 addresses instances where intervention is
authorized in defense of humanitarian values defined in the UN Charter. The recent
humanitarian interventions in the Congo and in Kosovo provide examples of autho-
rized humanitarian initiatives. Chapter 4 examines the American intervention in Pan-
ama in 1989 as we intervened both to protect our interests under the Panama Canal
Treaty and to ensure the safety of U.S. nationals present in Panama pursuant to that
agreement. Chapter 5 reviews those conflicts in which terrorist violence by individuals,
groups of individuals, and state-supported terrorist elements create a right to respond
through military force by the target state. The attacks by Iranian militants in 1979 and
by al-Qa‘ida in 2001 spearhead the discussion of lawful response to terrorist violence.
Chapter 5 argues that an effective counterterrorism strategy must ensure that enforce-
ment measures are not legally constrained and that people responsible for terrorist acts
are consistently held accountable by regional and international organizations. This ex-
panding body of international law, when coupled with increasingly effective national
legislation, appears to be arming the victims of terrorism with some of the legal instru-
ments necessary to combat the threat. This chapter concludes that governmental re-
sponse to state-supported terror violence, where the elements of necessity and
proportionality are met, is clearly supported by customary international law and the
UN Charter.
2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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Part III, consisting of chapters 6 and 7, addresses examples of major conflict. These are
conflicts that have involved aggression by one or more nation-states against another
nation-state, as opposed to the intervention by nations or coalitions of nations in re-
sponse to either humanitarian crises or terrorist violence. In these major conflicts, the
sovereignty of a nation is normally in dispute. While not necessarily exhibiting greater
destructiveness than “lesser” conflicts, the more traditional international conflicts ad-
dressed in Part III invoke the law-of-war principles reflected in the Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Chapter 6 examines the coalition response to Iraqi aggression in 1990–91 during Oper-
ation DESERT STORM. It contrasts the illegality of the actions of the Iraqi regime of
Saddam Hussein with the responses of the coalition led by the United States, which
succeeded in liberating Kuwait and returning its borders to the status quo ante. The
chapter begins with a discussion of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the response of the
United Nations, leading up to the decision to use force. It then examines the conduct of
armed hostilities by both sides during the war. The chapter concludes with observa-
tions on the role of law in the successes and failures of the postwar enforcement regime
in Iraq.
Chapter 7, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, examines the Bush administration’s decision to
invade Iraq in March 2003 and enforce a long series of UN Security Council resolu-
tions addressing Iraqi threats to international peace and security. This chapter exam-
ines these Iraqi violations in the context of international law principles justifying
intervention. More significantly, it examines the right of states to enforce mandates is-
sued by the Security Council and to redress violations of its edicts when the Council, as
a body, refuses to do so.
Part IV addresses U.S. policy for peace operations. The United States has voted to sup-
port the United Nations and NATO in providing multilateral forces to restore interna-
tional peace and security. The United Nations was involved in both Chapter VI
(peacekeeping) and Chapter VII (peace enforcement) operations in the 1990s, with
limited success. Chapter 8, “Development of Criteria for Peace Operations,” looks at
the limitations inherent in UN leadership of such operations, citing the UN failures in
Somalia and Bosnia. The success of NATO as the leadership element in Kosovo in 1998
was significant and may foreshadow a new era for the role of regional organizations
(discussed in chapter 9) under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
Part V concerns itself with special areas of legal concern that warrant consideration
with regard to legal justification for military response to international coercion. This
part, “Challenges for the Twenty-first Century,” addresses the right of states to respond
to threats to, and attacks on, critical infrastructure. Chapter 10 examines what rights, if
T H E R E G U L A T I O N O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L C O E R C I O N 3
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any, in self-defense are triggered by attacks on infrastructure systems critical to our na-
tional political and economic integrity. Chapter 11, concerning computer network at-
tack, takes this one step farther and examines the authority that international law
provides to nations wishing to protect these systems aggressively, through preemptive
defense. Chapter 11 carefully analyzes the right to target computer networks of nations
that have expressed “clear indicators of attack.” Finally, recommendations are offered to
enhance the ability of the international legal system to support and embrace, strongly
and legally, computer-generated data-warfare responses to such aggression.
This Newport Paper examines representative instances where force has recently been
used in international relations, the circumstances under which it was used, the instruc-
tive international policy and legal constructs that can be applied, and the relationship
of these policies to the minimum world order system established in Articles 2(4) and
51 of the United Nations Charter. That system, defined more fully in the pages that fol-
low, provides a complementary structure that prohibits and counters the unlawful, ag-
gressive use of force, on the one hand, and permits national and collective self-defense,
on the other, in a manner designed to meet both the traditional threats represented
during the Cold War and the nontraditional threats we have seen recently and can ex-
pect in the future.
4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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PART ONE
The Changing Nature of the Threat to National Security
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Customary Law
The Relationship between Law and the Use of Force
In consideration of the breadth of the process of coercion and of the related military
and economic imbalances on which coercion tends to thrive, a number of legal and
policy considerations need to be reexamined. Among these principles are necessity and
proportionality, principles of legal justification, the legal criteria for self-defense, and
the world-order commitments undertaken by all nations under the United Nations
Charter for the deterrence of aggression. In examining these principles, it must be un-
derstood that every nation has determined which exclusive or national interests it must
protect at all costs if it is to retain elements of its own sovereignty free from the de-
structive effects of armed attack, conventional or nonconventional. Where these national
or exclusive interests intrude upon the collective claims of the greater community of
states, as represented by the United Nations, they are rejected by that body. Within that
community of nations, however, there are subcommunities with separate agendas. One
such includes the lesser developed, or Third World, states, from which most recent de-
structive violence has been observed to arise.
Because coercion involves such a multivariance of concerns, it is necessary in any analysis
of specific factual situations to consider the objectives, motivations, and “needs” of the
states involved. Certain of the principles, because they dominate our consideration of the
legality of specific instances of coercion, must first be addressed in greater detail.1
The Use of Force: Principles of Legal Justification
The principles that confine the legitimate use of force are embodied in two competing
but complementary components. The first is the claim of participants to their right to
use force until the threat posed by an adversary has been overcome.2 A related but sepa-
rate requirement is that the level and type of force used be proportionate to the objec-
tive to be obtained. Referred to as the “principle of proportionality,” this concept
denies a participant the right to interpose excessive force, regardless of the level of the
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moderating element of necessity and that the operation of one without the other
would make efforts to regulate international coercion futile. The Department of the
Navy observes:
In allowing only that use of force necessary for the purpose of war, the principle of necessity implies
the principle of humanity that disallows any kind or degree of force not essential for the realization of
this purpose: that is, force that needlessly or unnecessarily causes or aggravates both human suffering
and physical destruction. Thus the two principles may properly be described, not as opposing, but as
complementing each other: the real difficulty arises, not from the meaning of the principles, but from
their application in practice.3
These principles have value only if respected in the practices of states, and specifically
in those of the United States and the nations of Western Europe, which shape policy
expectations for the larger community. Multilateral agreements like the Hague Conven-
tions of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which codify these principles in
specific rules, all depend for their vitality upon the restraint exercised in the actual
practice of states. The late Professor Myres McDougal, referring to these state practices
in terms of customary international law, declared, “What is important in the develop-
ment of international law by custom is, we may emphasize, the crystallization of per-
spectives among peoples, and especially among their effective decision-makers, that
certain past uniformities in decision will, and should, be observed in the future.”4
When the mutual tolerance and mutual restraint required to give effect to these princi-
ples are violated by one state in its relations with another, the delicate balance between
them of equal security under the law is lost. It is with this predicate in mind that these le-
gal precepts are applied to post–World War II intervention in the chapters that follow.
The Legal Criteria for Self-Defense
The “necessity” for the use of force by states and the “proportionality” with which that
force must be applied to an existing threat are simply elements of the right of states to
defend themselves and to maintain an international status quo.5 Thus, an understand-
ing of permissible coercion is as important as an understanding of the unlawful use of
force by states and nonstate actors. Professor McDougal stated most succinctly the
need to understand both parameters of coercion:
Complete disorder, failure to forbid even the most intense and comprehensive destruction of values is
not only possible but has in fact long characterized the perspectives of traditional international law. If,
on the other hand, the deliberate choice is made to pursue at least a minimum of order in the world
arena, the coercion that is to be prohibited clearly must be distinguished from that which is to be per-
mitted. The conceptions both of impermissible and permissible coercion are thus necessary in the the-
oretical formulation of authoritative policy as well as the practical application of that policy to
interacting human groups.6
Unfortunately, that coercion which is legally permissible and that which is illegal often
differ only in the perception of the state claimant. To the extent that states have a right
8 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, that right has been
shaped by their own ideologies. In that regard, the issue of whether preparation for
armed conflict is actually for a state’s national security and self-defense or for purposes
of aggression becomes a major political question in the legal dimension of coercion.
An equally relevant and related issue concerns self-serving and reinforcing doctrines ar-
gued by states following a use of force that is condemned by the community of nations.
One such reinforcing doctrine was the “Brezhnev Doctrine,” issued by the Soviet Union
at the height of the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia. It attempted to establish a special inter-
national right to intervention in order to protect and promote the “Socialist Common-
wealth of States.”7 Such claims, largely discounted by the international community, point
up the obstacles to uniform acceptance of reasonable interpretations of international law
principles, as well as the asymmetries between “open” and “closed” societies.8
The Policy of Deterrence
The policy of deterrence is a third aspect in the process of balancing vital interests of
states so as to preclude the initiation and escalation of conflict. The great value of this
perspective is that, unlike the traditional perspectives—political, military, cultural,
ideological, and economic—which view international conflicts primarily in terms of
original causes, “deterrence” offers a focus on avoidance. Each of these perspectives, how-
ever, is necessary in the dynamic approach required for the resolution of international
disputes. Such an integrated approach cannot avoid examining the role of law. Existing
international legal institutions and processes for establishing world order are addressed
in later chapters; however, consideration must also be given to the extent to which coun-
tries are willing and able to adopt legal standards in their international relations.
The Contextual Relationship
Within this broad context, the monograph’s case studies in the use of force and conflict
resolution examine the characteristic differences between the interpretive approaches
taken by national and nonnational entities in their respective claims and counterclaims
during international crises. The importance of the facts and rationales of post–World
War II coercion lies in the significance that nations place in the role of law as a neces-
sary element in gaining political support, both national and international. In their
statements of international legality, nation-states, including the United States, and
nonstate entities as well adopt and espouse customary and conventional international
principles that serve policy aims. The international legal mechanisms, led by the vari-
ous organs of the United Nations, provide means by which the flexibility of these vary-
ing interpretations of law is bounded.
T H E R E G U L A T I O N O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L C O E R C I O N 9
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This review of the events and issues surrounding examples of international coercion
since the 1945 Yalta Conference attempts to examine the various national and
subnational claims in terms of the common, inclusive interests of all sovereign states
(and nonstates aspiring to such status) in adhering to an international legal regime that
is protective of the interests of the greatest number. Exclusive claims asserted irrespec-
tive of these interests must be rejected.
Notes
1. This study will not equate illegal coercion un-
der Article 2(4) of the UN Charter with the
definition of aggression adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly without vote on 14 December
1974. (“Definition of Aggression,” 29 UNGA
Res. 3314). The fundamental question of ag-
gression has always revolved around “intent,”
which is approached tentatively in Article 2 of
the 1974 definition. Article 2 declares that the
use of armed force by a state “in contraven-
tion of the Charter” shall constitute prima fa-
cie evidence of aggression, in the absence of
justifying circumstances. The ambiguity of
this provision is such that even acts “in con-
travention of the Charter” could be legally
justified. When “illegal coercion” and “aggres-
sion” are addressed in this study, the defini-
tion provided by the late Professor Phillip
Jessup and widely accepted by international
legal scholars will be used. That definition
provides “a resort to armed force by a State
when such resort has been duly determined,
by a means that that state is bound to accept,
to constitute a violation of an obligation.”
Phillip Jessup, “Harvard Research in Interna-
tional Law: Rights and Duties of States in Acts
of Aggression,” American Journal of Interna-
tional Law Supplement 33 (1939), p. 827.
2. See Steven Downey, “The Law of War and
Military Necessity,” American Journal of In-
ternational Law 47 (1953), p. 251.
3. U.S. Navy Dept., Law of Naval Warfare, NWP
10-2 (Washington, D.C.: 1955); see also U.S.
Army Dept., The Law of Land Warfare, FM
27-10 (Washington, D.C.: 1976). Para. 41 of
FM 27-10 declares: “Unnecessary Killing and
Devastation. . . . [L]oss of life and damage to
property must not be out of proportion to the
military advantage to be gained. Once a fort
or defended locality has surrendered, only
such further damage is permitted as is
demanded by the exigencies of war, such as
the removal of fortifications, demolition of
military buildings, and destruction of stores.”
4. Myres McDougal, Harold Laswell, and Ian
Vlassic, Law and Public Order in Space (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1963), p. 243.
5. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
provides in part that the use of force in self-
defense can be invoked only “if an armed at-
tack occurs against a member of the United
Nations.” The Security Council is then re-
quired by the same article to take action to
“restore international peace and security.”
Clearly, the restoration of the status quo is
the primary justification for permitting co-
ercion in self-defense under the Charter.
6. Myres McDougal and Florentine Feliciano, Law
and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal
Regulation of International Coercion (New Ha-
ven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 128–29.
7. See “Legality of Czechoslovak Invasion,” in
Department of State Bulletin, UN Special
Committee on Principles of International
Law (Washington, D.C.: 14 October 1968),
pp. 396–401, for a discussion of this “doc-
trine.” Article 1 of the Soviet-Czechoslovak
Treaty on Stationing of Soviet Troops, in
force 18 October 1968, justified Soviet
troops in Czechoslovakia “for the purposes
of ensuring the security of the countries of
the socialist commonwealth against the in-
creasing revanchist aspirations of the West
German militarist forces.” Article 2 declared
that their “temporary presence” did not vio-
late the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia.
8. “Open” societies such as the United States draw
in greater participation from the citizenry in
decisions with respect to their armed forces.
See, e.g., S. Res. 2956, 92d Cong. 2d. sess.
(1972), passed over President Nixon’s veto.
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The Minimum World Order System
The inception of conflict management on an international scale can be traced to the
evolution of the modern state system. The benchmarks of this historical process,
marked by the breakup of medieval Christendom in Europe, were the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648 and the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. It was the nineteenth century,
however, that saw the emergence of factors that permitted the organizational means to
regulate international conflict. These factors included the development of improved
management structures within the developing national states and of improved means
of communication, both of which led to an awareness of the need for a method to reg-
ulate interstate relations.
The Pre-Charter System
In 1815, in the wake of the ruinous Napoleonic Wars in Europe, the Congress of Vienna
provided the first international forum for the major nations, as an alternative to the
traditional bilateral diplomacy of the past. Although the congress proved largely inef-
fective, it established a precedent for future multinational conferences. The tragically
destructive Crimean War and the equally devastating U.S. Civil War were major factors
in gaining support for the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences addressing means and
methods of warfare. These conferences gave equal status to all participant nations, forty-
four of them in the case of the 1907 conference. The great value of these conferences was
the template they established for future multilateral conferences to formulate and codify
international law principles and to institute procedures for the settlement of disputes.
The Hague approach to international dispute resolution was premised upon rationality
and the belief in the merit of a systems approach. The priority placed upon the peace-
ful settlement of disputes was a signal that conference participants viewed war as a re-
sult of misunderstandings that could be eliminated by clarification of issues and the
evocation of reason. Unfortunately, the Hague ideal of self-restraint and rational con-
sideration of opposing concerns has never been realized. The Hague approach viewed
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nations committed themselves, war could be prevented. This presumption was re-
flected in some 120 general arbitration treaties negotiated from 1900 to 1914 between
pairs of states.1
The Hague construct reached its zenith in a 1913 plan proposed by Secretary of State
William Jennings Bryan, calling for an investigatory function and a permanent interna-
tional commission. This proposal, which envisioned bilateral agreements between the
United States and any country willing to accede to the Bryan plan, called for submis-
sion of all disputes to investigation before any resort to force.2 Unfortunately, this intel-
lectual approach tied to mechanisms and procedures had little impact on the national
passions swirling on the eve of World War I, nor could it preclude the horrendous vio-
lence unleashed in 1914 at Sarajevo.3
The Period of the League of Nations
The League of Nations, established after World War I, was a further attempt by world
leaders to define the lawfulness of resort to war in procedural terms. Believing, albeit
incorrectly, that World War I had been a war by accident, they sought to establish a re-
gime in which the lawfulness of war did not depend solely on the rightness of one’s
cause but rather on whether procedural standards had been complied with. Thus, un-
der Articles 12, 13, and 15 of the Covenant of the League, resort to war was prohibited
only if the dispute leading thereto had not been submitted to arbitration, judicial set-
tlement, or the League.4 This created an obvious “gap” in the Covenant’s jurisdiction.
The League failed, however, not as a result of any technical language concern with the
Covenant or the failure of the United States to join (despite President Woodrow Wilson’s
pivotal role in its creation) but as a result of the utter failure by nations to take seriously
the Covenant’s clear mandate against aggression—an indifference evident in the ac-
tions of Japan, Italy, and Germany within their spheres of influence.5
During this same interwar period, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg was instrumental in
negotiating with representatives of Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, India,
Japan, Poland, and the Czechoslovak Republic the 1928 Treaty of Paris (or Kellogg-
Briand Treaty), which renounced war as an instrument of national policy, an attempt
to fill the gap in the Covenant of the League.6 This international commitment was not
deemed violated by certain of its signers who later used military force against their
neighbors, as described above. These uses of force were justified in each case as legiti-
mate exercises of the national right of self-defense.7 Despite this not-insignificant im-
perfection in practice, the Covenant of the League of Nations, with its commitment to
procedural safeguards, and the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, which forbade war except in self-
defense, provided the seminal concepts for the postwar conference that developed the
Charter of the United Nations.
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The Era of the United Nations Charter
When the Allies met in San Francisco following World War II, they structured their
work around an effective procedural framework and the prohibition of war, except for
self-defense, but also the principle of collective security, from Article 16 of the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations.8 The UN Charter made three important contributions
to the institutional development of law that had begun during the League period. First,
by prohibiting the “the threat or use of force,” it effectively expanded the scope of the
Kellogg-Briand formulation. Second, it provided for a strong Security Council, which
meant that in the future collective security could meaningfully be substituted for uni-
lateral action.9 Finally, it established an International Court of Justice to which disputes
between states could be referred.10 Notwithstanding the inadequacies in Charter opera-
tion reflected in the case studies in subsequent chapters, the advance in conflict man-
agement represented in the first point above merits discussion.
The basic provision restricting the threat or use of force in international relations is
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter, which states: “All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the United Nations.”11 The underlying purpose, to regulate aggressive behavior
between states, is identical to that of Article 12 in the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions, which declared that League members were obligated not to “resort to war.”12 This
terminology, however, left out hostilities that, although violent and destructive, could
not be considered warfare. The drafters of the UN Charter wished to ensure that the le-
gal aspects of a conflict’s status did not preclude cognizance by the international body.
Thus, in drafting Article 2, paragraph 4, they replaced the term “war” with the phrase
“the threat or use of force.” The wording was interpreted as prohibiting a broad range
of hostile activities including not only “war” and equally destructive conflicts but also
applications of force of a lesser intensity or magnitude.13
The United Nations General Assembly has clarified the scope of Article 2 in two im-
portant resolutions, both adopted unanimously.14 Resolution 2625, the Declaration on
Friendly Relations, describes behavior that constitutes the unlawful “threat or use of
force” and enumerates standards of conduct by which states must abide.15 Contraven-
tion of any of these standards of conduct is declared to be in violation of Article 2,
paragraph 4.16
Resolution 3314, the Definition of Aggression, is a detailed statement on the meaning
of “aggression,” defining it as “the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political integrity or political independence of another state, or
in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”17 This resolution
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contains a list of acts that, regardless of a declaration of war, qualify as acts of aggres-
sion.18 The resolution provides that a state that commits an act of aggression violates
international law as embodied in the UN Charter.19
The actions of states supporting terrorist activities, as previously observed in Afghani-
stan, plainly fall, in light of these resolutions, within the scope of Article 2, paragraph
4. The illegality of aid to terrorist groups has been clearly established by the UN Gen-
eral Assembly. Both resolutions specifically prohibit the “organizing,” “assisting,” or
“financing” of “armed bands” or “terrorists” for the purpose of aggression against an-
other state.20
The Development of the Law of Self-Defense under the UN Charter
When the UN Charter was drafted in 1945, the right of self-defense was the only excep-
tion included to the prohibition of the use of force. Customary international law had
previously accepted reprisal, retaliation, and retribution as legitimate responses as well.
Reprisal allows a state to commit an act that is otherwise illegal to counter the illegal
act of another state. Retaliation is the infliction upon the delinquent state of the same
injury that it has caused. Retribution is a criminal-law concept, implying vengeance,
that is sometimes used loosely in the international law context as a synonym for retali-
ation. While debate continues as to the current status of these responses, the U.S. posi-
tion has always been that actions protective of American interests are not punitive in
nature but offer the greatest hope of securing a lasting, peaceful resolution of interna-
tional conflict.21
The right of self-defense was codified in Article 51 of the Charter: “Nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”22 The word “inher-
ent” suggests that self-defense is broader than the immediate Charter parameters. Dur-
ing the drafting of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, for example, the United States expressed
its views as follows:
There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the
right of self-defense. That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every
nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or inva-
sion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense.23
Because self-defense is an inherent right, its contours have been shaped by custom and
are subject to customary interpretation. Although the drafters of Article 51 may not
have anticipated its use in protecting states from the effects of terrorist violence, such
as the United States experienced in September 2001, international law has always rec-
ognized the need for flexible application. George Shultz, when secretary of state, em-
phasized this point: “The UN Charter is not a suicide pact. The law is a weapon on our
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side and it is up to us to use it to its maximum extent. . . . There should be no confu-
sion about the status of nations that sponsor terrorism against Americans and Ameri-
can property.”24
The final clause of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter supports this interpretation,
forbidding the threat or use of force “in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations.”25 The late Professor Myres McDougal of Yale University placed the
relationship between Article 2, paragraph 4, and Article 51 in clearer perspective:
Article 2(4) refers to both the threat and the use of force and commits the Members to refrain from
the “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”; the customary right of defense, as
limited by the requirements of necessity and proportionality, can scarcely be regarded as inconsistent
with the purpose of the United Nations, and a decent respect for balance and effectiveness would sug-
gest that a conception of impermissible coercion, which includes threats of force, should be countered
with an equally comprehensive and adequate conception of permissible or defensive coercion.26
Significant in Professor McDougal’s interpretation is the recognition of the right to
counter the imminent threat of unlawful coercion as well as actual attack. This com-
prehensive conception of permissible or defensive coercion, honoring appropriate re-
sponse to threats of an imminent nature, is merely reflective of the customary
international law. It is precisely this anticipatory element of lawful self-defense that is
critical to an effective policy countering terrorist violence under the UN Charter.
Customary international law has long recognized that no requirement exists for states
to “absorb the first hit.”27 The doctrine of anticipatory or preemptive self-defense, as
developed historically, is applicable only where there is a clear and imminent danger of
attack. The means used for preemptive response must be strictly limited to that required
for the elimination of the danger and must be reasonably proportional to that objective.
Four historical incidents, cited with approval by international lawyers, are critical to an
understanding of existing authorities available to U.S. leaders in the twenty-first century,
when terrorist violence has already proven more deadly than a major conflict. In 1818,
the United States established the right to enter the territory of another state to prevent
terrorist attacks if the host is unable or unwilling to quell a continuing threat. The
Seminole Indians, in Spanish Florida, had demanded “arms, ammunition and provi-
sions or the possession of the garrison at Fort Marks.”28 President James Monroe directed
General Andrew Jackson to proceed against the Seminoles, declaring that the Spanish
were bound by treaty to keep their Indians at peace but were incompetent to do so.29
During the Canadian insurrections of 1837–38, the standard for justifiable anticipatory
self-defense was more clearly established.30 Anti-British sympathizers gathered near
Buffalo, New York. A large number of Americans and Canadians were similarly en-
camped on the Canadian side of the border, with the apparent intention of aiding these
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rebels. The Caroline, an American vessel that the rebels used for supplies and commu-
nications, was boarded in an American port at midnight by an armed group acting un-
der orders of a British officer; the boarders set the vessel on fire and cast it loose to drift
over Niagara Falls. The United States protested the incident, which had claimed the lives
of at least two American citizens. The British government replied that the threat posed
by the Caroline had been established, that American laws were not being enforced
along the border, and that the destruction had been an act of necessary self-defense.
In the controversy that followed, the United States did not deny that circumstances
were conceivable that would justify this action, and Great Britain admitted the neces-
sity of demonstrating the extreme urgency. The two countries differed only on the
question of whether the facts brought the case within the exceptional principle. Charles
Cheney Hyde summed up that “the British force did that which the United States itself
would have done, had it possessed the means and disposition to perform its duties.”31
Secretary of State Daniel Webster, in formulating an oft-cited principle of self-defense,
declared that there must be a demonstrated “necessity of self-defense, instant, over-
whelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation.”32 It is clear,
however, that the Webster formulation was not applied by the British in the decision to
destroy the Caroline, at least not with respect to time for deliberation. This formulation
may have been overly restrictive, even when stated in 1841.
In the present era, when terrorists and their sponsors possess weapons that can be em-
ployed rapidly, any requirement that a nation not respond until faced with a situation
providing no moment of deliberation is unrealistic.33 The U.S. Department of State has
criticized Secretary Webster’s formulation: “This definition is obviously drawn from
consideration of the right of self-defense in domestic law: the cases are rare indeed in
which it would fit an international situation.”34
Another example of preventative defensive measures, this time drawn from World War
II, has greater application to the element of necessity as it relates to states sponsoring
terrorist violence. Following the capitulation of France to Germany in June 1940 and
the establishment of the Vichy regime, many French naval vessels took refuge abroad, a
number of them at Oran on the North African coast. British demands for disposition
of the vessels were accepted by French commanders at Alexandria and Martinique
(thus establishing the reasonableness of the demands), but they were rejected at Oran.
Fearing the French vessels there would fall into Berlin’s hands, Britain destroyed them.
Professor Mallison, noting that acquisition of the French fleet could have provided the
Germans means to invade Great Britain by sea, stated: “Nothing in international law
required the British to defer action in self-defense until after the French warships were
incorporated into the German Navy.”35
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A fourth, and more recent, example occurred on 15 April 1986, when the United States
launched defensive strikes on military targets in Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya. The use
of force was preceded by conclusive evidence of Libyan responsibility for prior acts of
terrorism against the United States, with clear evidence that more were planned. The fi-
nal provocation occurred in West Berlin, on 5 April, when two American citizens were
killed and seventy-eight other people were injured by an explosive device detonated in
a discotheque.36
Eleven days earlier, on 25 March, a cable from Tripoli had directed the Libyan People’s
Bureau in East Berlin to target U.S. personnel and interests. On 4 April, a return mes-
sage was intercepted that informed Colonel Muammar Kaddafi’s headquarters that a
terrorist attack would take place the next day. On 5 April, the same People’s Bureau re-
ported to Colonel Kaddafi that the attack had been a success and “could not be traced
to the Libyan people.”37 On the next day, Tripoli exhorted other People’s Bureaus to fol-
low East Berlin’s example.38 In a news conference on 15 April, White House press secre-
tary Larry Speakes advised reporters that personnel from the East Berlin People’s
Bureau had been seen and identified in West Berlin, apparently on surveillance mis-
sions before the terrorist attack.39
In the week before the United States responded to the attack, American defense offi-
cials reported that Libya had been planning terrorist attacks against U.S. diplomatic
missions in ten African countries, the Middle East, and Latin America. In one African
country, for example, three Libyan agents were planning to bomb the U.S. embassy and
kidnap the ambassador.40 On 15 April 1986, Secretary of State Shultz stated that the
United States had information that Libya was targeting thirty American embassies for
possible attack.41
Nor were these isolated events. The Libyans had been known to have had a direct role
in kidnappings of Westerners in Lebanon between 1982 and 1985. Immediately after
the U.S. raid, three of those hostages (two British and one American) were murdered
by their captors. Sir Geoffrey Howe, British foreign secretary, stated on behalf of his
government, “We have good reason to believe the hostages were in Libyan hands.”42
Italy also appeared to have had enough of Kaddafi’s violence. After Libyan patrol craft
fired two Scud missiles at the Italian island of Lampedusa immediately following the
U.S. raid, Prime Minister Bettino Craxi stated that Italy would respond militarily if
Libya again attacked Italian territory.43
Other terrorist incidents prior to the raid could also be traced indirectly to Colonel
Kaddafi. The 1985 attacks on the ticket counters of Trans World Airlines and El Al Air-
lines at the Rome and Vienna airports had been masterminded by Abu Nidal, a Pales-
tinian terrorist supported both by Kaddafi and the Syrians. In fact, Abu Nidal had
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maintained a residence in Tripoli at the time, later moving to Baghdad, where he was
harbored by Saddam Hussein until Abu Nidal’s death in Iraq in 2002. President Reagan
summed up the U.S. view of Kaddafi’s complicity in international terrorism when he
spoke to the nation immediately following the 15 April 1986 defensive response by U.S.
warplanes: “Colonel Kaddafi is not only an enemy of the United States. His record of
subversion and aggression against the neighboring states in Africa is well documented
and well known. He has ordered the murder of fellow Libyans in countless countries.
He has sanctioned acts of terror in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East as well as the
Western Hemisphere.”44
As in the prior examples, the United States directed its response to continuing Libyan
violence at military targets only. The objective was to strike at the military “nerve cen-
ter” of Kaddafi’s terrorist operations and limit his ability to use his military power to
shield terrorist activities, thus “raising the costs” of terrorism in the Libyan leader’s
eyes and “deterring” him from future terrorist acts.45 Press Secretary Speakes asserted
that the American raids on Libya “were justified on grounds of ‘self-defense’ to pre-
empt further Libyan attacks.”46
The 1986 response involved F-111 bombers from an American air base in Great Britain
and A-6 fighter-bombers from two aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean Sea; the air-
craft struck five Libyan bases. The United States responded only after determining that
the Libyan leader was clearly responsible for the 5 April bombing, that he would con-
tinue such attacks, and, having assessed that the economic and political sanctions im-
posed after the Rome and Vienna airport bombings had been unsuccessful, that our
Western European allies were unwilling to take stronger joint steps against Kaddafi.
A clear linkage existed between the threat perceived and the response directed against
Libyan military targets. Despite the fact that Kaddafi had purposefully targeted civil-
ians, every effort was made to minimize collateral damage to the civilian communities
contiguous to the two target areas. Civilian sectors were inadvertently hit, but evi-
dence supports the conclusion that this resulted from an errant release of a bomb
from an F-111 aircraft that had been hit by Libyan antiaircraft fire.47
The role of the allies was clearly considered as well. Prior to authorizing the response,
President Reagan sent Ambassador Vernon Walters to consult with each of our NATO
partners to ensure that each understood our position and justification. Only Great
Britain’s prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, offered public support and overflight
rights for U.S. F-111 bombers. President François Mitterand of France “favored stron-
ger military action” than that actually proposed and executed against Libya but report-
edly told Ambassador Walters, “We can’t come out publicly for you.”48 It was reported
that the French president, the most vocal critic of U.S. counterterrorist policy in his
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public statements, had privately suggested an “all-out effort to change Libyan policy”
and “real major action against Libya.”49
In a 21 August meeting in Luxemburg, the actions of the foreign ministers of twelve
European states reflected the profound effect the defensive raid had had in inspiring al-
lied efforts to resist terrorism. The foreign ministers approved a package of diplomatic
sanctions aimed at limiting Libya’s ability to sponsor terrorist attacks, sanctions that
had been rejected only a week earlier.50 These sanctions had been endorsed and refined
at a Tokyo economic summit in May 1986, when President Reagan met with the leaders
of Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and West Germany, as well as other representa-
tives of the European Community. It is worthy of note that the U.S. essentially had to
act alone against Libya, even after Kaddafi’s implication in the 1985 Vienna and Rome
airport bombings. In April 1986, however, the U.S. use of force suddenly spurred more
active support among the allies.
This support, though offered only after the fact, suggests that the allies viewed the 15
April 1986 U.S. actions as proportionate to the perceived threat. Proportionality in the
Libyan case could be assessed from a dual perspective. First, this element of self-defense
required that the U.S. claims, in the nature of counterterrorist goals, be reasonably re-
lated to the existing terrorist threat to national interests. Second, proportionality man-
dated that the United States and other offended states use only such means as were
required to terminate the offending conduct. In the first sense of proportionality, the
U.S. actions in 1986 sought only to neutralize the broad effort to overthrow through
terrorist violence the power balance in the Mediterranean region; it did not seek to cre-
ate a new alignment of that balance in North Africa. In the second sense, the defensive
strikes, directed at targets in Tripoli and Benghazi, were restricted to military installa-
tions behind which Kaddafi’s terrorist infrastructure was concealed.
The 1986 defensive response of the United States to Libyan state-sponsored terrorism
met customary and conventional legal requirements to counter aggression and thus
was valid under international law. The four basic elements of the law of armed conflict
were clearly evident in the U.S. response. The force used was capable of being, and was
in fact, regulated by the United States. Necessity for its use had been established by ex-
haustion of lesser means. Libya’s complicity in supporting international terrorism had
been clearly established. The force used was not otherwise prohibited. The raid of 15
April 1986 was proportional to the threat and no greater in effect than was required.
Response to terrorism, like response to other forms of armed conflict, has as its princi-
pal purpose termination of hostilities under favorable conditions. Having forcefully
demonstrated that the United States would respond to weaken Libya’s military support
for terrorist violence, President Reagan’s follow-on moves were clearly appropriate. The
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president, through his support for coordinated diplomatic and economic sanctions at
the 21 April 1986 European Community ministerial session and his plea for concerted
action at the economic summit in Tokyo, emphasized that nonmilitary coercive mea-
sures against a pariah state are effective only if all major free nations participate. If the
15 April blow against Libya was to do more than reestablish the credibility of U.S.
forces, an integration of strategies involving nations trading with Libya was imperative.
The four examples cited do not suggest the lack of international law restraints upon the
determination of necessity for preemptive action. Rather, they suggest that self-defense
claims must be appraised in the total context in which they occur. One aspect of this
contextual appraisal of necessity, especially as it relates to response after the fact to ter-
rorist violence, concerns the issue of whether force can be considered necessary if
peaceful measures are available to lessen the threat. To require a state to tolerate terror-
ist violence without resistance on the grounds that peaceful means have not been ex-
hausted is absurd. Once a terrorist attack has occurred, the failure to consider a
military response would play into the hands of aggressors who deny the relevance of
law to their actions. The legal criteria for the proportionate use of force is established
once a state-supported terrorist act has taken place. No state is obliged to ignore an at-
tack as irrelevant, and the imminent threat to the lives of nationals requires consider-
ation of a response.
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against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a
State by the armed forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a
State on the land, sea, or air forces, or ma-
rine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State
which are within the territory of another
State with the agreement of the receiving
State, in contravention of the conditions
provided for in the agreement or any ex-
tension of their presence in such territory
beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its
territory, which it has placed at the dis-
posal of another State, to be used by that
other State, for perpetrating an act of ag-
gression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State
of armed bands, groups, irregulars or Mer-
cenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another State of such gravity
as to amount to the acts listed above, or its
substantial involvement therein.
19. A fundamental purpose of the UN Charter is
to “maintain international peace and secu-
rity” (Art. 1, para. 1). Article 1, paragraph 2
of the Definition of Aggression provides: “A
war of aggression is a crime against interna-
tional peace. Aggression gives rise to interna-
tional responsibility.” Definition of
Aggression, p. 144.
20. See notes 22, 26.
21. See statement of Acting Secretary of State
Dean Rusk in Arthur W. Rovine, “Contem-
porary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law,” American Journal of
International Law 68 (1974), p. 736.
22. UN Charter, Art. 51.
23. Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International
Law (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1965), sec. 25, pp. 971–72.
24. George Shultz, Low Intensity Warfare: The
Challenge of Ambiguity, Current Policy 783
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Dept., January
1986), p. 1.
25. See UN Charter, Art. 2, para. 4.
26. Myres McDougal, “The Soviet-Cuban Quar-
antine and Self-Defense,” American Journal
of International Law 57 (1963), p. 600.
27. See George Bunn, “International Law and the
Use of Force in Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships
Have to Take the First Hit?” Naval War College
Review 39, no. 3 (May–June 1986), p. 69.
28. J. Moore, A Digest of International Law
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1906), p. 404.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., pp. 409–14. The Caroline incident, of-
ten called the Caroline “case,” was not re-
solved through the judicial process but
rather through diplomatic correspondence.
31. C. Hyde, International Law, Chiefly as Inter-
preted and Applied by the United States, 2d
ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945), p. 240.
32. Moore, A Digest of International Law, p. 412.
33. For a more complete discussion of this issue,
see W. Thomas Mallison, “Limited Naval
Blockade or Quarantine Interdiction: Na-
tional and Collective Self-Defense Claims
Valid under International Law,” George
Washington Law Review 31 (1962), p. 335.
34. Participation in the North Atlantic Treaty of
States Not Members of the United Nations,
Hearings before the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations on the North Atlantic Treaty,
81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, pp. 101–102.
35. Mallison, “Limited Naval Blockade,” p. 349.
36. See discussion in James Terry, “Countering
State-Sponsored Terrorism,” Naval Law Re-
view (Winter 1986), p. 180.
37. See B. Kempster, “Cables Cited as Proof of
Libyan Terror Role,” Los Angeles Times, 15
April 1986, p. 5.
38. “Targeting a Mad Dog,” Newsweek, 21 April
1986, p. 25.
39. “Attack on Libya: The First Word,” New York
Times, 15 April 1986, p. 1; “Libyans Accused
of Worldwide Plots,” New York Times, 15
April 1986, p. A11.
40. Kempster, “Cables Cited as Proof of Libyan
Terror Role,” p. 5.
41. Ibid.
42. Brian Lelyveld, “Britain Cites ‘Evidence’ of Lib-
yan Role,” New York Times, 19 April 1986, p. 4.
43. Fortunately, these missiles missed their tar-
get. Kempster, “Cables Cited as Proof of
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Libyan Terror Role”; E. Dionne, “Italian
Promises to Answer Terror,” New York Times,
20 April 1986, p. 12.
44. “Transcript of Address by Reagan on Libya,”
New York Times, 15 April 1986, p. A10.
45. “Libyans Accused of Worldwide Plots,” p. A11.
46. Ibid.
47. See Terry, “Countering State-Sponsored Ter-
rorism,” p. 182.
48. See W. Weinraub, “U.S. Says Allies Asked for
More in Libya Attack,” New York Times, 22
April 1986, p. A1.
49. Ibid.
50. See R. Bernstein, “European Community
Agrees on Libya Curbs,” New York Times, 22
April 1986, p. A8.
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PART TWO
Lesser Conflict
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Humanitarian Intervention
Respect for national sovereignty and the commitment to nonintervention have long
been at the heart of the international legal order. The norm of state sovereignty, how-
ever, has never been absolute. It has always been subject to certain constraints, whether
embodied in other norms of international relations or formalized in international law.
A challenge to the traditional concept of sovereignty arises when a sovereign state fails
to perform such basic functions as providing political stability, distributing resources
equitably, or ensuring social welfare. When such failure is reflected in the direct viola-
tion of the civil liberties and human rights of a major segment of a state’s own popula-
tion, compromising its health and well-being and generating a humanitarian crisis, it is
generally the responsibility of the state’s body politic to hold the state accountable.
The Framework
Where the ethnic majority has joined with the government in promoting humanitarian
crisis within a community represented by the ethnic minority, as in Kosovo in 1998,
however, the international community has, arguably, if the 1947 Genocide Convention
has any meaning, a corresponding responsibility to help the victims and prevent their
genocide.1 Professor Louis Henkin has clarified most succinctly the responsibility of
states to address international human rights abuses: “The international system, having
identified contemporary human values, has adopted and declared them to be funda-
mental law. But in a radical derogation from the axiom of ‘sovereignty,’ that law is not
based on consent; at least it does not honor or accept dissent, and it binds particular
states regardless of their objection.”2
The debate on the concept of sovereignty has its most practical implication for the
principle of nonintervention. Nonintervention, the duty to refrain from uninvited in-
volvement in a state’s internal affairs, has been a standard corollary of the traditional
norm of sovereignty. As stated in the United Nations Charter, “All members shall re-
frain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territo-
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the basic purposes for its independence—that is, providing safety and fundamental hu-
man rights to all its population—the principles that guarantee that state’s immunity
from intervention are undermined.4
This chapter first examines the legal framework related to humanitarian intervention
as it has developed under customary and Charter precedents. It then reviews the poten-
tial or actual legal impact of the NATO intervention in Kosovo on that body of law,
suggesting that the principles of the UN Charter were fulfilled in this NATO action and
that they would have been frustrated had Soviet and Chinese opposition been allowed,
for political purposes, to preclude actions necessary to restore peace and security in
Kosovo. Finally, it suggests that criticism of the NATO actions in Kosovo may be mis-
guided in that they fail to understand that the Charter regime was designed to be effec-
tive and that interpretations of its provisions tending to make it so are supportive
rather than destructive of its moral authority.
Legal Concepts for Humanitarian Intervention
Traditionally, humanitarian intervention has referred to a forcible intervention de-
signed to stem a large-scale human rights crisis.5 The late Professor Richard Lillich of
the University of Virginia observed that humanitarian intervention is normally exer-
cised by a group of states and not by a single state, as has traditionally been the case in
the protection of nationals. He further stated that pre-Charter humanitarian interven-
tion was to be justified on the ground that although it obviously was an interference
with the sovereignty of the state concerned, it was a permissible one. “Sovereignty was
not absolute and when a state did reach this threshold of shocking the conscience of
mankind, intervention was legal.”6
Component elements of humanitarian intervention include the fact that it is executed
without the consent of the target government.7 In fact, this form of intervention is usu-
ally directed against the incumbent regime, although nonstate actors might be the tar-
get where the state is weak or unstable.8 It is important that only humanitarian abuses
be targeted; addressing other political objectives and interests takes an intervention out
of the humanitarian category.9 Therefore, if intervention is approved, the objective for
the use of force must be to address a human rights crisis and, more specifically, the
abuses that made intervention necessary.10 Finally, the rule of proportionality applies to
humanitarian intervention, as it would in every use of force.11 Thus, the level of force
exerted must be consistent with the magnitude of the specific crisis and must rise only
to that required to curtail the abuse.12 Professor Ved Nanda explains that demanding
adherence to the proportionality of force in such operations eliminates the “pretext
problem” that arises when overwhelming force is used to address a situation that quite
obviously does not warrant it.13
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Many legal experts, however, have opined that the entry into force of the United Na-
tions Charter in 1945 supplanted the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention, which
had been approved by customary international law.14 The reason that humanitarian in-
tervention would no longer apply, they claim, is that the Charter provides, in Chapter
VII, the exclusive authority for the use of force in such circumstances.15
The contrary view, supported by Professors John Norton Moore and Lillich of the Uni-
versity of Virginia, Professors Michael Reisman and McDougal of Yale University, Pro-
fessor Nanda of the University of Denver, and Professor Christopher Greenwood of Great
Britain, to name a few, argue that humanitarian intervention is permissible in response
to threats of genocide or other widespread arbitrary deprivation of human life in viola-
tion of international law, but only if diplomatic and other peaceful techniques are un-
available and the United Nations Security Council is unable to take effective action.16
Legal scholars advocating the post-Charter vitality of the doctrine of humanitarian in-
tervention have urged that a significant credibility gap exists between a strict
noninterventionist policy and fulfillment of the principles of the UN Charter. Con-
sidered as a whole, they claim, the Charter’s two main purposes are the maintenance of
peace and security, and the protection of human rights.17 Article 2(4), the Charter pro-
vision relevant to both these purposes, prohibits “the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner in-
consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
Since humanitarian intervention by a collective of states or a regional organization, far
from being inconsistent with Charter purposes, actually might further one of the world
organization’s major objectives if authorized, they urge that such interventions would
not run afoul of Article 2(4) if they do not affect the “territorial integrity” or “political
independence” of the state against which they are directed. In situations where the UN
Security Council is unable to act because of a potential veto, effectuation of this doc-
trine by a group of concerned states, as in Kosovo, thus becomes critical to upholding
Charter principles.
This argument becomes even more attractive legally when one studies the actual sub-
stance of the Charter. While the UN Charter is admittedly best known for the articles
that create a minimum world order system—as represented by Article 2(4) (prohibi-
tion on the use of force), Article 51 (exception for self-defense), and Chapter VII (Arti-
cles 39–51, addressing Security Council responsibilities)—there is certainly an equal
emphasis in the Charter on protection of human rights. The Preamble, in fact, focuses
on the rights of individuals vice the rights of nations, in stating that the purpose of the
Charter is
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to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime have brought unto
sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to es-
tablish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards
of life in larger freedom.
Article 1(3) reinforces this preambular language by stating that a principal purpose of
the organization is “to achieve international co-operation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promot-
ing and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all with-
out distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” Articles 55–60 of the Charter
directly address international economic and social cooperation. Article 55, for example,
emphasizes the need to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion.” The fifty-four-member Economic and Social Council, established in Arti-
cle 61 and addressed in Articles 61–72, provides the means by which the humanitarian
objectives set forth in Articles 55–60 are to be addressed and then reported to the Gen-
eral Assembly or Security Council for action.
The Security Council, which alone under the Charter framework enjoys authority to autho-
rize measures involving the use of force, can be frustrated therein when the support for
such a decision of all permanent members, required in Article 27(3), is not forthcoming.
This describes the situation in March 1999 when the Chinese and Russian delegates, despite
the support of twelve of the fifteen council members, refused to support a draft Security
Council resolution authorizing NATO-led forces to intervene in the Kosovo crisis.
It was precisely this concern that led legal experts to debate, long prior to the Kosovo
crisis, criteria that would both satisfy the need to address satisfactorily future instances
of widespread human rights abuses but at the same time preserve UN Charter princi-
ples. In 1974, Professor Lillich, anguished over the inability of the Security Council to
function in Chapter VII “all necessary means” matters, requiring the unanimous ap-
proval of the permanent members, argued that “the most important task confronting
international lawyers is to clarify the various criteria by which the legitimacy of a
State’s use of forcible self-help in human rights situations can be judged.”18 Lillich sug-
gested that consideration of the following five criteria by a state, collective of states, or
regional organization prior to taking humanitarian action in a foreign state would en-
sure that Charter principles of the United Nations were upheld even if Security Coun-
cil approval was lacking: the immediacy of the violation of human rights, the extent of
the violation of human rights, the existence of an invitation by appropriate authority,
the degree of coercive measures employed, and the relative disinterestedness of the
state or states invoking the coercive measures.19
3 0 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper Terry\Printer\NPTerry.vp
Friday, October 28, 2005 2:19:20 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Professor Nanda has offered similar criteria in arguing for the continued vitality of the
doctrine: a specific limited purpose, invasion by the recognized government, limited du-
ration of the mission, limited use of coercive measures, and lack of any other recourse.20
By far the most definitive and principled approach has been offered by Professor
Moore, a former legal advisor to the Department of State. He suggested in 1974 that in-
tervention for the protection of human rights is permissible if it meets the following
standards: an immediate threat of genocide or other widespread arbitrary deprivation
of human life in violation of international law; an exhaustion of diplomatic and other
peaceful techniques for protecting the threatened rights to the extent possible and con-
sistent with protection of the threatened rights; the unavailability of effective action by
an international agency or the United Nations; a proportional use of force that does
not threaten greater destruction of values than the human rights at stake and that does
not exceed the minimum force necessary to protect the threatened rights; minimal ef-
fect on authority structures necessary to protect the threatened rights; minimal inter-
ference with self-determination necessary to protect the threatened rights; a prompt
disengagement, consistent with the purpose of the action; and immediate full report-
ing to the Security Council and compliance with applicable regional directives of the
Council.21 Moore urged that intervention for the protection of fundamental human
rights should be permitted if carefully circumscribed:
Although it is recognized that legitimizing such intervention entails substantial risks, not permitting
necessary action for the prevention of genocide or other major abuse of human rights seems to pres-
ent a greater risk. Opponents of any such standard should at least endeavor to weigh the risks of per-
mitting such intervention as carefully delimited by the suggested standard against the risk of
insulating genocidal acts and other fundamental abuse of human rights from effective response.22
The critical most point with respect to the three proposed sets of criteria is that each
would permit a humanitarian response involving the use of force by a regional organi-
zation such as NATO in response to threats of genocide or other widespread arbitrary
deprivation of human life in violation of international law only if diplomatic and other
peaceful means are not available and the United Nations is unable to take effective ac-
tion. Another critical point is that under each of the three proposals, the territorial in-
tegrity and political independence of the target state is only temporarily affected, and
then to protect other equally significant Charter values.
These criteria, designed to ensure that territorial integrity and political independence
are preserved when humanitarian intervention to save lives is authorized, must never-
theless be balanced with the right of states regarding domestic jurisdiction, as set forth
in Article 2(7) of the Charter. Article 2(7) provides, “Nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State . . ., but this principle shall not prejudice
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the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” This provision to protect
the domestic jurisdiction of states does not mesh comfortably with the requirements in
Articles 55 and 56 to cooperate with the UN in promoting respect for human rights
(nor does it with the explicit duties of states set forth in human rights treaties).
The fall of the Soviet Union, however, marked a watershed in how many states viewed
the proper exercise of domestic jurisdiction. For example, Poland insisted in 1983,
when its own declaration of martial law was under severe international criticism, that
UN organs could not even consider human rights questions in a particular state unless
there existed a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms that was gross,
massive, and flagrant, that established a consistent pattern, and that endangered inter-
national peace and security.23 By 1991, however, Poland had endorsed the following
conclusion of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE):
The participating states emphasize that issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democ-
racy and the rule of law are of international concern, as respect for these rights and freedoms constitutes
one of the foundations of the international order. They categorically and irrevocably declare that the
commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and le-
gitimate concern to all participating states and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the
State concerned.24
Today, the issue of domestic jurisdiction is rarely raised in UN fora or other interna-
tional discourse in other than a perfunctory manner.25
Humanitarian Intervention in Context
The most significant post-Charter example of humanitarian intervention absent Secu-
rity Council approval, other than Kosovo, occurred in the Congo in 1964. The
Stanleyville intervention was unlike the 1965 interventions in the Dominican Republic
by U.S. Marines or the December 1989 intervention in Panama, ordered to protect
American lives. The intervention in the Congo was directed by the leaders of three
states to protect not only their own nationals but also the nationals of third states and
of the country in which the intervention occurred. As Professor Lillich explains, “the
Congo airdrop was a classic occasion of humanitarian intervention, and the Domini-
can Republic, at least initially, was a classic case of forcible self-help.”26
The Congo crisis presented legal issues nearly parallel to those faced by NATO in 1999.
In 1964 several thousand Congolese and foreigners had been captured by the faction
led by Antoine Gizenga in Stanleyville. The captured civilians were being held as hos-
tages, and Gizenga was threatening to kill them if his demands were not met. There is
no doubt that this constituted a violation not only of the UN Charter but also of the
Geneva Conventions; no one disputed that, but the Security Council was unable to
agree upon a course of action. Instead, the Council ceded authority to the Organization
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of African Unity to deal with the situation. It failed miserably. The United States, seeing
no alternative, much as it would in the later Kosovo crisis, cooperated with other concerned
states (Britain and Belgium) in mounting an airdrop of paratroopers without UN Security
Council authority. These forces landed at Stanleyville and rescued the hostages.27
Interestingly, while there was much political criticism, led by the Russian ambassador
to the UN, of the allied intervention, there has been little scholarly legal criticism alleg-
ing violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter in the Stanleyville operation. Not one legal
commentator has found that the use of limited force represented in the collective effort
of Britain, Belgium, and the United States impaired the long-term territorial integrity
or political independence of the Congolese state. In fact, it can be argued that the sta-
bility of the government was enhanced once the hostage crisis was resolved.28
A similar judgment can be reached in the case of Kosovo. When fighting broke out in
early 1998 between Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) authorities and Kosovo Alba-
nian paramilitary units, commonly known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), it
became clear the Serb offensive was designed to eliminate Kosovar resistance. The
United Nations responded to the extreme violence with Security Council Resolutions
1160, 1199, and 1203.29 When fighting continued, NATO leadership threatened air
strikes; this in turn led to negotiations between U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke and the
FRY leadership, which produced a 12 October 1998 accord between Holbrooke and
President Milosevic. Agreements were signed on 15 October 1998 between NATO and
the FRY, and on 16 October 1998 between the Organization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (OSCE) and the FRY.30 When the follow-on peace negotiations in March
1999 at Rambouillet, France, failed to produce a peace settlement the FRY was willing
to sign and the Serbs once again escalated the violence against ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo, NATO forces entered Yugoslavia as part of a humanitarian intervention to
force Serb forces from Kosovo and to bring an end to the violence against the ethnic
Albanians of this province.31
The NATO determination to intervene in Kosovo under other than UN Security Coun-
cil authority came after the Russian and Chinese permanent representatives to the Se-
curity Council advised in early March 1999 that their governments would not support
a draft resolution that would authorize the use of force to stop the Serb attacks in
Kosovo. Neither Russia nor China had impeded passage of Resolutions 1160, 1199, or
1203. These resolutions, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, called upon both Serb
and KLA forces to end the fighting, required Serb forces to withdraw, called upon Serb
forces to cooperate with investigators and prosecutors from the War Crimes Tribunal at
the Hague, and endorsed the 15 and 16 October 1998 monitoring agreements brokered
by Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia.32
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As noted above, the Serbs violated these obligations through renewed violence, refused
to sign the Rambouillet agreement in mid-March 1999 (calling for a cease-fire, Kosovo
autonomy, and a NATO peacekeeping force), and commenced an offensive designed to
drive all Albanian resistance from Kosovo. On 24 March 1999, NATO directed execu-
tion of Operation ALLIED FORCE against Serbian aggression and human rights viola-
tions. The operation continued until 9 June 1999.33
In the first eight days of the operation, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) reported that some 220,000 persons were forcibly expelled from Kosovo to
neighboring states, principally Albania, by Serbian forces. The OSCE Verification Mis-
sion in Kosovo was to estimate that over 90 percent of the Kosovo Albanian population—
some 1.45 million people—had been displaced by the conflict by the time it ended.34
Although the Security Council had never authorized the intensive bombing campaign,
it endorsed the political settlement that was reached and agreed to deploy an extensive
“international security presence” in parallel with an “international civil presence.” The
considerable responsibilities of each of these missions were spelled out in detail in UN
Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999.35
Legal Rationale for the Intervention in Kosovo
Immediately following the start of bombing on 24 March 1999, NATO representatives
of the five member states on the Security Council claimed that “NATO’s actions were
necessary to avoid a ‘humanitarian catastrophe.’”36 The German foreign minister, Klaus
Kinkel, had earlier argued that “under these unusual circumstances of the current crisis
situation in Kosovo, as it is described in Resolution 1199 of the UN Security Council,
the threat of and if need be the use of force by NATO is justified.”37
The British position on the use of force in Kosovo was stated by Foreign Minister An-
thony Lloyd in January 1999 before the House of Commons Select Committee on For-
eign Affairs. In response to a question concerning whether there was a legal right for
NATO to intervene in the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo to save lives, absent Security
Council authorization, Minister Lloyd stated, “Within those terms yes. International
law certainly gives the legal basis in the way that I have described. . . . We believe . . .
that the humanitarian crisis was such as to warrant that intervention.”38
Professor Christopher Greenwood, who represented Great Britain before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice defending NATO’s action in the Case Concerning the Legality of
the Use of Force in Kosovo, explained Britain’s legal position when he stated that
there is a right of humanitarian intervention when a government—or the factions in a civil war—cre-
ate a human tragedy of such magnitude that it creates a threat to international peace. In such a case, if
the Security Council does not take military action, then other states have a right to do so. It is from
this state practice that the right of humanitarian intervention on which NATO now relies has
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emerged. Those who contest that right are forced to conclude that even though international law out-
laws what the Yugoslav Government is doing[,] . . . if the Security Council cannot act, the rest of the
world has to stand aside. That is not what international law requires at the end of the century.39
Professor Antonio Cassesse, defending the Kosovo humanitarian intervention from an
ethical, not legal, perspective, has nevertheless stated that under certain strict condi-
tions “resort to armed force may gradually become [legally] justified even absent any
authorization by the Security Council.”40 The criteria Cassesse would require for legal
justification are the following:
(i) gross and egregious breaches of human rights involving loss of life of hundreds or thousands of in-
nocent people, and amounting to crimes against humanity, are carried out on the territory of a sover-
eign state, either by the central governmental authorities or with their connivance and support, or
because the total collapse of such authorities cannot impede those atrocities;
(ii) if the crimes against humanity result from anarchy in a sovereign state, proof is necessary that the
central authorities are utterly unable to put an end to those crimes, while at the same time refusing to
call upon or to allow other states or international organizations to enter the territory to assist in ter-
minating the crimes. If, on the contrary, such crimes are the work of the central authorities, it must be
shown that these authorities have consistently withheld their cooperation from the United Nations or
other international organizations, or have systematically refused to comply with appeals, recommen-
dations or decisions of such organizations;
(iii) the Security Council is unable to take any coercive action to stop the massacres because of disagree-
ment among the Permanent Members or because one or more of them exercises its veto power . . . ;
(iv) all peaceful avenues which may be explored consistent with the urgency of the situation to achieve a
solution based on negotiation, discussion and any other means short of force have been exhausted . . . ;
(v) a group of states (not a single hegemonic Power, however strong its military, political and economic
authority, nor such a Power with the support of a client state or an ally) decides to try to halt the atroci-
ties, with the support or at least the nonopposition of the majority of the Member states of the UN;
(vi) armed force is exclusively used for limited purpose of stopping the atrocities and restoring respect
for human rights, not for any goal going beyond this limited purpose. Consequently, the use of force
must be discontinued as soon as this purpose is attained. Moreover, it is axiomatic that use of force
should be commensurate with and proportionate to the human rights exigencies on the ground. The
more urgent the situation of killings and atrocities, the more intensive and immediate may be the mili-
tary response thereto. Conversely, military action would not be warranted in the case of a crisis which is
slowly unfolding and which still presents avenues for diplomatic resolution aside from armed force.41
It is significant that the facts of the Kosovo crisis precisely satisfy each of the factors re-
quired by Cassesse to provide legal justification for humanitarian intervention outside
Charter parameters. It is also striking how similar and parallel in content Cassesse’s six
criteria for humanitarian intervention are to the eight proposed by Professor Moore
twenty-five years earlier.
If the British justification for resort to force under the doctrine of humanitarian in-
tervention per Professor Greenwood was the clearest and most compelling, the U.S.
legal rationale was the least centered and most confusing. In fact, the official govern-
ment statements of legal justification for American participation never mentioned
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the doctrine of humanitarian intervention but ignored it completely. The United
States addressed instead a number of factors—some legal, some policy driven—that
justified its actions.
On 29 March 1999, after five days of NATO bombing, President Clinton offered the fol-
lowing rationale for U.S. participation: “Make no mistake, if we and our allies do not
have the will to act, there will be more massacres. In dealing with aggressors, . . . hesita-
tion is a license to kill. But action and resolve can stop armies and save lives.”42 Before the
UN General Assembly, President Clinton stated, “By acting as we did, we helped to vindi-
cate the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter, to give the U.N. the opportunity it
now has to play the central role in shaping Kosovo’s future. In the real world, principles
often collide, and tough choices must be made. The outcome in Kosovo is helpful.”43
As international legal scholar and writer Gary Sharp has accurately summarized, the
former president’s justifications “focused . . . on “moral imperative[s]” and the political
interests of America and NATO, and his War Powers Report did not refer to any inter-
national legal authority for the air strikes against Serbia-Montenegro. The White House
argued, however, that the NATO bombing campaign was backed internationally by Se-
curity Council Resolutions 1199 and 1203, in that they affirmed “that the deterioration
of the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to the peace and security of the region.”
Specifically, the United States contended that Resolution 1199 authorized the use of
force by United Nations members’ to compel compliance with its terms because it was
a Chapter VII resolution, though the resolution does not explicitly authorize the use of
force. The United States also contended that Resolution 1203 was to protect personnel
monitoring the cease-fire, though the monitors had been withdrawn before the NATO
air strikes began.44
The justifications of a number of the contributor states, including the United States, re-
flect an uneasy recognition that the Charter system is inadequate to address certain of
the humanitarian crises that may come before the UN, if unanimity among the five
permanent members of the Security Council continues to be a requirement. Only the
United Kingdom, Belgium, and Germany, among the NATO participants, have directly
addressed the matter and found that the authorization of the Security Council was not
necessary in Kosovo since the action was supportive of, rather than contrary to, the val-
ues represented in Article 2(4), thus obviating a need for that body to consider the matter.
The United States, unfortunately, fashioned a rather contrived and disingenuous ap-
proach to justification for intervention by claiming the Security Council had provided
the necessary authorization by implication in its earlier resolutions on Kosovo, despite
the lack of any specific reference thereto.
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Kosovo’s Implications for Future Charter Application
Kosovo thus requires we once again examine the law of humanitarian intervention as it
relates to Charter values, on the one hand, and required Charter procedures, on the
other. Kosovo is especially appropriate for consideration since it met all the require-
ments for humanitarian intervention under pre-Charter law. Specifically, the horren-
dous crimes against humanity, mass expulsions, and war crimes involved were widely
recognized and little disputed. The intervention had as designed only to redress the
threat to international peace and security and to end the abuses resulting from the
mass violations by Serb forces, not to disturb the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of the FRY. Equally important, the intervention was collective in nature, pur-
suant to the decision of NATO, a responsible body acting to carry out the will of the
world community—a community unable to act through a United Nations Security
Council resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter.
Professor Louis Henkin suggests that the likely result of the Kosovo intervention, un-
less the unanimity requirement can be separated from Security Council decisions on
humanitarian intervention, will be the establishment of a precedent whereby states, or
collectives, confident that the Security Council will acquiesce in their decision to inter-
vene, shift the burden of the veto. Instead of seeking authorization in advance by resolu-
tion subject to veto, states or collectives will act and challenge the Council to terminate
the action. A permanent member favoring the intervention could frustrate the adop-
tion of such a resolution.45
Henkin argues that Kosovo may in fact have already achieved this. He suggests that “for
Kosovo, Council ratification after the fact in Resolution 1244—formal ratification by
an affirmative vote of the Council—effectively ratified what earlier might have consti-
tuted unilateral action questionable as a matter of law.”46
This writer must agree. The actions of the North Atlantic Council and the subsequent
action of the Security Council in adopting UNSC Resolution 1244 clearly reflect a step
toward a change in the law. While it is unlikely there will be a formal change in the
Charter, the NATO actions in Kosovo support an interpretation of law such that hu-
manitarian intervention can be authorized by regional organizations absent Security
Council authorization when consistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and
when the careful strictures suggested by Professor Moore are applied to ensure that
neither the territorial integrity nor the political independence of the target state are
impacted in a way that would implicate Article 2(4) of the Charter.
In Kosovo, NATO’s use of military force to prevent the continuation of massive human
rights abuses was supportive of state practice that has established the lawfulness of hu-
manitarian intervention, as carefully circumscribed by Moore, Lillich, Nanda, Reismann,
T H E R E G U L A T I O N O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L C O E R C I O N 3 7
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper Terry\Printer\NPTerry.vp
Friday, October 28, 2005 2:19:21 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
McDougal and Greenwood. International law requires that the community of nations
first consider all means short of force to address threats to international peace and se-
curity. Where diplomacy fails and egregious human rights violations are observed, the
international community must not be allowed to excuse its failure to act by references
to pre-Charter principles of nonintervention and sovereign immunity or to the Char-
ter requirement for Security Council approval, when the lack of approval is contrary to
the values for which the Charter stands.
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Defense of U.S. Nationals
Intervention in Panama
Since the conclusion of World War II, one of the predominant forms of international
violence has been mixed civil-international conflict. Within that category, intervention
to protect nationals has been the most frequent activity for the United States. In the
seminal article on this subject, Professor Richard Lillich wrote in 1980:
If you go back to the first instances in which the United States sought to protect nationals by the use
of contingents ashore, you will find about 188 cases in which these forces allegedly protected the lives
and the property of American citizens, mostly in Latin America but in the East and Near East as well.
It was deemed to be permissible under international law, there was nothing wrong with this as states
could legally use forces to protect the lives and property of their citizens abroad. It was forcible self-
help, but it was a permissible sanction to protect the human rights of your citizens, including their
property rights. There was no doubt that it was not deemed to be intervention under customary inter-
national law. Even those people who said it was intervention would then go on to say it was permissi-
ble intervention because it was for a permissible purpose.1
Protection of nationals may be thought of either in the context of defense or actions
below the threshold of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. If necessary and proportional,
there is substantial support for the lawfulness of such actions.2 Such was the case when
the United States intervened in Panama in 1989 to protect U.S. citizens lawfully present
pursuant to our obligations under the Panama Canal Treaty.
The 1989 Intervention in Panama
Operation JUST CAUSE, the U.S. December 1989 military intervention in Panama, was
ordered, according to President George H. W. Bush, to protect U.S. lives, restore order,
and protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty.3 It was the fifth such incursion
into that nation in a century.4 From the perspective of international law, this use of
force was justified then, and can be today, as a legitimate use of American military
power in defense of U.S. and Panamanian national interests.
The use of the military instrument, under the best of circumstances, will engender in-
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Cold War rhetoric to denounce the action; leaders of neighboring Latin American
countries universally condemned the incursion within the Organization of American
States (OAS) and within the United Nations.5 (Strangely, this criticism was far more vo-
cal than it had been when the Panamanian strongman nullified the victory of oppo-
nents to his puppet regime the preceding May.) Britain and other Western European
nations were supportive.
What this use of military power in Panama emphasized was that criticism is short-lived
when both the people in the state in which the intervention occurs and the opposition
party of the intervenor nation support the action as within their respective national in-
terests. For the people of Panama, the intervention represented fulfillment of a then-
ongoing civic movement for democratization, their vital economic interest in political
change (they recognized that U.S. economic sanctions would be lifted only if the dicta-
tor General Manuel Noriega were deposed or surrendered to face American drug and
conspiracy charges), and an appeasement of the newly critical attitude of the interna-
tional community toward conditions in Panama.
The Threat to U.S. National Interests
For more than two years prior to the 20 December 1989 intervention by U.S. Southern
Command (USSouthCom) forces, Washington had attempted to resolve the crisis in
Panama through negotiation. That effort was directed toward protecting the thirty-five
thousand Americans in Panama, combating the drug transshipment trade from Co-
lombia (which was being coordinated in Panama City), and ensuring that the opera-
tion of the Panama Canal remained secure.
U.S. concern grew when in May 1989 opposition candidates on a slate headed by
Guillermo Endara appeared to have soundly beaten the Noriega slate in the national
elections. Noriega quickly nullified the election. Memories remain fresh of the brutal
beating the day after the election of Second Vice President–Elect Guillermo Ford by
thugs from Noriega’s “Dignity Battalions.”
Harassment of U.S. military personnel and their dependents increased significantly after
the election. On 15 December 1989, General Noriega declared his military dictatorship to
be in a “state of war” with the United States. This statement followed a declaration by his
puppet regime that he was now “Maximum Leader of the Panamanian People.” Noriega’s
declaration of war was coupled by thinly veiled threats against U.S. citizens, including
statements to the effect that he looked forward to seeing American corpses floating in the
Panama Canal.
On 16 December, forces under Noriega’s command shot and killed First Lieutenant
Robert Paz, an unarmed Marine, and wounded another. Both were assigned to U.S.
4 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper Terry\Printer\NPTerry.vp
Friday, October 28, 2005 2:19:22 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
forces stationed in Panama pursuant to the Panama Canal Treaty. Shortly after that in-
cident, a U.S. naval officer, similarly assigned and traveling with his wife in Panama
City, was arrested without cause and brutally beaten. His wife was interrogated and
then threatened with sexual abuse. Believing that this pattern of violence would con-
tinue, President Bush acted to protect U.S. lives and interests and to restore democracy
in Panama on behalf of the legitimately elected Endara government.
Application of International Law
The law supporting U.S. intervention in defense of nationals can be found in both in-
ternational agreement and custom. The cornerstone of the law regulating coercion be-
tween states is the minimum world-order system represented by Articles 2(4), 2(7), and
51 of the United Nations Charter, as described in chapter 2 of this monograph.6 The
provisions of Article 2 preclude the use of armed force by one state against another. Ar-
ticle 51 authorizes one exception, the inherent sovereign right to use military force in
self-defense. The UN Charter system requires strict accountability, however, before the
projection of force into the territory of another state can be justified.
The 1989 intervention in Panama must be tested against each of the several conditions
required to justify the use of military force in self-defense under Article 51. The first
condition, in the case of defense of nationals or otherwise, is the existence of an armed
attack or the imminent threat of armed attack upon one’s territory or citizens. In De-
cember 1989, U.S. citizens lawfully residing in Panama pursuant to Panama Canal
Treaty provisions, their property, and an international waterway vital to U.S. national
power were all imminently threatened with armed attack. Not only had threatening
rhetoric (to include a declaration of war) placed the Canal Treaty provisions in immi-
nent risk, but attacks on U.S. citizens, coupled with allusions by Noriega to further
“corpses,” made more attacks likely. Further, there was every indication that this threat
would continue as long as General Noriega remained in power.
A further condition relates to the possibility of an alternative to military force that
might have returned the U.S.-Panamanian relationship to an acceptable status quo. The
UN Charter contemplates a hierarchy of responses, envisioning armed force only when
other responses have been attempted and have failed or are obviously without applica-
tion. In the case of Panama, all other reasonable measures had been addressed. Every
form of diplomatic (including recalling the U.S. ambassador), economic (such as sanc-
tions), and legal initiative (even the indictment of Noriega) had been attempted, yet
conditions had only worsened.
The use of force was seriously questioned by some international legal scholars and cer-
tain Latin American nations.7 Nonetheless, a detailed scholarly analysis supports the
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action taken by President Bush. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, former jurist on the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ), notes that international law “by no means permits [self-
defense] in every case of illegality, but on the contrary, confines it to a very narrow
class of illegalities.8 Professor Ian Brownlee of Oxford University sets the parameters
clearly: “Provided there is control by the principal, the aggressor state, and an actual
use of force by its agents, there is ‘an armed attack.’”9 This view was further expanded
by the ICJ in its 1979 ruling “Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran” (United States v. Iran). The court found Iranian actions in seizing American
diplomats to be an armed attack on the United States.10
John Norton Moore was to categorize the actions carried out by Noriega’s forces
against U.S. citizens and interests as being within the scope of an “armed attack,” con-
cluding that “a state is entitled to respond against aggressive attack, whether that is a
direct attack using armies on the march, or whether it is low intensity conflict or guer-
rillas or terrorist attack.”11
The more significant legal issue in this case of protection of nationals may not be
whether the United States was permitted to respond to attacks on its personnel but
whether it could take those actions necessary to preempt reasonably anticipated future
acts of violence against its citizens in Panama through removal of Noriega. The United
States has always maintained that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter does not
create a new principle but rather reiterates the inherent right of self-defense recog-
nized by customary international law.12 In that light, the right of self-defense is not
limited to responding to an actual armed attack but includes preemptive or anticipa-
tory self-defense, as described in Chapter III. Secretary of State Shultz affirmed this
view during the Libyan crisis in 1986, when he stated the United States “is permitted to
use force to pre-empt future attacks, to seize terrorists, or to rescue its citizens when no
other means are available.”13
Four basic arguments in favor of anticipatory self-defense have been advanced, and
each has application with respect to the intervention in Panama.14 First, Article 51 em-
braces the inherent right of self-defense (which includes anticipatory self-defense).
Second, it is very difficult to distinguish acts that constitute preparation for aggression
(but might not justify responding coercion under a restrictive view) from others that
constitute elements of an attack. Third, the destructive power of modern weaponry
makes it unreasonable to expect a state to absorb a first strike before responding.15
Finally, a more restrictive position would only benefit an aggressor.16
Under the “minimum world order system” addressed in Chapter III and represented
principally by Articles 2, 2(7), and 51 of the UN Charter, the U.S. intervention in Pan-
ama must also be measured against the customary international-law principle of
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proportionality. Although the corresponding requirement of “necessity” is directly em-
braced, at least implicitly, within Article 51, the same arguably cannot be said for “pro-
portionality of response.”17 Professor McDougal and Dr. Feliciano of Yale University
Law School have defined the rule as follows:
Proportionality in coercion constitutes a requirement that responding be limited in intensity and
magnitude to what is reasonably necessary promptly to secure the permissible objectives of self-
defense. For present purposes, these objectives may be most comprehensively generalized as the
conserving of important values by compelling the opposing participant to terminate the condi-
tion which necessitates the responding coercion.18
This definition, as noted previously, requires merely a rational relationship between the
intensity of the attack and the intensity of the response. Although the relationship need
not approach precision, a nation subject to a number of state-sponsored attacks on its
citizens is not entitled, for example, to destroy in its entirety the capital city of the of-
fender state.
Other canons of military practice, such as conservation of resources, support this prin-
ciple of restraint in defense. The United Nations has condemned defensive actions that
greatly exceed the provocation as illegal reprisals.19 Where a continuation of hostile acts
beyond the triggering event or events is reasonably to be expected, however, as was the
case in Panama, a response that anticipates requirements of a continuing nature be-
yond the scope of the initial attack would be legally appropriate. The addition, on 20
December 1989, of some 9,500 troops from Fort Bragg and Fort Ord (among others) to
augment the thirteen thousand SouthCom soldiers already in Panama can hardly be
viewed as exceeding the parameters established by this rule, given the size of the forces
under Noriega’s control.
Application of Regional Arrangements
In addition to the regime established by the United Nations Charter, the United States
and Panama are bound by the Charter of the OAS, the Inter-American Treaty of Recip-
rocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), and the Panama Canal Treaty.20 At the time of the Pan-
ama intervention in 1989, Latin American nations were particularly sensitive to the
provisions of the Rio and OAS agreements, because of their view that the United States
had violated their tenets between 1981 and 1984, when it had been laying mines in Nic-
araguan ports and planning and directing attacks by Nicaraguan resistance forces, the
Contras, on ports, oil installations, and naval bases.
The ICJ had ruled in the case of Nicaragua v. United States that the assistance given by
the United States to the military and paramilitary activities of the Contras through fi-
nancial, training, weapons, intelligence, and logistics support constituted a clear breach
of the principles of nonintervention under provisions of the OAS and Rio accords.21
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The ICJ further found in that case that the actions of Nicaragua against its neighbors
had not, as the United States maintained, amounted to an armed attack that could have
authorized the collective countermeasures taken by the United States. In making these
findings, the ICJ ruled that the U.S. actions in Nicaragua had resulted in an infringe-
ment of territorial sovereignty under both agreements, as well as the UN Charter.22 It is
small wonder, then, that the Latin American nations expressed concern over the U.S.
intervention in Panama.
OAS Charter
The prohibitions against the use of force in the OAS Charter are phrased in language
that is even more categorical than that of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter—a reflection
of the long and painful history of the Latin American states. Article 13, for example, es-
tablishes: “No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The fore-
going principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference
or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, eco-
nomic and social elements.” Article 20 is equally clear with respect to territorial integ-
rity: “The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily,
of military occupation, or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or
indirectly, on any grounds whatsoever.”
The one exception to these comprehensive prohibitions, and the one relied upon by the
United States in taking action to protect American citizens and interests in Panama, is
Article 22, which provides: “Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and secu-
rity in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles
set forth in Articles 18 and 20.” The measures addressed in Article 22 include the right of
self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, as well as diplomatic and economic ac-
tions, to the extent that they are not considered regional enforcement initiatives pursuant
to Article 53 of the Charter. Because the U.S. measures in Panama satisfy the self-defense
criteria of the UN Charter, they likewise trigger the exception specified in Article 22 of
the OAS Charter.
Another article within the OAS Charter is relevant to the U.S. military action. Article
3d provides: “The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought
through it require political organization of those states on the basis of the effective ex-
ercise of representative democracy.” Not only had General Noriega violated this provi-
sion in May 1989, when he refused to allow the Endara government to assume power,
but the abuses heaped upon his opponents had violated similar provisions of the 1953
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.23
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The ICJ previously had opined that the commitment of states under Article 3d of the
OAS Charter is a political, rather than legal, requirement;24 however, the court had also
asserted that nothing precludes a state from assuming a binding and enforceable inter-
national commitment of this kind.25 When Panama committed itself to the multilateral
1953 declaration pledging to preserve these rights for its people, it had assumed a bind-
ing obligation that could be enforced by other states party to the declaration.26
The Rio Treaty
This multilateral agreement authorizes self-defense measures similar to those that can
be taken under the OAS Charter and the UN Charter. Article 3 provides that the parties
undertake “to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations.” This provision reinforces the U.S. right in the UN and OAS Charters to take
measures in self-defense when the criteria established for an armed attack are met.
Panama Canal Treaty
The strongest tenet underlying U.S. actions was the bilateral Canal Treaty itself. Under Arti-
cle 4, the United States had not only the right but the duty to protect the waterway. The ba-
sic U.S. responsibility was to operate and defend the Panama Canal until its transfer to
Panama per the terms of the agreement. Even after the Noriega regime’s illegal seizure of
power, the United States continued to do what it had done since the entry into force of the
treaty in 1979—provide for the safe and orderly transit of vessels through the canal while
ensuring increased Panamanian participation in its management and operation.
During 1988 and 1989, however, the Noriega regime engaged in a systematic campaign
to harass and intimidate American and Panamanian employees of the Panama Canal
Commission and members of the U.S. forces. In 1989 alone, there were over three hun-
dred violations of the U.S. military bases by Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) person-
nel. Over four hundred U.S. personnel were detained, and 140 U.S. personnel were put
in danger.27 When this dangerous and provocative behavior reached an intolerable level
in mid-December 1989, President Bush was compelled to act to end the threat to
American and Panamanian lives as well as to canal operations.
Meeting the Weinberger Criteria for Intervention
From the perspective of the heavily Democrat U.S. Congress, the fact that the initiative met
the carefully circumscribed criteria established by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
for intervention in 1984 was critical. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell stated imme-
diately after the intervention, “I support the President’s decision. It was made necessary by
the actions of General Noriega.”28 House Speaker Thomas S. Foley echoed these sentiments:
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“I support that decision. The President made a convincing argument. . . . The President
asked for my support, and I gave him that assurance. The decision is justified.”29
These statesmen had been two of the principal protagonists in the 1984 debates concerning
the use of military force following the Beirut bombing of the Marine battalion headquar-
ters and after the Grenada intervention. Those debates, precipitated by the military services
over the appropriate circumstances in which military personnel could be put in harm’s way,
led to a clear articulation of six criteria for intervention by Secretary Weinberger before the
National Press Club on 28 October 1984. These criteria, applauded then and since by the
Congress, required that any use of force be predicated upon a matter deemed vital to our
national interest, that the commitment be undertaken with the clear intention of winning,
that political and military objectives be clearly defined, that the forces committed be suffi-
cient to meet the objective, that the support of the American people be reasonably assured,
and that the commitment of U.S. forces be a last resort.30
The intervention in Panama met each of these tests, and because it did, the support of
the American people and Congress was overwhelming. If we have learned one lesson
from Panama, it is that legal criteria and political criteria are related. Where use of mil-
itary force can be defended as necessary and proportional under the canons of interna-
tional law, the American people will support it as a proper exercise of national power.
Fifteen years later, when the George W. Bush administration struggled to offer justifica-
tion for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, it would have been well served to place its argu-
ments in terms of the Weinberger criteria.31
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Response to International Terrorism
A third genre of lesser conflict is reflected in the devastation directed against the
United States on 11 September 2001. The attacks by the al-Qa‘ida terrorists on the
World Trade Center in New York and on the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., do not
represent a new kind of international conflict. They do, however, depart significantly
from traditional warfare between states adhering to the law of armed conflict. These at-
tacks reflect nontraditional violence against states and innocent civilians by individuals
or groups supported by rogue states for political ends without regard to the civilized
behavior on the battlefield that underpins the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.1
The Context
In light of this significant threat to democratic values, several U.S. presidents, most re-
cently George W. Bush in late 2003, have articulated a right to respond “preemptively”
when evidence exists of an imminent threat of terrorist violence.2 Ronald Reagan’s ad-
ministration issued the seminal “preemption” doctrine in 1984. In the words of former
Defense Department official Noel Koch, President Reagan’s National Security Decision
Directive (NSDD) 138, issued 3 April 1984 “represent[ed] a quantum leap in counter-
ing terrorism, from the reactive mode to recognition that proactive steps [were]
needed.”3 NSDD 138 is classified, but Robert C. McFarlane suggested at a Defense
Strategy Forum on 25 March 1985 that it included the following key elements: The
practice of terrorism under all circumstances is a threat to the national security of the
United States; the practice of international terrorism must be resisted by all legal
means; the United States has the responsibility to take protective measures whenever
there is evidence that terrorism is about to be committed; and the threat of terrorism
constitutes a form of aggression and justifies acts in self-defense.4
While the moral justification for this U.S. policy may be obvious, the problem of defining
state support or linkage that warrants a U.S. military response, a legal framework sup-
portive of such a proactive policy, and reasonable force alternatives responsive to the
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The linkage between the terrorist and the sponsoring state is crucial to providing the
United States, or any nation, with justification for response against that state. Covert
intelligence operatives are necessary for identifying and targeting terrorist training
camps and bases and for providing effective warning of impending terrorist attacks.
Unfortunately, as noted by Secretary of State George Shultz in 1984, “We may never
have the kind of evidence that can stand up in an American court of law.”5
The question, then, is how much information is enough, from several perspectives.
Caspar Weinberger has underscored the very real and practical difficulties that exist for
military planners in attempting to apply a relatively small quantum of force over great
distance with uncertain intelligence. He has accurately noted the difficulty of ensuring
success without accurate information, and he has echoed the relationship between
public support and demonstrable evidence of culpability in any resort to force by the
United States in defending against terrorist attack.6
No U.S. administration official, past or present, has been able to define adequately,
“how much evidence is enough.” As asserted by Secretary Shultz, the demand for pro-
bative, or court-sustainable, evidence affirming the complicity of a specific sponsoring
state is an impractical standard, one that has contributed to the impression—prior to
the articulation of NSDD 138 in 1984—that the United States was inhibited from re-
sponding meaningfully to terrorist outrages. This view was certainly reinforced when
in 1979 the U.S. government allowed fifty-two American citizens to remain hostage to
Iranian militants for more than four hundred days. Hugh Tovar has correctly noted,
“There is a very real danger that the pursuit of more and better intelligence may be-
come an excuse for nonaction, which in itself might do more harm than action based
on plausible though incomplete intelligence.”7
Legal Framework for Response
An examination of authorized responses to state-sponsored terrorism requires an un-
derstanding that terrorism is a strategy that does not follow traditional military pat-
terns. In fact, a fundamental characteristic of terrorism is its violation of established
norms. Whereas the conduct of warfare is governed by carefully defined norms that
survive despite their frequent violation; the sole norm for terrorism is effectiveness. In-
ternational law requires that belligerent forces identify themselves, carry arms openly,
and observe the laws of war.8 Prominent among the laws of war are the principles of
discrimination (or noncombatant immunity) and proportion. Terrorists, however, do
not distinguish between the innocent (noncombatants) and the armed forces of the
country in which the attack is made.
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Two rationales may explain this terrorist strategy. The very fact that the victims of ter-
rorism are innocent third parties enhances the shock value of attacking them. Alterna-
tively, the terrorist may decree that everyone living in a certain society is guilty of its
perceived sins and deserving of punishment. In the contemporary language of defense
economics, they wage countervalue rather than counterforce warfare.
Why is this important? It is important because it tells us that the only credible response
to terrorism is deterrence. There must be an assured, effective reaction that imposes
unacceptable costs on the terrorists and those who make possible their activities. How-
ever, this reaction must counter the terrorists’ strategy within the parameters of inter-
national law, and more specifically, the law of armed conflict. Those who suggest
otherwise understand neither the inherent flexibility of international law nor the cost
of violating that law.9
International law has long recognized the need for flexible application. The underlying
tenet of that law, the prohibition against the use of force, has as its principal tenet the
right of response in self-defense. Self-defense, however, is an inherent right, shaped by
custom and subject to customary interpretation. Its codification within Article 51 of
the UN Charter recognizes this inherent quality: “Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack oc-
curs against a Member of the United Nations.”
According to some legal scholars, though, responding coercion cannot be justified un-
der Article 51 unless the force directed against the “political independence” of another
state has as its purpose “the permanent subjugation of that state to domination.”10 This
interpretation envisions a broad-based and far-reaching attack; arguably, however, an
attack against a smaller or isolated segment of a nation’s governmental, military, or so-
cial apparatus is legally analogous to an attack against the whole. If U.S. citizens, diplo-
mats, or military personnel are attacked or held captive by terrorists in an attempt to
induce a change in American policy, the political independence of the United States has
clearly been subjected to attack.
The final clause of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which forbids threat or
use of force “in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Na-
tions,” supports this interpretation. The principles codified in the Charter have it as
their primary purpose to “bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjustment of or settlement of international
disputes or situations that might lead to a breach of the peace.”11 Terrorist seizures of or
attacks on U.S. citizens or instrumentalities are certainly uses of force “in a manner in-
consistent” with the Charter. Article 2(4) and Article 51, its exception, must be read
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together in a way that gives them both reasonable meaning. As Professor Myres
McDougal explains,
Article 2(4) refers to both the threat and use of force and commits the Members to refrain from “the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”; the customary right of defense, as lim-
ited by the requirements of necessity and proportionality, can scarcely be regarded as inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations, and a decent respect for balance and effectiveness would
suggest that a conception of impermissible coercion, which includes threats of force, should be coun-
tered with an equally comprehensive and adequate conception of permissible or defensive coercion.12
A second restriction that doctrinaire legal scholars attempt to impose would permit
self-defense against state supporters of terrorist violence only when an attack “occurs.”
This interpretation is based not only on Articles 51 and 2(4) of the Charter but also on
Article 2(3), which states, “All members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are
not endangered.” The late Ian Brownlie argued that while “isolated or sporadic” inci-
dents may constitute aggression, they do not reach the level of an “armed attack.”13 It
has thus been argued that because the definition of armed conflict is narrower than ag-
gression, “certainly self-defense against armed bands would not seem to be included
within the permitted area.”14
Such rigid interpretations do violence to the very values underlying Article 51 of the
Charter and to the customary international law it seeks to codify. Neither the plain lan-
guage of Article 51 nor U.S. practice in addressing incidents of aggression under its in-
herent right of self-defense suggests such a restrictive interpretation.
Other considerations in addressing terrorist violence include the fact that the real-time
relationship between threat and threat recognition is often compressed in the terrorist
conflict arena. Strategy development is thus limited with respect to the nonmilitary ini-
tiatives, short of attack, that must always be the option of choice. Traditional means of
conflict resolution, authorized by law and customary practice, are precluded, because
terrorism by definition is covert in execution, unacknowledged by its state sponsor, and
practiced with violent effectiveness. Thus diplomacy and conciliation may be of little
utility in responding to a state that denies its actions and ultimately designs its prac-
tices to eliminate normal, lawful intercourse between nations.
It must be noted, however, that noncoercive efforts to avoid terrorist attack have their
importance. Counterterrorism expert Dr. William Farrell notes, “Diplomatic action,
alone or in concert with allies that could conceivably impact successfully upon a ter-
rorist group and/or its sponsor, should be considered and employed initially. Political
and economic sanctions are also alternatives which demand consideration before mili-
tary force is employed.”15
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In a democratic society, however, the range of options open to an administration desir-
ous of protecting its citizens and resources from terrorism, is limited. One of the best
things a democratic government can do is educate the public and its military about the
realistic options available in any crisis. Professor Abraham Miller suggests, “The image
of an invincible and omnipotent America that can rescue hostages under any circum-
stance is patently unrealistic. It is a mindset that comes from a failure to realize how
lucky the Israelis were at Entebbe and from the charges and countercharges of the 1980
election campaign, during which the Iranian hostage crisis was played to the hilt.”16
This further suggests that measures justified by law may not be feasible in terms of exe-
cution. Another value, identified by Dr. Farrell, that must be considered before using
military force is moral justification.
Claiming justification in the protection of democratic values while employing tactics
that are similar to those of the terrorists undermines public confidence. There may be
some immediate emotional release no matter what the response, but thoughtful reflec-
tion over the long term will tolerate only action based on moral grounds.17 These valid
concerns underscore the need to weigh long-term values besides countering the imme-
diate terrorist threat when determining an appropriate policy.
Proactive Responses Authorized under International Law
When the decision to use force is made, it must be as closely tied to a clear objective as
would an action at the higher end of the coercion spectrum. Because the relationship
between objective and threat is often unclear in the low-intensity-conflict arena, a
strategy to fight state-supported terrorist violence must always focus on the underlying
political purpose of the states supporting terrorist organizations. That purpose is un-
questionably the removal of the United States from the region concerned.
How do we counter this purpose, this objective? George Shultz was correct when he
stated that our policy “must be unambiguous. It must be clearly and unequivocally the
policy of the United States to fight back—to resist challenges, to defend our interests,
and to support those who put their lives on the line in a common cause.”18 Implemen-
tation of this proactive policy requires the fullest use of all the weapons in our arsenal.
These should include not only defensive measures that reduce U.S. vulnerability but
also new legal tools and agreements on international sanctions, as well as the collabora-
tion of other concerned governments. While we should use our military power only if
conditions justify it and other means are not available, there will be instances, as oc-
curred after 11 September 2001, when the use of force is the only alternative. In that
circumstance, our actions were fully justified as necessary defensive measures to elimi-
nate a continuing threat to the United States.
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Closely related to the legal question is the question of sponsorship. When clear evi-
dence of state support exists, we must publicize that relationship and attack with dis-
crimination, striking only those targets that most affect the well-being of the state
sponsor. The “center of gravity” in the sponsoring state must always be that target the
destruction of which will most significantly undermine the target state’s will to commit
future acts of terror. Since terrorism is a form of international conflict and thus bound
by its rules, lawful response is limited to targets that do not enjoy civilian immunity.
Military targets may be preferable for two other reasons as well. First, the selection of
military targets—while the terrorists are attacking our civilians in violation of interna-
tional law—should alleviate any concern on the part of other states. Additionally, selec-
tion of military targets would refocus attention on the fact that terrorism is in fact a
form of armed conflict.
Establishing Linkage between State Sponsor and Actor: The al-Qa‘ida Model
Causal connectivity or linkage, the most important element in justifying the use of
force in response to terrorist violence, can be established only if effective intelligence
operatives are positioned to discover who the terrorists are, where they are, and who
supports them. While U.S. intelligence did not prevent the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, it did quickly establish critical linkages afterward. It was
quickly learned that the perpetrators of the 11 September 2001 violence were members
of the al-Qa‘ida organization and that it was being protected and given safe haven in
Afghanistan by the Pushtun Taliban militia.
The Taliban was the strongest of the ethnic militias in Afghanistan by mid-2001 and
controlled the political machinery of state in Kabul. During that period it constituted
the de facto government of Afghanistan, but it was unable to conduct normal foreign
relations or to fulfill international legal obligations. Independent press reports con-
cluded that it had become so subject to the domination and control of al-Qa‘ida that it
could not pursue independent policies with respect to other states.19 Nonetheless, Af-
ghanistan continued to have the essential elements of statehood.20 Accordingly, it was
called upon by the international community—in UN Security Council Resolutions
1333 (2000), 1267 (1999), and 1214 (1998)—to fulfill its obligations and the interna-
tional agreements prior Afghan governments had signed.21 The Taliban militia consis-
tently refused.
Professor Robert Turner has explained that when “[Osama] bin Laden masterminded
the attacks on New York and Washington, Afghanistan [was] in breach of its state re-
sponsibility to take reasonable measures to prevent its territory from being used to
launch attacks against other states.”22 Prior to 11 September 2001 al-Qa‘ida supplied
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the Taliban with the money, material, and personnel it needed to gain the upper hand
over its primary opposition, a multiethnic (but non-Pushtun) grouping known as the
Northern Alliance.23
By 11 September 2001 and for some time thereafter the Taliban, with al-Qa‘ida sup-
port, effectively controlled nearly 90 percent of Afghan territory, exercising govern-
mental functions therein: operating a system of taxation, administering Islamic courts,
appointing and confirming regional governors, district leaders, mayors, and other re-
gional and local officials, and imposing law and order. Therefore, and because the
Taliban, with its al-Qa‘ida supporters, clearly opposed the coalition’s use of force in
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, we must conclude that an armed conflict in fact ex-
isted between two “high contracting parties” to the Geneva Conventions, justifying all
U.S. actions exercised in self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.24
Protection of Diplomats from Terrorist Violence: The Iranian Hostage Crisis
Nor was 11 September 2001 the first time the United States had been attacked by ter-
rorists so clearly linked to a state sponsor. The 1979 attacks on the U.S. embassy in Teh-
ran and the consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz followed by one week the entrance of the
shah into the United States for medical treatment.25 On 4 November 1979 approximately
three hundred demonstrators overran the embassy compound in Tehran. The Islamic
government of Iran normally maintained ten to fifteen uniformed policemen outside the
embassy compound as well as a nearby contingent of “Pasdaran” Revolutionary Guards.26
On the day of the attack, however, these security personnel made no effort to deter or
discourage the demonstrators from seizing the premises; they simply disappeared.27
The invading militants initially seized not only the lower floor of the chancery but also
the U.S. security officials who had gone out to attempt to negotiate with them. After
more than two hours, they gained entry to the upper floor of the chancery and seized
the remaining personnel, with the exception of eleven American staff members who
held out in the main vault for a further hour.28
Despite repeated calls for help to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, no Iranian security
forces were sent to protect the Americans during this three-hour assault. No attempt was
made by the Iranian government to clear the embassy premises, rescue the personnel held
hostage, or persuade the invaders and demonstrators to terminate their action.29 In fact,
one Iranian spokesman stated in an interview the following day that the Revolutionary
Guards had indeed been sent to the embassy following the appeal for help, but not to
secure the release of the hostages and premises. According to a government statement
of 5 November 1979: “Yesterday the American Embassy Chargé d’Affaires immediately
contacted the Foreign Ministry and stated he lacked security and that he would need
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protection. So, on orders of the government, the Revolutionary Guards entered to pre-
vent clashes there. Last night the brothers who are occupying the Embassy thanked the
guards for their presence and for maintaining security there.”30 On the same morning
that this official statement was made, militant students seized the American consulates
in Tabriz and Shiraz; once again the Iranian government took no protective action.31
The failure of the government of Iran on 4 and 5 November to protect the American
diplomatic premises and its complicity in the attack—from the moment the Revolu-
tionary Guards were sent to assist the militants—directly violated earlier assurances of
that government to the United States.32 During an attack on the embassy in February
1979, the government of Iran had moved quickly and efficiently to remove the insur-
gents.33 Later, Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan sent a letter to the embassy expressing
deep regret, indicating Iran’s readiness to indemnify the United States for the damage
caused to its premises “by anti-revolutionary elements,” and conveying assurances that
the government had “made arrangements to prevent the repetition of such incidents.”34
On at least two other occasions prior to the November seizure, the embassy’s chargé
d’affaires, L. Bruce Laingen, discussed the security situation with Iranian Foreign Min-
ister Ebrahim Yazdi, who repeated a pledge that Iran would fulfill its international obli-
gation to protect the U.S. embassy.35
Following the 4 November takeover, the remaining fifty-three captured Americans were
subjected to a harrowing ordeal in various “prisons.” At the outset, some were paraded
blindfolded with hands bound before hostile and jeering crowds.36 For much of their
captivity the hostages were to be bound and frequently blindfolded, forced to remain
silent for extended periods of time, denied mail or the right to communicate with each
other, subjected to interrogation, threatened with criminal trials, and threatened with
death in the event of an American rescue attempt. Some were also physically abused
and threatened directly with weapons.37 All contact between the hostages and the U.S.
government, even by telephone, was prohibited.38 American archives and documents
were seized and ransacked, with the apparent intent of using them as evidence in the
event of hostage trials.39
Diplomatic Efforts
In the days immediately following the November 1979 attacks, the U.S. government
moved quickly and quietly to secure the hostages’ release and the clearing of the em-
bassy through diplomatic means. Prime Minister Bazargan was immediately contacted,
and his government, on 5 November 1979, gave assurances “that the hostages would be
released.”40 Then, on 6 November, Bazargan resigned, in apparent protest at lack of sup-
port of the Revolutionary Council in opposing the militants’ actions.
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The following day, former U.S. attorney general Ramsey Clark arrived in Turkey en
route to Iran at the head of a presidential mission. Before the Clark delegation could
reach Tehran, the effective head of the Iranian state, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
forbade any Iranian contact with the mission.41 On 12 November a newly appointed
“overseer” at the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Abdol Bani-Sadr, announced that before the
hostages could be released the United States would have to admit that the property and
the fortune of the shah were stolen, promise to refrain from further intervention in Ira-
nian affairs, and extradite the shah to Iran for trial.42 Clearly, the Iranian authorities
had assumed full responsibility for the seizure of the diplomats and were unwilling to
grant their immediate and unconditional release.
Thus four early developments indicated to President Jimmy Carter that diplomacy
alone would not secure the hostages’ freedom: Khomeini’s support for the terrorism,
the collapse of the relatively moderate Bazargan government, the unacceptable condi-
tions announced by Bani-Sadr, and Khomeini’s order forbidding contact with Ameri-
can representatives.43
As a result of the unwillingness of the Iranian leadership to accept diplomacy as a route
to a solution, President Carter undertook a series of actions to demonstrate that the
Iranian actions were legally and morally unacceptable and that the United States was
determined to press Iran for an early release of the hostages. American efforts included
application for relief at the International Court of Justice, bilateral contacts with other
governments, multilateral initiatives at the United Nations, unilateral economic ac-
tions, advocacy of multilateral economic measures, and a failed attempt to use force.
Resort to the United Nations
The United States requested that the Security Council consider options for the release
of the American hostages and the restoration of the diplomatic compound. This re-
quest came in the form of a letter dated 9 November 1979 from the U.S. permanent
ambassador at the United Nations to the Security Council.44 In response, the president
of the Security Council, speaking for the Council, appealed the same day for the release
of the hostages.45 The president of the General Assembly similarly called for the release
of the hostages.46
On 25 November 1979, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim requested that the Security
Council convene to work out a peaceful solution to the crisis.47 Addressing the Council
on 29 November, Waldheim declared that the situation in Iran “threatens the peace and
stability of the region and could well have very grave consequences for the entire
world.”48 On 4 December the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 457,
which called upon the government of Iran “to release immediately the personnel of the
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Embassy of the United States of America being held in Tehran, to provide them protec-
tion and allow them to leave the country.”49 Resolution 457 also requested the secretary
general to lend his good offices to the immediate implementation of the resolution and
take all appropriate measures to that end.
On 29 December the United States again requested the Security Council to consider
measures to induce Iran to comply with its international obligations. At that meeting,
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, speaking for the United States, stated that “the United
States Government has, with determination, persistence and patience, pursued every
peaceful channel available to us.”50 Two days later the Security Council adopted Resolu-
tion 461, which reaffirmed the earlier Resolution 457. This measure deplored Iran’s de-
tention of the hostages and once again called for their release.51 Iran did not comply
with the resolutions, and a Soviet veto blocked an American request that the Security
Council implement sanctions.52
Application to the International Court of Justice
When it became apparent that violations of diplomatic immunity were supported by
the ruling government in Iran and not merely acts of individual or group terrorism,
the United States instituted proceedings against Iran in the ICJ. On 29 November a re-
quest for Interim Measures of Protection was filed.53 Jurisdiction was grounded upon
Article 36 of the Statute of the Court.54 It was founded as well upon a number of trea-
ties to which the United States and Iran are party and that govern the status, rights, and
treatment to be accorded diplomatic personnel and premises.55
One day later, the president of the International Court of Justice, Sir Humphrey Waldock,
in the exercise of the power conferred upon him by the Rules of Court, addressed a tele-
gram to the governments of Iran and the United States calling attention to the need to act
in such a way as would enable any subsequent order of the court to have an appropriate
effect.56 A hearing was held on the request for provisional measures;57 thereafter, on 15
December 1979, the court unanimously ruled that Iran should release the American hos-
tages and restore the seized premises to exclusive American control.58
On 17 December the Iranian foreign minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, stated that “the
prefabricated verdict of the Court was clear to us in advance; for this reason, Iran’s
Chargé d’Affaires at the Hague was ordered to officially reject the decision of the
Hague Court.”59 President Waldock set 15 January 1980 as the deadline for the filing of
an American memorial and 18 February for the Iranian countermemorial.60 Oral pro-
ceedings were scheduled to begin on 19 February, but the United States obtained a
postponement, in order to determine whether any of Secretary Waldheim’s initiatives
would bear fruit. They did not, and 18 March 1980 was assigned as the date for oral
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proceedings.61 Although the government of Iran did not participate, the court carefully
addressed the potential objections that Iran might have raised to its subject-matter ju-
risdiction. Similarly, the court also considered possible substantive defenses that Iran
might have raised to the American allegations of abuse. The ICJ ultimately found, as it
had in its order of 15 December 1979, that this case was not—as Iran had claimed in its
letter of 9 December—a matter solely within Iran’s domestic jurisdiction. The court
stated, “A dispute which concerns diplomatic and consular premises and the detention
of internationally protected persons, and involves the interpretation or application of
multilateral conventions codifying the international law governing diplomatic and con-
sular relations, is one that by its very nature falls within international jurisdiction.”62
Iran had also maintained that the hostage matter was only a “marginal and secondary
aspect” of an “overall situation containing much more fundamental and more complex
elements [that cannot be examined] divorced from its proper context, namely the whole
political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the past 25 years.”63
The ICJ emphasized, as it had in its 15 December ruling, that the seizure of a nation’s em-
bassy, consulates, and diplomatic personnel could never be considered secondary or
marginal to any other alleged violation.64 The ruling emphasized that the secretary gen-
eral had referred to the holding of diplomatic hostages as a “threat to . . . peace.”
The court noted that the Security Council, in unanimously passing Resolution 457, had
stressed the international community’s concern at such action.65 In ruling against Iran,
the ICJ observed that “no provision of the Statute or Rules of Court contemplates that
the court should decline to take cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because
that dispute has other aspects, however important.”66
Regarding substantive areas, the ICJ examined the special circumstances claimed by
Iran in defense. It found Iran’s broad, unspecific allegations of interference in internal
affairs unconvincing and emphasized that if Iran had desired to present specific evi-
dence of such claims, it certainly had been presented with the opportunity to do so.67
More importantly, the court stressed that even if Iran had been able to establish inter-
ference, that would not have been a defense or justification for the seizure of diplo-
matic personnel.68 President Waldock also delineated the contribution of Islam to an
international norm of diplomatic protection.69
Even Judge Tarazi, in his dissenting opinion, concurred with the majority regarding Is-
lamic leadership in this area. Quoting a 1937 lecture of Professor Ahmed Rechid of the
Istanbul Law Faculty, Tarazi wrote, “In Arabia, the person of the Ambassador has al-
ways been regarded as sacred. Muhammed consecrated this inviolability. Never were
ambassadors to Muhammed or to his successors molested. One day, the envoy of a for-
eign nation, at an audience, granted to him by the Prophet, was so bold as to use
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insulting language. Muhammed said to him: ‘If you were not an envoy I would have
you put to death.’”70
The court’s majority opinion noted that under the customary international law and
under the agreements cited earlier—agreements to which the United States and Iran
are signatories—diplomatic law has developed sanctions designed to be effective with-
out destroying relations between states.71 Unfortunately, Iran neither admitted the va-
lidity of nor adhered to the International Court’s December 1979 suggestion of interim
measures. Nor did Iran recognize the May 1980 decision on the merits.72
Economic Measures
In addition to the unsuccessful efforts at securing the hostages’ freedom via diplomacy,
and acting through the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, the
United States took additional measures. On 12 November 1979, President Carter, under
the Trade Expansion Act, banned U.S. purchases of Iranian oil.73 He did so to make
clear that the United States would not allow itself to be blackmailed because of oil re-
quirements.74 The United States then learned that Tehran planned to withdraw all Ira-
nian assets held in American banking institutions. The removal of funds would have
jeopardized billions of dollars in American claims against those assets—debts owed to
both government and private enterprise.75 The ripple effect of a mass withdrawal would
have threatened the entire international financial system.
The president acted quickly to protect the interests of American creditors by blocking
the removal of the Iranian funds. In order to do this, the president invoked the provi-
sions of the International Emergency Powers Act of 1977.76 This act permits the freez-
ing of foreign assets when there exists “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”77 The secretary of
the treasury implemented the president’s executive order on 14 November 1979 with a
series of Iranian Assets Control Regulations.78
A month later, the United States informed the Iranian chargé d’affaires in Washington
that personnel assigned to the Iranian embassy and consular posts in the United States
would be limited to fifteen at the embassy and five per consulate.79 From January to
March 1980, the United States exercised restraint, in order to allow time for the initia-
tives of Secretary General Waldheim, as well as those of intermediaries, to work. Unfor-
tunately, factional disputes in Iran prevented Bani-Sadr and Iranian authorities from
honoring their pledges regarding the authority of the United Nations Commission in
Iran, and this in turn stifled Waldheim’s diplomatic initiatives.
President Carter then moved to impose unilateral sanctions on Iran, and in April 1980
acted to prohibit all financial dealings and exports to Iran except food and medicine.80
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On 17 April the Carter administration imposed additional prohibitions on imports,
travel, and financial transfers related to Iran.81 This executive order also restricted travel
under the Immigration and Nationality Act.82 Finally, that same month, the United
States broke diplomatic relations with Iran and ordered the Iranian embassy in Wash-
ington closed.
While these unilateral measures were being implemented, our allies in Europe, Japan,
and Canada were also imposing economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iran, in an
effort to maintain a common front. At a 21 April 1980 meeting of the leaders of the
European Community, nine allied nations reaffirmed their support for severe sanctions
against Iran and stated they would seek legislation from their respective legislative
branches enabling them to join the effort to isolate Iran internationally in the event the
hostage crisis was not resolved by 17 May.83 When no progress had been made by that
date, these allies moved to accommodate an American request that no new contracts be
entered into with Iran and that all contracts negotiated between these nations and Iran
since 4 November 1979 be disavowed.84
Unfortunately, several European states—Great Britain included—were unable to gain
parliamentary support for the entire package of sanctions promised. Thus their impact,
while significant, failed to isolate Iran completely from a vital source of imports—Eu-
rope. The Soviet Union compounded the problem when it announced that if Iranian
ports were blockaded or primary commodities became unavailable from the West, the
Soviet Union would neutralize those measures by providing all necessary assistance.
Specifically, the Soviet Union offered to move Iranian goods on its own roads and rail-
way system if Iran’s harbors should be blocked.85 It also promised to supply Iran with
primary foodstuffs if these became unavailable from customary sources. 86
The economic measures adopted by the Western nations, while psychologically satisfy-
ing, thus proved singularly ineffective. In fact, the only noticeable impact was a rallying
of Iranians behind Khomeini and the diversion of Iranian attention from internal diffi-
culties to the foreign challenge. These measures ultimately tended to fragment interna-
tional support for the United States while making it politically difficult for the Iranians
to back down. In short, economic pressures, although perhaps politically expedient as a
means to demonstrate presidential resolve, had the counterproductive effect of unify-
ing Iranian opposition without coercing cooperation.
Humanitarian Intervention
Concurrently with its judicial, diplomatic, and economic initiatives, in November 1979
the United States began planning a military operation to rescue the hostages. Citing the
same legal justification claimed by Israel in rescuing its citizens from terrorists at
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Entebbe, Uganda, and by West Germany in a similar successful rescue at Mogadishu,
Somalia, in 1977, the United States entered Iran during the night of 24 April 1980.87 A
team of approximately ninety American servicemen departed the aircraft carrier USS
Nimitz (CVN 68) by helicopter for a remote, deserted airstrip in southern Iran, ap-
proximately three hundred miles from Tehran. There they met a C-130 transport air-
craft for refueling. The plan then called for a flight to Tehran.88 However, three of the
eight RH-53 helicopters were disabled at the rendezvous point by mechanical failures
resulting from sand intake, and the mission was aborted .89 The remaining aircraft de-
parted Iran, but not before a further helicopter and transport collided and exploded.90
International Law Violations with Respect to U.S. Diplomats
Article 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations obligated Iran to
treat each American diplomat with “due respect,” to take “all appropriate steps to pre-
vent any attack on his person, freedom, or dignity,” and to ensure that diplomatic per-
sonnel were not subjected to “any form of arrest or detention.”91 Article 37 of this
convention extends these same privileges and immunities to members of the adminis-
trative and technical staffs, as well as to their families.92 These protections embody “the
oldest established and the most fundamental rule of diplomatic law.”93 This was a point
repeatedly emphasized by the ICJ in its 15 December 1979 order discussing provisional
measures with respect to the American hostages:
There is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations between states than the invio-
lability of diplomatic envoys and embassies, so that throughout history nations of all creeds and cul-
tures have observed reciprocal obligations for that purpose: . . . the obligations thus assumed, notably
those for assuring the personal safety of diplomats and their freedom from prosecution, are essential,
unqualified, and inherent in their representative character and their diplomatic function.94
In addition to its obligation to protect diplomatic personnel, Iran also had a duty to
bring the attacking militants to justice. Its failure to take either step laid the ground-
work for subsequent American claims for reparations.95
When Khomeini’s regime threatened the hostages with criminal trials, the provisions
of Article 31 of the 1961 Vienna Convention, which exempts diplomatic personnel from
the criminal jurisdiction of a host state and frees them of any obligation to appear as wit-
nesses, also came into play.96 This general immunity is so ingrained as customary inter-
national law that, in the view of one leading authority, no case can be cited where,
without consent, a diplomatic agent has been tried or punished by local courts.97
History records many cases of diplomatic envoys who conspired against the receiving
states but were not prosecuted. Thus, in 1584, when the Spanish ambassador in England,
Don Bernardino de Mendoza, plotted to depose Queen Elizabeth, he was ordered to leave
the country. In 1587, when the French ambassador in England, L’Aubespine, conspired
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against the life of Queen Elizabeth, he was simply warned not to commit a similar act
again. In 1654, when the French ambassador to England, De Bass, conspired against the
life of Cromwell, he was ordered to leave the country within twenty-four hours.98
The 1961 Vienna Convention also obligates the receiving state to protect the diplo-
matic premises of the sending state, as well as its personnel. On 4 November 1979, ac-
cording to Article 22 of the convention, Iran was and continued to be under an
obligation to ensure that American diplomatic premises in Iran were held inviolable
and immune from search. Article 22 required Iran to ensure that its agents did not en-
ter the premises “except with the consent of the head of the mission.” A “special
duty” was placed upon Iran under this article “to take all appropriate steps to protect
the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any distur-
bance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.”99 Ironically, at the Vi-
enna Conference, which approved this convention, Iran had been particularly vigorous
in insisting that the special duty of protection not be qualified in any way, even under
exceptional circumstances.100
Just as Khomeini’s government failed in its obligation under Article 22 to preserve the
inviolability of American diplomatic premises, so too did it fail in its related obligation
to ensure the protection of archives and documents present there, as required by Arti-
cle 24.101 By approving the seizure, by ransacking and publishing documents from the
mission, and by further threatening their use as “evidence” in judicial proceedings, the
Khomeini government seriously impaired its international standing. By depriving itself
of the respect that a state normally enjoys under the doctrine of sovereign equality, the
regime forfeited an opportunity to gain world sympathy and also reduced its chances
of cultivating friends and allies.102
Despite Iran’s multiple violations of the 1961 Vienna Convention with respect to
American diplomatic personnel, the diplomatic staffs of other nations—with the one
exception of the arrest of the Soviet first secretary on 26 June 1980—continued to en-
joy the requisite respect and protection.103
All governments have a shared interest in upholding the rights of their diplomatic rep-
resentatives, since the relations between states depend on free communication in a
myriad of interdependent ways. Iran’s adherence to diplomatic law except in the case of
the United States suggested that the Khomeini regime did not want to quarrel with this
basic notion. Iran’s willingness in 1979, however, in the case of American personnel, to
defy both customary international practice as well as specific legal obligations under-
scored the intensity and virulence of its anti-American posture. From Khomeini’s per-
spective, American interference since 1953, when the Central Intelligence Agency
helped to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh and restore the shah, had
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delayed a true Islamic revolution for almost thirty years. The metaphor of America as
“Satan” embodied Khomeini’s notion of an ultimate foe, and the spasm of lawlessness
that began on 4 November 1979 is perhaps best explained as a catharsis after three de-
cades of bitterness and frustration.104
As in most developing countries, there were few internal factors—whether from oppo-
sition parties, a critical press, or an enlightened public—that could have constrained
Khomeini to uphold the law. In the atmosphere of fervent nationalism that accompa-
nied Khomeini’s sweep to power, forces for moderation were depicted as tools of for-
eign interests. In such an atmosphere, the militant supporters of the clerical leadership
fomented domestic pressure to violate other recognized norms as well—such as prop-
erty ownership, religious freedom, and judicial protection. This combination of revolu-
tion and nationalism yielded explosive results, a reordering of both Iranian domestic
society and its approach to foreign affairs.
Iran’s breach of diplomatic law appears, in retrospect, to have had a greater impact on
developed nations than it did on Iran itself or the rest of the world community. Be-
cause Iran was (and is) a vendor nation of an export commodity—oil—coveted by in-
dustrialized countries, it could survive economically despite the turbulence and
xenophobia of Khomeini’s regime.
Legal Analysis of U.S. Responses
International coercion can assume many forms. In addition to the use or threat of mili-
tary force, coercion can also appear as economic or other nonviolent pressure, if it has
the effect of altering significant national interests. Coercion in its many forms is a fact
of international relations. Under the current norms of international law, coercion is
impermissible when unreasonable, and reasonableness in turn is a function of both the
necessity and proportionality of specific measures in a given context.105
Vital also to a viable system of world order is the concept of community response.106
Group action is preferred, but in situations where a community response is either un-
available or too slow, unilateral response by the attacked nation may be necessary and
legitimate.107 In the days following the Iranian hostage seizure, Washington made every
effort to mobilize the world community through the United Nations. The United States
urgently addressed the president of the Security Council on 9 November 1979, request-
ing assistance in obtaining release of the hostages. The Security Council responded by
unanimously adopting Resolution 457, which called upon Iran to free the hostages and
clear the embassy premises immediately. When the Iranian government ignored this
resolution, the Council unanimously affirmed its earlier action with Resolution 461.
This second call was also ignored.
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On 13 January 1980, in an effort to convince Iran that its best interests would be served
by immediate compliance with community norms, the United States proposed enforce-
ment measures in the Security Council. The draft resolution easily received a two-
thirds majority within the Council, but a Soviet veto effectively ended any chance for
the United Nations to back its words with actions and be more than an impotent on-
looker as the crisis unfolded.108
Concurrently, the United States filed an action in the International Court of Justice.
Both the interim measures endorsed in December 1979 and the later decision on the
merits were repudiated by Iran. These avenues having been exhausted, the United
States instituted a number of economic sanctions intended to be coercive.109 The focus
of American response turned from words to deeds.
But President Carter’s inability to settle on a firm course of action made it difficult for
America’s European allies to be certain where the United States was headed. For five
months after the hostage seizure, President Carter seemed ready to rely on a medley of
political, judicial, and economic initiatives, in the belief that rational leadership in Iran
would eventually prevail over the militants. When on 24 April 1980 he abandoned that
policy without consulting the allies, he was stunned to find amazement among friends
abroad. Months earlier, Carter had similarly imposed a series of unilateral sanctions
against both Iran and the Soviet Union without first preparing the Western alliance.
These turns of policy, taken without seeking consensus, suggested that President Carter
did not believe that he could successfully mobilize a community response.
The attempt at forcible rescue in April 1980, had it been successful, would have solved
the American part of the problem without resolving the larger issues of diplomatic
rights and international order. The unsuccessful rescue operation followed an adminis-
tration posture wherein it had first been severe toward Iran, then lenient, then harsh once
again. While the Carter administration could have argued persuasively that these changes
were justified in light of the constantly changing situation, the frequent reversals trou-
bled European allies. Had the allies followed President Carter’s initial call for strong
measures, noted one European ambassador at the time, they would have been caught
short by the change to leniency. “We would have been out on a limb and he could have
sawed it off. That’s why we are a little wary now of being told we have to be tough.”110
As Under Secretary of State George Ball urged in early 1980, the European allies did
have an important, although narrower, interest in the Iranian crisis: “We should wel-
come their counsel and not resent it.”111 He stated further at the time that the United
States should listen carefully to the urging of its allies for a unified effort to isolate Iran
politically so that the community of states could show the Iranian people “that the gov-
ernment which violates the sanctity of an embassy becomes an international pariah.”112
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Lessons in Crisis Diplomacy
In retrospect, certain implications of the 444-day Iranian hostage crisis are clear. The
continued vitality of mutual world values depends on much more than a search for na-
tional catharsis. The American public’s penchant for gestures, such as candlelight vigils
and yellow ribbons, was matched by the Carter administration’s tendency to confuse
symbol with substance and to adopt poses in the name of policy.
Politically, the crisis put Carter in a difficult position. He perceived time as on the side of
the Iranians. It appeared that the crisis controlled Carter rather than he the crisis. His
willingness to take varying approaches in dealing with the crisis met the public demand
for visible action and also provided moments of cathartic relief. In the longer term, how-
ever, this attempt to reconcile Iranian intransigence with the American appetite for ac-
tion resulted in a settlement favorable to Iran. A country that confuses catharsis with
defense of its interests is a nation uncertain of its values, and President Carter’s effort to
traverse differing courses of action at the same time proved counterproductive.
Upon his inauguration, President Reagan found himself bound by the terms of the
Carter administration’s negotiated settlement, terms that the Supreme Court upheld as
legal, if not wise.113 Certain of the terms, such as the requirement to return unencum-
bered Iranian financial assets, did no more than honor preexisting obligations. Other
commitments that pertained directly to the official relationship between the U.S. and
Iran, such as the formation of a Joint U.S.-Iranian Claims Tribunal, could be honored
as positive contributions to community values.
Some parts of the agreement, however, were legally unenforceable. One such provision
was the requirement that the United States “will order all persons within U.S. jurisdic-
tion to report to the U.S. Treasury, within 30 days, for transmission to Iran, all infor-
mation known to them, as of Nov. 3, 1979 . . . with respect to the property and assets of
the former Shah. Violation of the requirement will be subject to civil and criminal pen-
alties described by U.S. law.”114 No such order was ever issued, nor could it have been
enforced if it had been.
President Reagan’s pledge upon taking office of “swift and effective retribution” in case
of further threats to Americans abroad was clearly meant to deter future attacks as well
as reassure a concerned nation. Given the profusion of incidents throughout the world
since, however, including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the attacks of 11
September 2001, it is clear that President Reagan’s warnings did not turn back the tide
of disorder.
Clearly, however, the painful lessons of the Iranian hostage crisis spurred subsequent
administrations to review the entire range of alternatives available for protecting
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limited—but highly visible—national interests like American diplomatic personnel
and property. For example, National Security Decision Directives 62 and 63, approved
in the Clinton administration, clearly identified specific U.S. interests and critical infra-
structure for protection in a more definitive way than previously.115 The George W.
Bush administration, after the September 11 attacks, established the Department of
Homeland Security to directly address these threats on an institutional basis. These ac-
tions make obvious a greater and heightened sensitivity and increased alertness to the
possibility of terrorism against Americans than existed in 1979. These actions and
those addressed in chapters 11 and 12 of this monograph will go far toward preparing
the United States more effectively to address future attacks while at the same time pro-
moting responsive contingency planning.
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several other occasions of a similar kind.
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PART THREE
Major Conflict
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Operation DESERT STORM
U.S. air, ground, and naval forces assigned to the United Nations–sponsored coalition
in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM during 1990–91 endured legal scrutiny unlike that
of any other prior military campaign. Unlike other recent combat in which U.S. forces
were involved (Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama), DESERT STORM was conducted under
the threat of chemical strikes and indiscriminate surface-to-surface missile attacks.
Nevertheless, coalition forces carefully adhered both to the law regarding means and
methods of warfare and to the protections to be accorded the victims of armed con-
flict. In contrast, the Iraqi forces operated with no apparent sense of legal obligation.
This chapter addresses Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the response of the
United States and its coalition partners, leading up to the decision to use force. It then
examines the conduct of hostilities by both sides during the conflict. The chapter con-
cludes with some observations on the role of law in the postwar enforcement regime in
Iraq prior to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003.1
Invasion of Kuwait
On 2 August 1990, an Iraqi force of over a hundred thousand troops and several hun-
dred tanks invaded Kuwait, with great precision. The Kuwaiti military, consisting of
only twenty thousand men and 250 tanks, was quickly routed. The emir and crown
prince (who also served as prime minister) fled to Saudi Arabia.
The invasion followed by less than one day the collapse of negotiations on financial
and territorial claims made by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Iraq’s rationale for war was mul-
tifaceted. In July 1990, Iraq was burdened with a huge debt, eighty-two billion dollars,
largely as a result of its 1980–88 war with Iran. Twenty-five billion dollars of this
amount was owed to Kuwait’s emir, who claimed and administered the contested is-
lands of Warba and Bubiyan, which controlled Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf. Kuwait
had sown further displeasure in Baghdad in early 1990 by producing more than its
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view, the invasion would resolve a long-standing territorial grievance with Kuwait dat-
ing to the British demarcation of Arab borders in 1922, after the collapse of the Otto-
man Empire.
The Conflict as Bounded by International Law
The law governing the actions of participant states in the Persian Gulf War can be
found in custom and convention. International conventions shaping the actions of the
parties on the battlefields of Kuwait and Iraq largely codify customary international
law, embracing restrictions on the means and methods of warfare and requirements for
the treatment for the victims of the conflict. In addition to the UN Charter and Hague
Convention IV of 1907 addressing weapons and modalities of warfare, the 1949
Geneva Conventions, which provide protections for noncombatants and those hors de
combat, were also applicable to all parties.2
Because of the threat posed to the coalition of states that mobilized to oppose Iraq by
the possible Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons, the prohibitions within the
1925 Geneva Protocol became important as well.3 The United States, its coalition part-
ners (except Oman and the United Arab Emirates), and Iraq were parties to that agree-
ment, which preceded the current Chemical Weapons Convention. The 1925 protocol
prohibited the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in time of war.
Both the United States and Iraq had filed reservations to this treaty, providing they
would not engage in “first use” of these weapons but would not be precluded from a
response “in kind” if they were attacked.4 The United States was also (and is today) a
party to the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction;5 Iraq be-
came a party on 18 April 1991, after the conclusion of hostilities.
Several important conventions addressing the law of armed conflict had no legal appli-
cation to the first Gulf war. These include the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (Protocol I);6 the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military
or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Con-
vention);7 and the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Cer-
tain Conventional Weapons.8 Protocol I was intended to modernize the law of war by
updating and strengthening the 1949 Geneva Conventions but had objectionable pro-
visions resulting in its rejection by the United States, Great Britain, France, Israel, and
Iraq. The ENMOD Convention, which outlaws environmental modifications of a hostile
nature, had been ratified by most coalition states, but not by Iraq. Because it requires one
party to enforce an action against another, it did not apply in DESERT STORM.
8 0 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper Terry\Printer\NPTerry.vp
Friday, October 28, 2005 2:19:27 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
The Conventional Weapons Convention, proscribing certain especially debilitating in-
struments in combat (such as certain uses of flame weapons, certain mines, and booby
traps), had no direct applicability, because the belligerents were not parties to the con-
vention. Nevertheless, all coalition activities were consistent with its language; Iraqi ac-
tions, however, would have violated provisions addressing booby traps and land mines.
Response to Iraqi Aggression
The actions undertaken on behalf of Kuwait were pursued under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter.9 On the day of the Iraqi invasion, the Security Council con-
demned the invasion and demanded that Iraq “withdraw immediately and uncondi-
tionally all its forces” (Resolution 660). On 6 August 1990, the Council ordered a
comprehensive trade and financial embargo (Resolution 661). On 9 August it voted fif-
teen to none to declare null and void Iraq’s purported annexation of Kuwait of 8 Au-
gust (Resolution 662). On 18 August the Council again voted fifteen to none to demand
that Iraq free all detained foreigners (Resolution 664). Resolution 665 reflected an accep-
tance of the U.S. position that force might be necessary to enforce the sanctions.
The Council was concerned with strict compliance with the embargo authorized by
Resolution 661. As it continued, some countries began to suggest they would allow
food shipments to Iraq; Resolution 661 allowed distribution to those most in need, but
not to the Iraqi military. Another issue that arose was whether aircraft flying to Iraq
were adhering to the economic sanctions. Resolution 670, adopted on 25 September,
directed states to take steps to ensure that their aircraft and aircraft flying over their
territory were in compliance. On 30 October 1990, the Security Council tightened the
pressure on Baghdad by approving Resolution 674, which laid the groundwork for seiz-
ing Iraqi assets that had been frozen around the world. Resolution 674 declared Iraq re-
sponsible for all damage and personal injuries resulting from its invasion and illegal
occupation of Kuwait; it further requested states to collect relevant information regard-
ing their claims and those of their nationals and corporations “for restitution or finan-
cial compensation by Iraq.” Finally, when it was apparent that these lesser measures
were inadequate, the Council authorized (in Resolution 678 of 29 November) “all nec-
essary means” after 15 January 1991 to enforce its edict that Iraq withdraw all forces
from Kuwait.
The resulting use of force against Iraq pursuant to UN authorization and the right of
collective self-defense embraced the customary principles of necessity and proportion-
ality.10 As shown below, the forces of the U.S. Central Command and those of the coali-
tion partners carefully avoided both intentional destruction of civilian objects not
imperatively required by military necessity and direct attacks on civilians not taking
part in the hostilities. Coalition forces adhered to these principles through target
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selection and the matching of available forces and weapons systems to selected targets
and Iraqi defenses, notwithstanding Iraq’s violations of its law-of-war obligations to-
ward the Kuwaiti civilian population and civilian objects.
The Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait
When Iraqi forces entered Kuwaiti territory on 2 August 1990, the provisions of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, or Civilians Convention (CC) were immediately applica-
ble.11 By its actions, Iraq had become an “occupying power” in Kuwait, with specific ob-
ligations to the Kuwaiti people and other third-country citizens in Kuwait and in Iraq.12
Although Iraqi officials were quick to claim that U.S. citizens in Iraq and Kuwait were
spies, Security Council Resolution 664 of 18 August 1990 made clear that the Iraqi gov-
ernment was obliged to comply completely with the CC and carefully outlined its legal
obligations with regard to foreign civilians under Iraqi control. The resolution obli-
gated Iraq to allow the departure of U.S. citizens and other third-country nationals
from Kuwait or Iraq unless national security dictated otherwise. Under Articles 5, 42,
and 78 of the CC, Iraq could intern foreign nationals in Iraq only if internal security
made it “absolutely necessary,” in Kuwait only if “imperative.” Iraq did not assert these
provisions in defense of its illegal hostage taking.
The conduct of the Iraqi government was the more onerous because of its placement
of American and other forced detainees in or around military targets as “human
shields,” in violation of Articles 28 and 38(4) of the CC. This act, coupled with the tak-
ing of hostages in violation of Article 34, unlawful deportations in violation of Article
49 of the same convention, and compelling hostages to serve in the Iraqi military, were
all grave breaches under CC Article 147 and thus punishable as war crimes should trial
and conviction result.13
As a result of intense international pressure, noncombatant hostages from the United
States and other third parties (except Kuwaitis) were released in December 1990, well
before the commencement of coalition combatant operations. Not only, however, did
Iraq not release Kuwaiti civilians, but it seized many more during the final phase of
DESERT STORM and used them to shield retreating Iraqi forces from coalition forces
liberating Kuwait.
Iraq treated civilians in the occupied state brutally. The government of Kuwait has esti-
mated that 1,082 civilians were murdered during the occupation and that many more
were forcibly deported to Iraq. The 2 August invasion implicated not only the CC on
behalf of Kuwaiti citizens but also the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, the 1948 Genocide Convention, and the 1954 Hague
Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property.14 Although Iraq is not a party to
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the 1907 Hague Convention, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg stated
in 1946 that its rules are recognized by “all civilized nations . . . as being a declaration
of the laws and customs of war.”15
From the outset, Iraqi forces and its government leaders denied Iraq’s status as an oc-
cupying power. That denial was belied, however, by Iraq’s claim of Kuwait as the nine-
teenth Iraqi province and its transfer of a part of the Iraqi civilian infrastructure into it
for the purpose of annexation and resettlement, both of which constituted clear viola-
tions of Article 49 of the CC.16
Similarly, the confiscation of certain private and public Kuwaiti property was prohib-
ited by Articles 46, 53, 55, and 56 of the regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV.
Confiscation of immovable national public property (e.g., buildings) is authorized and
its use allowed, but it may not be damaged. Movable national public property may not
be seized without a military requirement for its use, and the property is subject to cash
compensation at the conclusion of hostilities. Iraq violated each of these requirements.
The provisions of the 1954 Hague Convention (concerning cultural property) were ap-
plied by all parties to the coalition. Although the United States is not party to the con-
vention, it specifically applied its provisions in its targeting portfolios. Article 4(1)
provides specific protections for cultural property, to include shrines, temples, and rec-
ognized structures of national and religious significance.17 Waiver of these protections
is permitted under Article 4(2) in the case of “imperative military necessity,” such as
when an enemy uses otherwise protected property to shield lawful military objectives.
An example during DESERT STORM was the placement of Iraqi combat aircraft contigu-
ous to the ancient Temple of Ur.18 Despite such actions, U.S. and other coalition mem-
bers made every attempt to respect Iraqi cultural property.
The most disturbing abuse of civilians witnessed during the Gulf War concerned the
obvious attempt to destroy the identity of the Kuwaiti people, in violation of the Geno-
cide Convention. The 1948 convention made it an international crime to commit acts
with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group as such. These acts include killing members of the group, causing serious bodily
or mental harm to them, deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring
about the group’s physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures in-
tended to prevent births, or forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group. Evidence indicates Iraq committed acts violative of each of these categories ex-
cept forcible transfer of Kuwaiti children to another group. Kuwaiti citizens were mur-
dered and tortured; others were forcibly removed to Iraq. Women of childbearing age
were brutalized and rendered incapable of conceiving. Collective executions were com-
monplace. Public records were collected and destroyed, and Kuwaiti identification
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cards and license plates were replaced with Iraqi credentials, identifying the people and
property as belonging to the state of Iraq.
In the process of destroying the identity of Kuwait’s civilian population, Iraqi adminis-
trators denied Kuwaitis, those who had not succeeded in escaping to Saudi Arabia, the
necessities of survival (such as adequate food, water, and basic medical care), in violation
of Articles 55 and 56 of the Civilians Convention. Equally significant, medical supplies
and equipment in Kuwaiti hospitals necessary for the needs of the civilian population
were removed, in violation of Article 57 of the CC. This brutal disregard for law was
evident in the findings of U.S. Army war crimes investigators that many Kuwaiti infants
died as a result of the removal of infant-care equipment from Kuwaiti hospitals.19
Law of Armed Conflict Issues
Targeting considerations during the hostilities presented another area of stark contrast.
As the air and ground portions of the campaign unfolded, it became clear that Iraq
lacked any significant capability to project force accurately outside of Iraq through its
missile batteries. Despite its lack of targeting capacity, Iraq proved very willing to direct
Scud ballistic missiles toward the cities of its enemies. Under the best of circumstances,
Scuds are indiscriminate; however, Iraq deliberately employed these missiles as terror
weapons, declaring that it intended to rain random destruction on enemy civilian pop-
ulations. Even less excusably, Iraq made a number of Scud attacks on Israel, a country
not a party to the conflict and not in the coalition. Iraq also possessed chemical and bi-
ological weapons capabilities, which it had previously used in both internal and exter-
nal conflicts. Iraq had made clear that their use would not be constrained by any legal
limitations, although in the event, apparently for practical reasons, it did not use either
weapon during DESERT STORM. In short, Iraq complied with the law of armed conflict
only to the extent it was not able to violate it.
In contrast, coalition forces placed major emphasis on targeting only military and
military-related targets in Iraq and occupied Kuwait. It subjected targeting to legal
review at all levels, both the broadest war plan and each specific mission.
The law of targeting is based upon the customary international law principles of neces-
sity and proportionality.20 Necessity requires that only objectives of military impor-
tance be attacked; it permits the use of overwhelming mass to destroy those objectives.
However, proportionality, the coaxial principle to necessity, requires that unnecessary
destruction be avoided. The law of targeting, therefore, requires that, consistent with
mission accomplishment, all reasonable precautions be taken to ensure that only mili-
tary objectives are targeted and that civilians and civilian objects are protected to the
extent possible.
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The customary principles described above reflect three parallel but fundamental
principles of the law of armed conflict. These provide that the right of belligerents to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited; that it is prohibited to launch
attacks against the civilian population as such; and that distinctions must be made
between combatants and noncombatants, to the effect that noncombatants are
spared insofar as possible.21
Coalition forces during DESERT STORM made every effort to comply with these re-
quirements. They took a number of immediate steps to minimize the risk to noncom-
batants when attacking lawful targets in populated areas. Aircraft and munitions were
selected, whenever possible, so as to achieve the greatest possible accuracy. Support air-
craft accompanied and protected attacking aircraft so their crews could concentrate on
their mission. Positive identification of targets was required before munitions were re-
leased; for this reason, 25 percent of all attack aircraft missions never dropped their
munitions. In the ground war, similar precautions were invoked. The maneuver plan
was designed in part to avoid the heavily populated areas along the coast of Kuwait,
where civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects would have been high.22
Despite every reasonable effort to minimize collateral damage, there were 2,500–3,000
civilian casualties as a result of the air campaign.23 This can be attributed to several
causes: the integration by Iraq of its civilian and military infrastructure in Baghdad;
Iraq’s refusal to move critical targets outside of populated areas; and Iraq’s failure to
implement civil defense evacuation procedures that had been rehearsed in Baghdad
prior to the inception of the air campaign. In any case, compared to the thirty thou-
sand lost in Rotterdam during one day of German bombing during World War II, the
Iraqi civilian losses, though significant, gain some perspective.
The U.S. and coalition effort to apply discrimination in all targeting associated with
ground and air missions over Iraq and occupied Kuwait must be juxtaposed against in-
discriminate Iraqi practices. Not only did the Iraqis attack cities and other civilian ob-
jects in Saudi Arabia and Israel with unguided ballistic missiles, but they attacked
petroleum facilities in Kuwait and fouled Gulf waters, with no military advantage to be
gained, reflecting a total repudiation of Hague and Geneva law.
Prisoners of War
In DESERT STORM, U.S. practice in dealing with enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) re-
flected great improvement over Vietnam.24 During the Vietnam conflict, U.S. forces ex-
perienced significant difficulty in providing for captured personnel as a result of a lack
of centralized management, inadequate training of prisoner-handling units, delayed es-
tablishment of a prisoner of war information center, and loose accountability.25
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Coalition forces in DESERT STORM, in contrast, carefully followed the tenets of the
Third Geneva Convention for all EPWs and the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Civil-
ians Convention, for all civilian internees. During the operation, 86,743 Iraqi prisoners
of war were captured, with a total of 69,820 EPWs and civilian internees marshaled
through U.S.-operated facilities between 19 January and 2 May 1991.26 During the pre-
ceding, preparatory operation, DESERT SHIELD, because of the Arab occupation of the
defense belt along the Kuwait-Saudi border, the Saudi government handled all detained
persons and Iraqi deserters.
Centralized management of EPW operations began during DESERT SHIELD. The Na-
tional Prisoner of War Information Center was in place and operational well before the
ground offensive began. The Center used for collecting information and accounting for
personnel a new automated program that satisfied all requirements of the Third and
Fourth Geneva Conventions.27
Consistent with the requirements for transfer in Articles 46–48 of the Third Geneva
Convention, U.S. policy required that a formal international agreement approved by
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and by the State
Department be concluded as a prerequisite for transferring any EPWs to a coalition
partner.28 Agreements were concluded with Saudi Arabia on 15 January 1991, with the
United Kingdom on 31 January 1991, and with France on 24 February.29 These agree-
ments outlined the actions to be taken by capturing forces in processing the prisoners
and internees to the U.S. camps, through medical channels, and then to the Saudi gov-
ernment for final repatriation. Officials of the International Committee of the Red
Cross stated at the time that the coalition handling of Iraqi prisoners was the best they
had observed under the Third Geneva Convention.
Conversely, Iraqi treatment of the twenty-one captured coalition personnel failed to
comply with most articles of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War. Coalition prisoners were not given “capture cards”; never registered with
the ICRC; used in propaganda videos; paraded before the Iraqi populace; beaten,
shocked, and generally mistreated; and denied writing privileges.30
Coalition prisoners were transported to Baghdad, where they were interrogated, then
incarcerated. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force personnel were confined in the Iraqi
Intelligence Service Regional Headquarters, a legitimate military target of the coalition,
in violation of Article 23 of the Third Geneva Convention.31 American prisoners were
placed at great risk on 23 February 1991, when the facility was bombed by U.S. aircraft.
Army prisoners of war were detained at the Ar Rashid Military Prison, where they re-
mained until repatriation. The detention of prisoners of war in criminal confinement
facilities is expressly prohibited by Article 22 of the Third Convention unless justified
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by the conduct of the prisoners themselves.32 That circumstance was never asserted by
the Iraqi government.
Damage to the Environment
Another significant issue was the carnage to the natural environment wrought by Iraqi
forces during Operation DESERT STORM. The damage was unprecedented among re-
cent conflicts. Iraqi forces had wired with explosives, and ultimately detonated, more
than six hundred oil wells in occupied Kuwait. Additionally, Iraq dumped more than
seven million barrels of Kuwaiti crude oil into Gulf waters.33 The extensive and inten-
tional damage caused by the fires and oil spills represented precisely the kind of vindic-
tive and wanton destruction that has long been prohibited by the laws of war. This
basic principle is reflected in many specific rules, such as the prohibition on pillage.34
Even if a case could be made that these acts were accomplished for a military purpose,
the magnitude of destruction was clearly disproportionate under the circumstances.35
Equally significant, Iraq’s status as an occupying power placed it under a special obliga-
tion with respect to property in Kuwait.36
The Iraqi case during DESERT STORM demonstrated two principles. First, the Hague
and Geneva Convention rules governing armed conflict, though designed to protect ci-
vilian lives, health, and property, also protect the environment. Second, knowledge of
the environmental consequences of military action affects the application of these
rules, broadening the restraint imposed upon combatants. In other words, the Iraqi
leadership was required to consider the effects of their actions on the environment, if
only because failure to do so would result in unlawful injury to civilians and nonmili-
tary objects.37
The Regulations Annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV have direct application to
Iraqi actions. Article 22 provides that “the right of belligerents to adopt means of injur-
ing the enemy is not unlimited.” Article 23g specifies that it is especially forbidden “to de-
stroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such seizure be imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war.” Article 46 adds that “private property cannot be confiscated” by an oc-
cupying force, and Article 47 states that “pillage is formally forbidden.”
To clarify further the restrictions upon occupying powers such as Iraq during
DESERT STORM, Article 55 states, “The occupying State shall not be regarded only
as administrator . . . of . . . real estate . . . belonging to the hostile State, and situ-
ated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and
safeguard them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.” Had these strictures been
observed by Iraq, there would have been no significant violation of Kuwait’s envi-
ronment or that of its Gulf neighbors.
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The Geneva Conventions of 1949 built upon the requirements and prohibitions of
the 1907 Hague Conventions. Article 50 of Geneva Convention I (Wounded and Sick
in the Field), for example, provides that it shall be a grave breach for any state to
commit extensive destruction of property that is not justified by military necessity
and is carried out unlawfully or wantonly. Article 51 of Geneva Convention II
(Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked at Sea) merely restates this rule. The Fourth
Geneva Convention (Civilians Convention), while restating in Article 147 the general
protections for the environment seen in the Hague Rules, also places significant re-
sponsibilities upon an occupying power. Article 53 provides that “any destruction by
the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually, or collec-
tively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or
cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations.” It can certainly be argued that Kuwait’s
territorial seas, bays, beaches, and oil fields were subjected to wanton, unlawful de-
struction unjustified by military necessity.38
In comparison to those activities related to the environment directed by Saddam
Hussein, coalition forces planned their campaign to preserve, rather than destroy, hu-
man and material values to the extent possible. Targeting of Iraqi military installations
was conducted such that minimal collateral damage was inflicted. The most discrimi-
nate weapons available were used. Psychological operations advised of opportunities to
surrender without penalty, and those who surrendered were treated with dignity. In
short, the coalition forces were scrupulous in their adherence to law.
Availability of a Post–DESERT STORM Enforcement Regime
The importance of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to Operation DESERT STORM ex-
tended beyond the provisions of the articles themselves. The enforcement regime rep-
resented in articles common to each of the four conventions required that grave
breaches by each of the contracting parties be identified and addressed.39 Moreover, an-
other article common to each required penal sanctions.40 That article, the cornerstone
of the enforcement regime, obligates each contracting party to enact implementing leg-
islation, search for persons alleged to have committed breaches of the conventions, and
bring such persons before its own courts or, if it prefers, hand them over for trial to an-
other state party concerned. Article 146 of Geneva Convention IV provides further that
the accused persons shall benefit from proper trial and defense no less favorable than
the safeguards provided in Article 105 (and those following) of the 1949 Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. When those provisions address-
ing violations by individuals are considered in conjunction with the requirements of
Article 3 of Hague Convention IV (that violating states are liable to pay compensation
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to the injured state), a comprehensive scheme, and one appropriate for addressing Iraqi
actions in the First Gulf War, becomes apparent.41
The First Gulf Conflict in Perspective
The events leading up to the 1990–91 first Gulf war, the DESERT SHIELD and DESERT
STORM operations, and the follow-on PROVIDE COMFORT and SOUTHERN WATCH ini-
tiatives, will continue to be reviewed by historians and lawyers, because they represent
textbook examples of both disregard for and compliance with the rule of law. In pre-
cipitating the 1990 crisis, in invading and occupying Kuwait, and in engaging coalition
forces, Saddam Hussein reached ever-greater heights of ingenuity in flouting the rule
of law of civilized nations. Conversely, the coalition forces complied with both jus ad
bellum (the law of self-defense) and jus in bello (the law of the conduct of war).
Of importance, the United Nations Security Council has never worked harder than it
did then to ensure that a victim of aggression was returned to the status quo ante and
that the aggressor was appropriately penalized for its actions. The UN-sponsored coali-
tion successfully expelled Iraq from Kuwaiti territory, but the compensation for dam-
age and depletion of resources was not forthcoming. Stonewalling by the Baathist
regime of Saddam Hussein was to be very costly for the government of Kuwait.
Resolution 692 created an effective regime for compensation drawn from Iraqi oil ex-
port revenues. This resolution also allocated a share of those revenues to providing re-
lief to the Iraqi people. Nevertheless, Saddam Hussein refused to avail himself of this
opportunity, denying not only compensation to Kuwait but all but minimal food and
medicine to his own people.
The actions of the Iraqi leadership under Saddam Hussein not only frustrated the Ku-
waitis’ right to reparations but emphasized that the people of Iraq, with no history of
democratic participation and no cohesive infrastructure capable of mobilizing against
tyrannical leadership, would suffer not only from without but also, more egregiously,
from within. This had nothing to do with the law of armed conflict, but everything to
do with the failed political system in Baghdad.
The actions on the part of the Baathists during and after DESERT STORM emphasized
that the failure to enforce acceptable behavior on the part of Iraq during and following
armed conflict could not be attributed to an inadequacy of law but rather to an incom-
plete implementation of an enforcement regime by the member states of the United
Nations. In form, the enforcement mechanisms were more than satisfactory. In sub-
stance, the United Nations proved incapable of exerting sufficient pressure on the Iraqi
government to enforce anything near full compliance.
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ment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 Decem-
ber 1948, UN Doc. A/810, p. 174; 78 UNTS
277. Convention for the Protection of Cul-
tural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict, 14 May 1954, reprinted in Dietrich
Schindler and Jirí Toman, The Laws of
Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conven-
tions, Resolutions and Other Documents
(Leiden, Neth.: Sijthoff; and Geneva: Henry
Dunant Institute, 1973), p. 529.
15. International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg),
“Judgment and Sentence,” American Journal of
International Law 41 (1947), p. 172.
16. Article 49 provides, in part, “The Occupying
Power shall not deport or transfer parts of
its own civilian population into the territory
it occupies.”
17. During review of proposed target lists, com-
mand judge advocates and lawyers on the
staff of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in Washington ensured that Article 4(1)
was carefully adhered to as a matter of pol-
icy, even though the United States was not a
party to the 1954 convention.
18. Although it was recognized by American
military officials that the Iraqi actions made
the Temple of Ur a legitimate target, U.S.
control of the air made it unnecessary to
eliminate those two aircraft.
19. The U.S. Army investigation was conducted
in 1991 by reservists coordinated by the In-
ternational Affairs Division, Office of the
Judge Advocate General of the Army.
20. See chapter 1.
21. For a thorough review of these principles,
see U.S. Navy Dept., The Commander’s
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,
NWP-9 (Rev. A) (Washington, D.C.: 1989).
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22. A discussion of the thinking that went into
the decision to adopt the maneuver plan in
DESERT STORM is included in appendix O to
the Title V Report (on the Conduct of the
Persian Gulf Conflict) of the Persian Gulf
Conflict Supplemental Authorization and
Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 [hereafter Ti-
tle V Report].
23. See William Arkin, Needless Deaths in the Gulf
War: Civilian Casualties during the Air Cam-
paign and Violations of the Laws of War (New
York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), p. 19.
24. See Title V Report, appendix L, for a thor-
ough discussion of the Vietnam difficulties
in EPW management.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid. U.S. EPW facilities were operational
until 2 May 1991, when the last EPW was
turned over to the Saudis for repatriation.
27. Ibid.
28. This process is further explained in appendix
L to the Title V Report.
29. Ibid.
30. See Title V Report, appendix L, pp. 29–33.
31. Article 23 states, in part: “No prisoner of war
may at any time be sent to, or detained in ar-
eas where he may be exposed to the fire of
the combat zone, nor may his presence be
used to render certain points of areas im-
mune from military operations.”
32. Article 22 states in part, “Except in particular
cases which are justified by the interests of
the prisoners themselves, they shall not be
interned in penitentiaries.”
33. Title V Report, appendix L, p. 49.
34. See, e.g., the principles reflected in Articles
22, 23(a), 23(e), and 28 of the 1907 Hague
(IV) Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land; Article 33 of the
1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War; and Articles 35(2), 48, 51, and 57 of the
1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions.
35. Article 147 of the 1949 Geneva Civilians
Convention describes as a “grave breach” of
the convention “willfully causing . . . exten-
sive destruction and appropriation of prop-
erty, not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly.”
36. See, e.g., the principles reflected in Articles
46, 47, and 55 of the regulations annexed to
the 1907 Hague (IV) Convention Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, as
well as Article 56 of the 1949 Geneva Con-
vention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Ci-
vilian Persons in Time of War.
37. See James P. Terry, “The Environment and
the Laws of War: The Impact of DESERT
STORM,” Naval War College Review 45, no. 1
(Winter 1992), p. 61.
38. See ibid., pp. 61–67.
39. See Art. 51, Geneva Convention I (GC I); Art.
52, GC II; Art 131, GC III; and Art. 148, GC IV.
40. See Art. 49, GC I; Art. 50, GC II; Art. 129, GC
III; and Art. 146, GC IV.
41. UN Security Council Resolution 687, requir-
ing Iraqi compensation to Kuwait, had its
underpinning in Art. 3, Hague Convention
IV of 1907.
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Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
The determination by the Bush administration to enter Iraq and remove the regime of
Saddam Hussein from power in early 2003 followed twelve years of Iraqi violations of
United Nations Security Council resolutions following Operation DESERT STORM.
Prior to the decision by the United States and its coalition partners to intervene,
Saddam Hussein had done everything possible to avoid complying with the will of the
international community. Of the twenty-six demands made by the Security Council
since 1991, Iraq had complied with only three. Equally significant, the regime’s repres-
sion of the Iraqi people had continued.
The 2 October 2002 joint resolution of the Congress authorizing the use of all means,
including force, to bring Iraq into compliance was merely one of a series of actions by
the Congress to address the noncompliance by Baghdad of its international obliga-
tions.1 In 1998, for example, the Congress passed a similar resolution.2 It declared that
Iraq’s continuing “weapons of mass destruction” programs threatened vital American
interests and international peace and security; declared Iraq to be “in material breach
of its international obligations”; and urged President Clinton “to take all appropriate
action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to
bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations.”3
These congressional and UN Security Council resolutions were not the only outcry for
change. In the Iraq Liberation Act, passed in 1998, U.S. lawmakers expressed the sense
of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to re-
move from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic
government to replace that regime.4 The reasons for this strong congressional reaction
to the Hussein regime rested not solely on Iraqi defiance of United Nations resolutions
but also on Saddam Hussein’s repression of the Iraqi people, his support for interna-
tional terrorism, his refusal to account for Gulf War prisoners, his refusal to return sto-
len property to Kuwait following the 1990–91 conflict, and the Baathist regime’s efforts
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Framework for Discussion
This chapter examines these Iraqi violations in the context of contemporary interna-
tional law standards justifying intervention. More significantly, it examines the right of
states to enforce mandates issued by the Security Council and to redress violations of its
edicts when the Council, as a body, subsequently refuses to do so; this is precisely what
occurred with respect to Iraq when the Baathist regime refused to comply fully with the
requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1441.5 Finally, the chapter examines the
independent authorities available to states, such as the right to intervene to address a
threat to international peace and security under Article 51 of the Charter, and the right to
invoke the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, when the Security Council cannot or
will not act in circumstances in which its edicts have been clearly violated.
The U.S. intervention with its coalition partners in Iraq in March 2003 must be viewed
as a significant historical precedent in the relationship of a major power to the Security
Council. Previously, in 1998 in Kosovo, the United States and a coalition largely made
up of NATO partners intervened, as we have seen, to rescue and protect the threatened
Albanian population from Serb aggression without specific Security Council approval.
The military action in Kosovo could arguably be justified as a humanitarian interven-
tion;6 in contrast, the coalition entry into Iraq in 2003 was justified on the basis of re-
peated violations of UN Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII (authorizing
all necessary means) and the threat to international peace and security in the region
and to the world community posed by the Saddam Hussein regime as a result thereof.
As President Bush stated to the UN General Assembly on 12 September 2002,
Twelve years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait without provocation. And the regime’s forces were poised to
continue their march to seize other countries and their resources. Had Saddam Hussein been ap-
peased instead of stopped, he would have endangered the peace and stability of the world. Yet the ag-
gression was stopped—by the might of coalition forces and the will of the United Nations.
To suspend hostilities, to spare himself, Iraq’s dictator accepted a series of commitments. The terms were
clear, to him and to all. And he agreed to prove he is complying with every one of those obligations.
He has proven instead only his contempt for the United Nations, and for all his pledges. By breaking every
pledge—by his deceptions, and by his cruelties—Saddam Hussein has made the case against himself. . . .
The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to
peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces
a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be
honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose
of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?7
Thus, the intervention in Iraq must be viewed through a different lens than either our
intervention in Afghanistan, where we responded to a direct attack on America, or our
intervention in Kosovo, where the coalition responded to a solely humanitarian crisis.8
In Iraq, the coalition led by the United States and the United Kingdom was responding
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to an attack on the very effectiveness of the United Nations security system, by seeking
redress for repeated violations of Security Council resolutions that, if not addressed di-
rectly, would have done irreparable harm to the minimum world order system repre-
sented by Article 2(4) and Chapter VII of the Charter, to the peace and security of the
region, and to the well-being of the Iraqi people, through continued repression.9
Analysis of Iraqi Violations of Security Council Mandates
Prior to intervention on 19 March 2003 and the inception of Operation IRAQI FREE-
DOM, the regime of Saddam Hussein had repeatedly violated sixteen UN Security
Council resolutions (UNSCRs) designed to place sharp controls on the regime’s activi-
ties and to ensure that Iraq did not pose a threat to international peace and security.10
These violations spanned a period of more than twelve years and were first addressed in
Security Council resolutions arising from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
In UNSCR 678, passed in the fall of 1990, UN member states were authorized “to use all
necessary means” to redress the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.11 Resolution 686 (1991) placed
requirements on Iraq to return all prisoners, restore all property seized, and accept liabil-
ity for all damages arising from its illegal invasion of Kuwait.12 The most significant of the
early resolutions addressing Iraqi violations, UNSCR 687 (cease-fire resolution of 3 April
1991), required that Iraq “unconditionally accept” the destruction, removal, or neutral-
ization “under international supervision” of all “chemical and biological weapons and all
stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components,” and further required that
Iraq declare fully its weapons of mass destruction programs, not “use, develop, construct
or acquire” any weapons of mass destruction, and reaffirm its obligations under the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty.13 This was followed by UNSCR 688 (1991), which “con-
demn[ed]” Iraq’s repression of its civilian population, “the consequences of which
threaten international peace and security,” and demanded that this repression cease.14
In UNSCR 707 (1991), the Security Council “condemn[ed]” Iraq’s “serious violation” of
UNSCR 687 and further “condemn[ed]” Iraq’s noncompliance with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. This resolution required that Iraq halt nuclear activities of all kinds and mandated
a full and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction and mis-
sile programs.15 When Iraq did not cooperate as required, the Council passed UNSCR 715
(1991), mandating that Iraq cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors.16
In 1994, Saddam Hussein’s regime began military deployments once again designed to
threaten Kuwait. The Security Council passed UNSCR 949 (1994) condemning these
movements and directing Iraq not to utilize its military or other forces in a hostile
manner so as to threaten its neighbors or UN operations in Iraq.17
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Within two years, it was apparent that Saddam Hussein was again acquiring unautho-
rized weapons components. In response, in 1996 the Security Council passed UNSCRs
1051 and 1060. In UNSCR 1051, the Council demanded that Iraq report to the UN and
IAEA shipments of dual-use items related to weapons of mass destruction.18 It also
required that Iraq cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors and allow them im-
mediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access. UNSCR 1060, in turn, “deplored”
Iraq’s refusal to allow access to UN inspectors and its “clear violations” of previous
UN resolutions.19
In 1997, with access for inspectors still effectively denied, the Security Council passed
UNSCR 1115, which “condemn[ed] repeated refusal of Iraqi officials to allow access” to
UN officials. The Council claimed these actions to be a “clear and flagrant violation” of
UNSCRs 687, 707, 715, and 1060.20 In UNSCR 1134 (1997) the Security Council repeated
the demands contained in UNSCR 1115.21 When Iraqi actions threatened the safety of
UN personnel in late 1997, the Council “condemn[ed] the continued violations by Iraq”
of previous UN resolutions, including its “implicit threat” to the safety of aircraft oper-
ated by UN inspectors and its tampering with UN inspector monitoring equipment.22
The Iraqi lack of cooperation with the inspection regime continued in 1998, and in
March the Security Council passed UNSCR 1154, which stated that any violation
would have the “severest consequences for Iraq.”23 On 5 August 1998, the Baathist re-
gime suspended all cooperation with UN and IAEA inspectors. This led to Security
Council condemnation in Resolution 1194 (1998) and the declaration that Iraqi ac-
tions constituted “a totally unacceptable contravention” of its obligations under
UNSCRs 687, 707, 715, and 1060.24 On 31 October 1998 the Iraqis made their August
suspension permanent and ceased cooperation with UN inspectors. The Council, in
UNSCR 1205, “condemn[ed]” this decision and described it as a “flagrant violation” of
UNSCR 687 and other resolutions.25
In 1999, frustrated with the continued lack of Iraqi cooperation, the Security Council
passed Resolution 1284, which created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification,
and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace the previous weapons inspection
team, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which had existed since
1991. In creating this new entity, the Council stated that Iraq must allow UNMOVIC
“immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access” to Iraqi officials and facilities.26
This concern with Iraqi weapons was reemphasized in UNSCR 1382 (2001), which re-
affirmed the obligation of all states to prevent the sale or supply to Iraq of weapons or
any other military equipment.27
Finally, in UNSCR 1441 (2002), under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council
stated it was “determined to secure full compliance with its decisions.”28 The Council
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“decide[d] that Iraq ha[d] been and remain[ed] in material breach of its obligations
under relevant resolutions . . ., [d]ecide[d] . . . to afford Iraq . . . a final opportunity to
comply with its disarmament obligations . . .,” and “decide[d] that false statements or
omissions in the declarations submitted . . . shall constitute a further material breach of
Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment.”29
Equally disturbing, during the period represented by the preceding resolutions Saddam
Hussein had repeatedly circumvented UN economic sanctions, refused to allow weapons
inspectors to oversee the destruction of his weapons of mass destruction, failed to destroy
his ballistic missiles of range greater than 150 kilometers, failed to stop support for terror-
ism or prevent terrorist organizations from operating within Iraq, declined to help account
for missing Kuwaitis, refused to return stolen Kuwaiti property or bear financial responsi-
bility for damage from the first Gulf war, and continued his repression of the Iraqi people.30
In addition to the legally binding resolutions, the Security Council had also issued at
least thirty statements from its president regarding Saddam Hussein’s continued viola-
tions of these resolutions.31 On 7 March, following the thirty days provided in Resolu-
tion 1441 for an Iraqi response to the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1441 and full
compliance therewith, Secretary of State Colin Powell documented for the Council
Iraq’s unresponsiveness.32 He summarized:
Iraq’s current behavior, like the behavior chronicled in Dr. Blix’s document*, reveals its strategic deci-
sion to continue to delay, to deceive, to try to throw us off the trail, to make it more difficult, to hope
that the will of the international community will be fractured, that we will go off in different direc-
tions, that we will get bored with the task, that we will remove the pressure, we will remove the force.
And we know what has happened when that has been done in the past.
We know that the Iraqis are still not volunteering information and, when they do, what they are giv-
ing is often partial and misleading. We know that when confronted with facts, the Iraqis are still
changing their story to explain those facts—but not enough to give us the truth.33
Confronting Security Council Inaction
When President Bush secured broad bipartisan support for the Joint Resolution to Au-
thorize the Use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq on 2 October 2002, few
could have imagined that the Security Council would not ultimately follow suit.34 After
all, U.S. leaders had obtained unanimous support in the Council for UNSCR 1441,
which all but constituted an ultimatum. Secretary Powell clearly defined the burden of
Council membership in his 7 March 2003 address, in which he had carefully outlined
the failure of Iraq to comply with UNSCR 1441:
Security Council membership carries heavy responsibilities. We must not walk away. We must not
find ourselves here this coming November with the pressure removed and with Iraq once again
marching down the merry path to weapons of mass destruction, threatening the region, threatening
the world.
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If we fail to meet our responsibilities, the credibility of this Council and its ability to deal with all the
critical challenges we face will suffer. As we sit here, let us not forget the horror still going on in Iraq,
with a spare moment to remember the suffering Iraqi people whose treasure is being spent on these
kinds of programs and not for their own benefit; people who are being beaten, brutalized and robbed
by Saddam Hussein and his regime.
Colleagues, now is the time for the Council to send a clear message to Saddam that we have not been
taken in by his transparent tactics. Nobody wants war, but it is clear that the limited progress we have
seen, the slight substantive changes we have seen, come from the presence of a large military force—
nations who are willing to put their young men and women in harm’s way in order to rid the world of
these dangerous weapons.
It doesn’t come simply from resolutions. It doesn’t come simply from inspectors. It comes from the
will of this Council, the unified will of this Council and the willingness to use force, if it comes to that,
to make sure that we achieve the disarmament of Iraq.
Now is the time for the Council to tell Saddam Hussein that the clock has not been stopped by his strata-
gems and his machinations. We believe that the resolution that has been put forward for action by this
Council is appropriate and, in the very near future, we should bring it before this Council for a vote.35
The draft resolution Secretary Powell spoke of was opposed by Russia and France and
thus was never formally proposed for a vote within that body. The provisional draft of
7 March 2003, brought under Chapter VII of the Charter, stated that the Council was
determined to secure full compliance with its decisions and to restore international
peace and security in the area.36 It further stated
that Iraq will have failed to take the final opportunity afforded by resolution 1441 (2002) unless, on or
before 17 March 2003, the Council concludes that Iraq has demonstrated full, unconditional, immediate
and active cooperation in accordance with its disarmament obligations under resolution 1441 (2002)
and previous relevant resolutions, and is yielding possession to UNMOVIC and the IAEA of all weapons,
weapon delivery and support systems and structures, prohibited by resolution 687 (1991) and all subse-
quent relevant resolutions, and all information regarding prior destruction of such items.37
When the Council did not agree to the proposed resolution, President Bush, with the
support of the United Kingdom, Spain, and more than forty other nations, directed
U.S. forces, in a coalition with the British, to enter Iraq on 19 March and remove the
regime of Saddam Hussein.38 This decision came only after President Bush determined
that reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone
would not lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions regarding Iraq, and further that the Security Council, despite the Iraqi lack of
compliance with UNSCR 1441, would not act.
Not surprisingly, on 22 May 2003, after the United States and Great Britain freed the
region from the threat posed by the Baathist regime in Iraq and the Iraqi people from
the repression of Saddam Hussein, the Security Council passed UNSCR 1483, by a vote
of fourteen to none.39 This resolution recognized the United States and the United
Kingdom as the “authority” in Iraq pending establishment of an independent demo-
cratic Iraqi government and affirmed “the need for accountability for crimes and
atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi regime.” Acting under Chapter VII of the
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UN Charter (and expressly recognizing that the situation in Iraq “continues to consti-
tute a threat to international peace and security”), the Security Council “call[ed] upon
the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant in-
ternational law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective admin-
istration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of
conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi
people can freely determine their own political future.”40
Analysis of the Lawfulness of the Use of Force in Iraq
It is important to consider whether the failure of the Council to act to enforce UNSCR
1441 and the preceding relevant resolutions with respect to Iraq authorizes any indi-
vidual state or coalition of member states to enforce them. In the case of the United
States, President Bush persuasively argued his case before the United Nations on 12
February 2003;41 further, Congress had endorsed the use of force by the president in its
2 October 2002 joint resolution.42 In that resolution, Congress had identified both the
threat to the United States and to international peace and security, and the need for hu-
manitarian intervention:
Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and interna-
tional peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and unacceptable breach
of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant
chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and sup-
porting and harboring terrorist organizations;
Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the United Nations Security Council by continuing to
engage in brutal repression of its civilian population thereby threatening international peace and secu-
rity in the region, by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully de-
tained by Iraq, including an American serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized
by Iraq from Kuwait.43
While the main responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the UN system is
lodged with the fifteen-member Security Council, its effectiveness of the latter as an in-
strument of collective action has often been neutralized when the approval, required in
Article 27(3), of all permanent members is not forthcoming.44 This situation obtained
in March 1999, when the Chinese and Russian delegates refused to support a draft Se-
curity Council resolution authorizing NATO-led forces to intervene in the Kosovo cri-
sis, despite the support of twelve of the fifteen Council members, and in March 2003,
when the Russian and French delegates refused to support the coalition-led interven-
tion in Iraq.
Precisely this possibility had led legal experts to debate long prior to the Kosovo and
Iraq crises criteria to address Council inaction in the face of obvious violations of
Charter principles. In 1974, Professor Lillich, lamenting the inability of the Security
Council to function in matters requiring the unanimous approval of the permanent
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members for Chapter VII “all necessary means” operations, argued that the most im-
portant task confronting international lawyers was to clarify the legitimacy of a state’s
use of force in support of Charter principles.45
In Iraq, as in Kosovo, the coalition’s use of military force was supportive of state practice
that has established the lawfulness of intervention as carefully circumscribed by the pa-
rameters outlined in Article 2(4). Articles 39 to 51 of the Charter establish a framework
for collective security based on the use of military forces and provide the Security Coun-
cil authority for enforcement.46 Despite these powers, the reluctance of certain members
in 1998 and 2003 left the organization on the sidelines at a time when, according to the
Charter, its possibilities should have been used to the maximum. Evidence of partisan-
ship and division among members, and especially among the Permanent Five, may in
part explain the sidetracking of the Security Council. Nevertheless, we should take such
matters with the utmost seriousness and ask ourselves what can be done to restore the
Council to the position of influence it was given in the Charter.
In fact, Chapter VII makes extensive provision for collective action “to maintain or re-
store international peace and security” when a threat to the peace or an act of aggres-
sion has occurred.47 Under Chapter VII it is the Council that must decide whether, in
any particular instance, a threat to the peace exists or aggression has been committed,
and if so, by whom, and finally what collective steps, if any, by the world organization
would best remedy the situation. With the exception of UN-sanctioned action in the
defense of Kuwait in 1990, however, it has never been possible to invoke these collective
enforcement provisions.48 Even in Korea, the potential veto of the Soviet ambassador
obliged the organization to turn to the General Assembly for the necessary authority
under Articles 11, 14, 18, and 24 of the Charter.49
The scarcity of actions brought under the collective action provisions of Chapter VII
does not in any way suggest the existence of a peaceful world. By 1970, Professor
Thomas Franck had already recorded more than one hundred outbreaks of hostility
between states in the some twenty-five years the UN had been in existence.50 The total
is now easily double that number. If the Chapter VII collective action provisions have
been markedly inconspicuous, increasing use has been made by states, including the
United States, of Articles 51, 52, and 53, which set out the rights of states themselves,
under certain exceptional circumstances, to resort to force outside the UN framework.
In fact, it is fair to say that the exceptions have overwhelmed the rule and transformed
the system. This was certainly the case in Iraq in 2003.
In Iraq, the Security Council had repeatedly condemned Iraqi actions that had violated
international peace and security.51 It is important to note that after the United States
and Great Britain successfully intervened in March 2003 to eliminate the threat to
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international peace described in numerous Security Council resolutions and eliminate
the violations of international human rights law described in UNSCR 1441 (2002) and
preceding statements, the Council quickly passed UNSCR 1483 unanimously recogniz-
ing the coalition as the appropriate “authority” in Iraq pending establishment of a law-
ful government. The incongruity of the refusal of the Security Council to support the
coalition intervention that directly supported the repeated demands it had made of
Iraq followed by unanimous approval of a resolution recognizing the interveners as the
legitimate “authority” in Iraq is obvious.
An equally significant credibility gap exists between the noninterventionist policy re-
sulting from a divided Council and fulfillment of the humanitarian principles of the
UN Charter with respect to Iraq. Examining the UN Charter as a whole, it becomes ap-
parent that its two main purposes are the maintenance of peace and security and the
protection of human rights.52 Article 2(4), the Charter provision relevant to both these
purposes, prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations” (emphasis supplied).
The intervention, as argued above, clearly reflected the humanitarian purposes stated
in a myriad of United Nations resolutions. I would further argue that this intervention
did not violate but actually supported the other requirements in Article 2(4), in that it
did not significantly affect, other than in a positive way, the “territorial integrity” or
“political independence” of the state against which directed. The territorial integrity of
Iraq remains undisturbed. Under the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein, there was no
political independence, at least not for the people of Iraq. Nor did political independ-
ence exist for the regime. Heavily sanctioned by the UN for repeated violations of in-
ternational law, the economy was increasingly restricted; the only international
intercourse available to the Baathist leaders lay with other rogue nations.
This argument is even more attractive legally when one studies the actual language of the
Charter. While it is admittedly best known for the articles that create a minimum world
order system, as represented by Article 2(4) (prohibition on the use of force), Article 51
(exception for self-defense), and Chapter VII (Articles 39–51, addressing Security Coun-
cil responsibilities), there is certainly an equal emphasis on protection of human rights.
The Preamble, in fact, focuses on the rights of individuals vice the rights of nations:
The purpose of the Charter is to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in
our lifetime have brought unto sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of
nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.
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Article 1(3) reinforces this preambular language, stating that a principal purpose of the or-
ganization is “to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion.” Article 55 emphasizes the need to promote “universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion.” The Economic and Social Council established in Article
61 provides the means by which the humanitarian objectives set forth in Article 55 are to be
addressed and reported to the Security Council for action.
A New Paradigm
The Iraqi intervention reflects an uneasy recognition that the Charter system is inade-
quate to address certain of the security and humanitarian crises that may come before
the United Nations, if unanimity among the five permanent members of the Security
Council continues to be a requirement. Only the United States and United Kingdom
among the Permanent Five on the Security Council were willing to support an enforce-
ment resolution in the case of Iraq. Nevertheless, some forty nations found that autho-
rization of the Security Council was not necessary, since the action was supportive of,
rather than contrary to, the values represented in Article 2(4).
The March 2003 intervention in Iraq thus requires we once again examine the law re-
lated to intervention in the case of violations of international peace, security, and hu-
man rights. We must attempt to reconcile the Charter’s values, on the one hand, and its
procedures, on the other. Iraq is especially appropriate for consideration since the
widespread violations of its international obligations were acknowledged in the Coun-
cil unanimously in numerous resolutions. Additionally, the human rights violations at-
tributed to the Baathist regime in Baghdad met all the requirements for humanitarian
intervention under pre-Charter law. Specifically, the horrendous crimes against Kurds
in the north and Shiites in the south were widely recognized and little disputed. The
intervention had as its purpose only to redress the threat and end the abuses. There was
no intention other than to restore political independence to the Iraqi people and na-
tion. Its territorial integrity remains intact.
Professor Louis Henkin suggests that the likely result, unless the unanimity require-
ment can be separated from Security Council decisions, will be establishment of prece-
dent whereby states or collectives, confident that the Security Council will acquiesce in
their decision to intervene, shift the burden of the veto. That is, instead of seeking au-
thorization in advance by resolution subject to veto, states or collectives will act and
then challenge the Council to terminate the action. A permanent member favoring the
intervention could frustrate the adoption of such a resolution.53
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Henkin argues, in fact, that this situation may already exist. He suggests that after-the-
fact Security Council ratifications in the Kosovo intervention (with UNSCR 1244) and
by extension in Iraq (with UNSCR 1483) effectively confirmed what might have consti-
tuted unilateral action questionable as a matter of law.54 The actions of the Security
Council in adopting Resolution 1483 and endorsing the authority of the coalition dur-
ing the transition to an independent Iraq clearly reflected a step toward a change in the
law. While it is unlikely there will be a formal change, the Council’s behavior supports
an interpretation of law such that intervention consistent with Charter values (i.e.,
when neither the territorial integrity nor the political independence of the target state
are impacted in ways inconsistent with the values represented by Article 2[4]) will be
endorsed and not condemned.
International law requires that the community of nations first consider all means short
of force to address threats to international peace and security. Where diplomacy fails
and egregious human rights violations are observed, the international community
must not be allowed to excuse its failure to act by pre-Charter references to principles
of nonintervention and sovereign immunity or to the Charter requirement for Security
Council approval when the lack of approval is contrary to the values for which the
Charter stands.
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PART FOUR
U.S. Policy for Peace Operations
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The Development of Criteria
for Peace Operations
The new world order that replaced the Cold War political relationships in 1991 re-
quired the United States and other nations to counter threats that did not challenge
their national interests directly but were no less real. Nearly every contingency opera-
tion in which the United States participated in the 1990s and since has been conducted
in support of a United Nations Security Council mandate under Chapter VII and has
been consistent with our obligations under Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter. The
1990s were truly the peacekeeping “era.”1
U.S. Policy Development for Peace Operations
Whether in Haiti, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, or Rwanda, Presidents George H. W.
Bush and William “Bill” Clinton drew their authority to commit U.S. forces from
Charter commitments represented in Security Council resolutions, which they them-
selves could influence through votes and U.S. “muscle” in the Council.2 This was abso-
lutely critical to buttress their Article II authority as commanders in chief under the
Constitution, as none of the foregoing crises posed a threat to vital national interests or
implicated any mutual defense accord ratified by the Senate.
The conventional criteria for commitment of forces is found in our national security
strategy, which is reflected in the Defense Planning Guidance and the Contingency
Planning Guidance.3 This guidance is designed to address potential threats to U.S. na-
tional interests, which would implicate Article 51 of the UN Charter and our inherent
right of self-defense. The U.S. commitments to peacekeeping and peace-enforcement
operations in the 1990s, however, required an expansion of this conventional thinking,
as each of our commitments in Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia was predicated
upon a UN request for assistance, with no corresponding threat to vital U.S. interests
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By the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration had put in place new criteria for deter-
mining when to commit forces to preserve the peace in areas of instability or unrest,
restore the peace in areas of conflict, reduce the impact of regional strife, and curtail
human suffering. The publication in 1994 of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25,
“Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” reflected this new thinking.4 The strategy
in PDD 25 embraced the U.S. government’s soul-searching in the aftermath of our ex-
perience in Somalia, just as the earlier Weinberger Doctrine had arisen in the wake of
the Beirut bombing in October 1983.5 In fact, the criteria formulated by Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger for U.S. military response to crises abroad was largely
adopted by President Clinton in PDD 25.
The criteria for military support under PDD 25 and for our vote in support of any
given peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation in the Security Council required
that we first ask whether the situation represented a threat to international peace and
security. Second, did the operation as proposed by the secretary general have a defined
scope with clear objectives? Third, was there an international community of interest to
deal with the problem on a multilateral basis? Fourth, if a Chapter VI peacekeeping op-
eration was contemplated, was there a working cease-fire in effect? Fifth, were financial
and human resources available? Finally, was there an identifiable end point to the pro-
posed operation?6
When the commitment of U.S. forces to a UN contingency was to be considered under
PDD 25, interagency representatives would ask whether the peace operation advanced
U.S. interests; whether personnel, funds, and resources were available; whether Ameri-
can participation was necessary for the operation to be successful; whether an end
point for U.S. involvement could be identified; whether congressional and domestic
support existed; and whether command and control arrangements would be accept-
able.7 Satisfactory response to each of these inquiries was viewed as critical.
Finally, when the use of force was contemplated in circumstances where significant
numbers of U.S. personnel had been committed, Presidential Decision Directive 25 re-
quired that it be asked whether we had the ability to commit sufficient forces to achieve
the defined military objectives, whether the leaders of the operation had a clear inten-
tion to achieve decisively the stated objectives, and whether there was sufficient com-
mitment on the part of the UN or other sponsoring body continually to reassess and
adjust the objectives and composition of the force to meet changing security and oper-
ational requirements.8 These criteria, although articulated specifically for UN opera-
tions and other coalition efforts where direct challenges to vital national interests were
not present, offer prudent guidance for any U.S. commitment of forces.
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These policy formulations followed a series of events in 1992 in which Secretary
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had attempted to take advantage of a Security Coun-
cil no longer threatened with a Soviet or Chinese veto during debates on possible
peace-enforcement operations.9 In a January 1992 Security Council meeting attended
by President George H. W. Bush, the president of the Council asked the secretary gen-
eral to provide a report on ways to improve the UN peacekeeping process. In July 1992,
the secretary general submitted his report, An Agenda for Peace.10 President Bush’s Sep-
tember 1992 address to the UN responded to the positive steps of the secretary general
by announcing a series of American initiatives for improving the ability of the United
Nations to conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian operations effectively. Included
were commitments concerning an improved intelligence capability and establishment
of an operations center, as well as assurance that means would be found to provide
better price and availability data for ordering critical equipment, supplies, and services
necessary to sustain sizable operations.11
A Bush administration review of peacekeeping policies culminated in National Security
Directive (NSD) 74. NSD 74 codified the main elements of President Bush’s September
1992 speech.12 The principal elements of the Bush peacekeeping effort outlined in NSD
74 were presented to our allies in a January 1993 meeting.
In February 1993, however, the new Clinton administration directed a “clean slate,”
bottom-up review of U.S. policies toward the United Nations and UN peacekeeping.
NSD 74 was set aside in order to make room for the new administration’s ideas for im-
proving, supporting, and participating in United Nations operations. It was from this
review that PDD 25 emerged.
Events Precipitating Policy Change
Presidential Decision Directive 25 resulted from the confluence of two parallel pro-
cesses. The first was the increased power and influence of a newly unified United Na-
tions Security Council and its resultant vigor in addressing breaches of international
peace and security—often without the required expertise or assets.13 The second strand
reflected a Congress increasingly wary of U.S. participation in UN and other coalition
activities without clear safeguards.
The rejuvenation of the Security Council posed for the United States some significant
concerns. The requirement to address international crises through UN mechanisms
had brought many problems unforeseen by U.S. leaders at the end of the Cold War.14
The most trying of these was the lack of an effective operational capability within the
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, then headed by Kofi Annan.
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There being no operations center at the UN that could fuse information/intelligence
capabilities into effective military planning, that function had to be “contracted out.”
Further, with no cadre of experienced military advisors and planners available to the sec-
retary general, the United Nations was at the mercy of its more affluent and experienced
members for military leadership. Further, the UN, having no intelligence-gathering capa-
bility, either human or electronic, and no access to overhead satellite systems that could
provide real-time intelligence, was able to consider only the information that its suit-
ably sophisticated member states were willing to share. Of similar concern was the
UN’s lack of an in-house logistics capability. The support of an operation at great dis-
tance from the contributing states could pose staggering costs; members were reluctant
to supply large operations like UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia or UNOSOM II
in Somalia even with UN reimbursement.
Finally, even if an operation were fully funded, complete with adequate logistics sup-
port, very few states had militaries or officer corps with recent experience in planning
and executing sophisticated operations. Moreover, effective artillery/infantry coordina-
tion in an era of highly mobile forces required the most modern communications, and
the use of tactical aviation necessitated an understanding of close air support and air/
ground coordination. It was such shortcomings, especially in Somalia, that ultimately
led Congress to place restrictions on U.S. participation in UN peace operations.15
Congress and Peace Operations
The loss of Pakistani lives in Somalia in June 1993 and then of eighteen Americans in
Mogadishu in October may have been the death knell of U.S. support for UN peace op-
erations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—unless led by American officers and
conducted with a preponderance of U.S. forces.16 In passing the Byrd Amendment to
the fiscal year (FY) 1994 Defense Appropriations Act, the Congress sent a strong mes-
sage that the president’s authority to deploy forces without congressional approval in
circumstances where no vital national interest is implicated was not unlimited.17 Using
the “power of the purse,” the Congress was quick to limit defense funding where it de-
termined U.S. interests were not well served. When the Byrd legislation lapsed on 30
September 1994, Congress quickly passed the Kempthorne Amendment, continuing
funding restrictions, to the FY 1995 Defense Authorization Act.18
The Congress likewise showed itself entirely willing to dictate to President Clinton
when it considered he was not doing enough in a peace-enforcement effort. In early
1994 Senator Robert Dole led an attempt to compel legislatively the unilateral lifting of
an arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims and thus vitiate the UN resolution establish-
ing the embargo. Senators Sam Nunn and George Mitchell, attempting to moderate
this effort through compromise, drafted what became known as the Nunn-Mitchell
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Amendment to the FY 1995 Defense Authorization Act. This provision, which was en-
acted, did not lift the arms embargo unilaterally but precluded enforcement against the
Bosnian Muslims while continuing our obligations as they related to the other parties
to the conflict.19 Even this compromise measure undoubtedly contributed to an earlier-
than-planned withdrawal from Bosnia by UNPROFOR.
Congress made in 1994 two other efforts, both of which failed passage, to interject itself
into military affairs long thought the sole province of the president. In Senate bill S 5 (the
Peace Powers Act) and House of Representatives bill HR 7 (the National Security Revi-
talization Act, or NSRA, part of the “Contract with America”), Congress attempted to
restrict the president’s authority as commander in chief and limit U.S. involvement in
future peace operations. The Peace Powers Act, an initiative of Senator Dole, would
have prohibited U.S. forces from serving under foreign operational control even where
it might be in the American interest, as in DESERT STORM.20 Similarly, Speaker Newt
Gingrich’s National Security Revitalization Act would have limited the use of Defense
Department funds for peacekeeping activities and restricted the sharing of intelligence
with the UN. Either of these measures, if passed, would have severely impacted the presi-
dent’s constitutional prerogatives. Despite their failure, however, there remained biparti-
san concern in the Congress after UNOSOM II in Somalia that the president (whether
the incumbent or successors) would have to exercise greater stewardship with regard to
peace operations managed by the UN.
Operational Lessons of Peace Operations in the 1990s
Just as the Congress and the United Nations in the mid-1990s became focal points for
debate concerning peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the operations themselves
provided many insights into American strengths and weaknesses in these tasks. When
Iraq massed its Republican Guards on Kuwait’s border in September 1994, for example,
our post–DESERT STORM defense strategy was immediately put to the test.
Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, which followed, was an excellent test of the U.S. ability
to deploy forces rapidly to Southwest Asia. We learned quickly that prepositioned stocks
had to be packed for efficient breakout—both ashore and afloat.21 We reconfirmed that
timely indications and warning of Iraqi movements and intentions were essential. We
also confirmed the need to build and maintain relationships and understandings among
regional states, such that “bedding-down” of aircraft and overflight rights were secured
in advance.
Other issues also surfaced. United Nations leadership in UNOSOM II proved inade-
quate to enforce the mandate of that operation, brought under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.22 The mission—which was heavily tied to nation building—was simply too
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ambitious, especially since the Somali leaders in 1993–94 were unwilling to commit
themselves to the process. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin
Powell, and the Commander, U.S. Central Command, Marine general Joe Hoar, had
clearly recognized the need to circumscribe carefully the mission to that which was
achievable during the preceding UNITAF operation. They had limited that effort to
humanitarian relief. Unfortunately, the UN had not learned the same lesson.
Notes
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Security Council resolutions and abide by
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15. See discussion in James P. Terry, “A Legal Re-
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keeping and Peace Enforcement Operations,”
Naval Law Review (1995), p. 79.
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leading the U.S. Senate to pass the Byrd
Amendment limiting funding.
17. The Byrd Amendment, section 8156 of the
fiscal year 1994 Defense Appropriations Act,
provided that funds appropriated for the De-
fense Department for “the Operations of
U.S. Armed Forces in Somalia” could be obli-
gated only for expenses incurred through 31
March 1994.
18. The Kempthorne Amendment, although less
onerous than the Byrd Amendment, re-
stricted funding for U.S. military personnel
in Somalia on a “continuous basis” after 30
September 1994.
19. The Nunn-Mitchell Amendment also pro-
vided specific direction, in paragraph
(f)(1)(B), for the president to submit a plan
to Congress on the manner in which the
Bosnian army would be trained by U.S. and
allied forces outside Bosnian territory. The
amendment, however, has to be read in light
of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
713, which called “upon all States to refrain
from any action which might contribute to
increasing tension or impeding or delaying a
peaceful and negotiated outcome to the con-
flict in Yugoslavia.” This training was viewed
by many as making the U.S. a party to the
conflict, just as the USS New Jersey’s fire mis-
sions on behalf of the Lebanese armed forces
in 1983 had taken the United States over the
line and into the conflict, thus legally (if not
morally) justifying the attack on the Marine
Barracks at Beirut International Airport.
20. In Operation DESERT STORM, a brigade of the
82d Infantry Division and a Marine Corps ar-
tillery unit of the 12th Marine Regiment were
assigned to the command of French and Brit-
ish forces, respectively, to allow their advance
at the same pace as other coalition forces.
21. Following the conclusion of DESERT STORM,
the Defense and State departments jointly ne-
gotiated Defense Cooperation Agreements
(DCAs) with many of our Gulf partners.
These executive agreements permitted the
prepositioning of defense stocks on their ter-
ritory in order that the United States could as-
sist these states should another crisis arise in
the region. This prepositioning was to prove
invaluable during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
22. Chapter VII comprises Articles 39–51 of the
UN Charter, relates to peace enforcement
vice peacekeeping, and authorizes “all neces-
sary means.”
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The Role of Regional Organizations in
Peace-Enforcement Operations
The experience in Somalia in 1992–94 and in Bosnia during the same period renewed
questions for the United States concerning the future role of the UN in enforcement
operations requiring a Chapter VII (“all necessary means”) mandate. The sheer num-
ber of peace-enforcement requirements had obliged the United Nations itself to seek
new venues of cooperation with groups of member states already organized for joint
military action, such as NATO.1 This fact, coupled with congressional insistence that
American forces serve under responsible leadership and that strict standards be adhered
to in determining whether U.S. forces should participate in any peace-enforcement oper-
ation, suggested that American participation in such operations would be restructured in
the future.2
This restructured participation in international peacekeeping and peace enforcement
drove similar rethinking among our major allies and other regular contributors to
these operations. From the U.S. perspective, participation in these operations had to
comply with Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25.3 This directive, which requires
clear accountability in deciding when to participate, when to assign forces, and under
what conditions, now precludes U.S. participation in Somalia-style operations where
UN leadership is not viewed by the United States as adequate.4
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter refers to regional organizations, such as NATO, in the
context of appropriate regional action in the maintenance of international peace and
security.5 In this connection a relationship exists between the two organizations, with
ultimate authority centered in the United Nations. Excepting the area of international
peace and security, however, the relationship is not hierarchical.
The Treaty of Washington, which established the NATO Charter in 1949, made no ref-
erence to any relationship to the Security Council as a “regional arrangement,” nor did
it contain any requirement that actions of the organization be predicated upon autho-
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treaty obligated NATO’s member states to “collective self-defense” under Article 51 of
the UN Charter and, correspondingly, embodied only the requirement to report “mea-
sures taken” to the Security Council.7 This formulation was adopted by the United
States and its NATO allies because subjecting in advance NATO actions as regional ar-
rangements to Security Council review would have made all of its actions vulnerable to
Soviet veto. The characterization of NATO’s military actions as “collective self-defense”
under Article 51 meant that there would be no “regional arrangement” action in the
sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and no prior Security Council review. How-
ever, the internal disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1990–91 and the events in
Tiananmen Square in the People’s Republic of China have made Moscow and Beijing
more willing over the past fifteen years to support UN-requested involvement in peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement operations.
The adaptation of NATO to a role as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the
UN Charter with a peace-enforcement mandate must be viewed as part of a broad,
long-term American and allied strategy that supports a peaceful and democratic Eu-
rope. This strategy benefits U.S. security and builds on the bipartisan premise that the
security of Europe is a vital interest. Certainly, American sacrifices in two world wars
and the Cold War have proven our commitment to the region as a community of
shared values, and those sacrifices have more than established the nation’s interest in
recognizing and encouraging the rapid settlement of disputes in Europe.
When the Cold War ended, the United States and its NATO allies pursued a number
of initiatives to advance this strategy. These included negotiation and implementa-
tion of the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), support for the
unification of Germany, bilateral assistance to support reforms in former Soviet
states, negotiation of the START II strategic arms control treaty, programs to dis-
mantle nuclear stockpiles in Russia, the elimination of intermediate nuclear forces
(INF), including a 90 percent overall reduction in NATO’s nuclear weapons in Eu-
rope, and most importantly, active American diplomacy and the deployment of U.S.
troops as part of a NATO-led force in 1994–95 that helped stop the war and secure
the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.8
NATO plays an important role today in this broader strategy, for many of the same rea-
sons that it has played an essential role in maintaining peace and security in Europe
during the past sixty years. NATO’s success during this period went far beyond its ac-
complishments as an effective military mechanism for collective defense and deter-
rence. It has proved invaluable as a political institution in fostering continuing
involvement of the United States and Canada in European security.
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Adaptation of NATO’s interest in broader European security to activities under the UN
Charter’s Chapter VIII began in 1990, soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In July
1990, under the active leadership of the George H. W. Bush administration, NATO set
out in its London Summit Declaration new goals for the alliance, called for changes in
strategy and military structure, and declared that the alliance no longer considered Russia
an adversary. These efforts were reaffirmed by a declaration in Copenhagen in June 1991
that NATO’s objective was “to help create a Europe whole and free.” At the Rome Summit
in November 1991 the alliance adopted a new strategic concept that reaffirmed the
continuing importance of collective defense while orienting NATO toward new secu-
rity challenges, such as out-of-area missions, crisis management, and peacekeeping.
Since then, NATO has taken further steps to pursue a Chapter VIII role. At its January 1994
summit in Brussels, the alliance made three important decisions related to its status as a re-
gional organization. First, it launched the Partnership for Peace (PFP), to enable intensive
political and military-to-military cooperation with Europe’s new democracies as well as
states that had considered themselves neutrals during the Cold War. PFP has proven an im-
portant and effective program for these states and for the alliance. A PFP Coordination Of-
fice was established in Mons, Belgium; major PFP exercises have been held each year since
1994; and numerous exercises have been conducted with partners “in the spirit” of PFP. The
program has more than proved its merit in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where thirteen PFP states
have made substantial contributions to the NATO-led peace enforcement in the Balkans.
Similarly, then–partner states such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic generously
contributed their resources to NATO’s Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo in 1999 and to
the follow-on UN peacekeeping operation.
The second major initiative related to adaptation to Chapter VIII undertaken by NATO
in Brussels in 1994 was a decision to embrace the concept of combined joint task
forces. This approach would enable NATO forces and national military assets to be em-
ployed in a more flexible manner for peace enforcement. The final initiative involved
the invitation of additional European states to join NATO (the first tranche included
Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic in 1999; seven more were added in 2004, for
a total of twenty-six NATO members).9 While this NATO enlargement initiative was
not directly related to Chapter VIII, the training and increased military-to-military re-
lations that have accompanied it will complement NATO’s increased capacity to per-
form as a regional organization.
The benefits of a broadened NATO doctrine that emphasizes flexible response as a re-
gional organization are both immediate and long term, and they accrue not only to ex-
isting and prospective NATO allies but to states outside the alliance. Europe is a more
secure and stable region because of NATO’s commitment to work within Chapter VIII
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of the UN Charter. Even now, Central and Eastern European states are reconstructing
their foreign and defense policies to bring them in line with alliance values and norms.
The NATO acceptance of Chapter VIII responsibilities has been most significant in
Bosnia. NATO countries made a profound contribution to European security through
their participation in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and are still doing
so ten years later under its successor Stabilization Force (SFOR), which is continuing to
implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords. It is clear from these
Bosnian missions that NATO members are already restructuring their forces so they
can participate in the full spectrum of current and new alliance demands, including
Article V (of the NATO charter) missions and peace-enforcement missions. The NATO
involvement in Kosovo in 1999, while not executed pursuant to a Security Council res-
olution, nevertheless reflected an important opportunity for the alliance to demon-
strate, through a non–Article V mission, a cohesive out-of-area presence to preclude
genocide and restore peace to an important region.10
NATO acceptance of non–Article V missions has been necessary and was contemplated
by the alliance charter. With the end of the Cold War came a unique opportunity to im-
prove the security structure to increase stability in the Euro-Atlantic area without creat-
ing divisions among NATO members. The NATO alignment, with its history of military
integration and cooperation brought about by years of successful planning and training
for mutual defense responsibilities, was in an ideal position to participate effectively in
peace-enforcement activities requiring the exercise of “all necessary means” under Chap-
ter VII of the UN Charter.
As noted earlier, peace-enforcement operations, to be effective, require careful plan-
ning, experienced leadership, and highly integrated command and control arrange-
ments. The Bosnia operation has demonstrated that NATO-led forces can meet these
requirements as well as comply with the principles of force commitment embodied in
PDD 25. The carefully developed response of leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance to
the military requirements of the Dayton Peace Accords have reflected the immense po-
tential resident in NATO for peace enforcement. The UN has recognized the need for
regional leadership, and NATO has proven that it can successfully execute missions un-
der United Nations authority.
Notes
1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
comprising twenty-six member states, pro-
vides for collective defense in Article V of its
charter. Non–Article V missions authorized
for consideration include peacekeeping and
peace enforcement, now properly considered
under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Re-
gional Organizations).
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2. See James P. Terry, “The Emerging Role of
NATO in UN Peace Enforcement Opera-
tions,” in The Law of Military Operations:
Liber Amicorum Professor Jack Grunawalt, In-
ternational Law Studies vol. 72, ed. Michael
N. Schmitt (Newport, R.I.: Naval War Col-
lege, 1998), p. 297.
3. See below in this chapter.
4. See James P. Terry, “U.N. Peacekeeping and
Military Reality,” Brown Journal of World Af-
fairs 3 (1996), p. 136, for a review of UN in-
adequacies in peacekeeping and peace
enforcement.
5. Chapter VIII, in Articles 52–54 of the UN
Charter, specifically provides for “regional
arrangements or agencies” for dealing with
such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are ap-
propriate for regional action. Article 53 pro-
vides, in pertinent part: “The Security
Council shall, where appropriate, utilize
such regional arrangements or agencies for
enforcement action under its authority. But
no enforcement action shall be undertaken
under regional agencies without the authori-
zation of the Security Council.” On the
maintenance of international peace and se-
curity, see An Agenda for Peace: Report of the
Secretary General, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/
24111 (New York: United Nations, 31 Janu-
ary 1992).
In paragraphs 60–65, Boutros Boutros-Ghali
called upon regional organizations to do
more. In his Supplement to an Agenda for
Peace: Report of the Secretary General, UN
Doc. A/50/60-5/1995/1 (New York: United
Nations, 3 January 1995), the secretary gen-
eral specifically endorsed the 1994–95 NATO-
led operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6. Treaty of Washington (North Atlantic Treaty),
63 Stat. 2241, TIAS 1964 (entered into force
24 August 1949).
7. Art. 5 of the Treaty of Washington provides,
in pertinent part: “Any such armed attack
and all measures taken as a result thereof
shall immediately be reported to the Security
Council. Such measures shall be terminated
when the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security.”
8. The CFE agreement alone has resulted in the
elimination of more than fifty thousand
pieces of military equipment in Europe.
9. The seven new members added in 2004 in-
cluded Bulgaria, Rumania, Latvia, Estonia,
Lithuania, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
10. See chapter 4.
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PART FIVE
Challenges for the Twenty-first Century
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Defense of Critical Infrastructure
Computer Network Defense
In 1997, in an exercise emphasizing infrastructure security, the National Security
Agency exposed the vulnerability of the United States to disruption of computer oper-
ations at its major military commands at the hands of a hostile state or an organization
with hostile intent.1 A year earlier, U.S. authorities had detected the introduction of
software, called a “sniffer,” into computers at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, per-
mitting the perpetrator to download a large volume of complex telemetry information
transmitted from satellites. The deputy attorney general reported that the “sniffer” had
remained in place for a significant period of time.2
Of equal concern, an FBI report in 1999 detailed Chinese efforts to attack U.S. govern-
ment information systems, including that of the White House.3 These actual and pro-
jected interstate intrusions into government computer networks once thought secure
raise important questions concerning what, if any, rights in self-defense are triggered
by such attacks, and more importantly, how would the right of self-defense, if an attack
impacts a vital national security interest, be translated into effective rules of engage-
ment, and more specifically, legally defensible targeting decisions.
Understanding the Threat
The world of information operations represents an environment created by the con-
fluence of cooperative networks of computers, information systems, and telecommu-
nication infrastructures. The concern addressed here relates to the threat posed when
operations of these systems are unlawfully disrupted, denied, or degraded, or when
secure information that is stored in computers or computer networks is destroyed,
compromised, or altered in such a way as to have a destructive effect on national se-
curity interests. Computer espionage, computer network attacks, and the subversion
of political, economic, or nonmilitary information bearing on a nation’s capabilities
and vulnerabilities may well constitute an unlawful use of force warranting a military
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The threshold issues that emerge are: Which peacetime interstate activities within the
telecommunications “highway” constitute a threat or use of force? When does such a
threat constitute an attack under the international law such that the right of self-defense
exists? What is an appropriate response? To answer these questions, we must understand
the military applications of information technology. This requires an understanding of
the Internet. The Internet was originally, in the 1970s, a network of computers linked by
communications infrastructure and managed by the Department of Defense. The key
breakthrough by which the internal computer networks of universities and private re-
search facilities were ultimately merged was the development in 1989 of hypertext,
which translates diverse computer protocols into standard format.
The hypertext approach, while extremely beneficial to both the military and civilian
sectors, has created vulnerabilities. The World Wide Web, which resides on the Internet
and of which hypertext is the primary vehicle, is the heart of the Defense Reform Ini-
tiative and of the reengineering and streamlining of Defense business practices. Yet it
can at the same time provide adversaries a potent instrument to obtain, correlate, eval-
uate, and adversely affect an unprecedented volume of critical aggregated information.
This chapter addresses these attacks on U.S. infrastructure. International law could not
have anticipated these specific concerns when the Hague Conventions of 1899, address-
ing means and methods of warfare, were negotiated; nonetheless, the drafters of those
conventions did anticipate technological change. The “Martins Clause,” included
within both Hague II and Hague IV of the 1899 Conventions, provides that even in
cases not covered by specific agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the
protection and authority of principles of international law derived from established
custom, from principles of humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience; they
are not merely subject to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders.4 This provi-
sion was considered necessary to prevent unnecessary or disproportionate destruction
from future weapons systems. The drafters had just witnessed previously unimagin-
able carnage in the Crimean War and the American Civil War resulting from ad-
vanced rifle-manufacturing techniques and other innovations, and they were well
aware that warfare was rapidly changing. The Martins Clause that resulted means, as
Greenberg and colleagues so accurately state, that “attacks will be judged largely by
their effects, rather than by their methods.”5
The Legal and Operational Parameters for Response
Because time is often compressed in the techno-violence arena, legal recourse and
strategy development are often severely limited. This is especially true of nonmilitary
initiatives that may be considered in response to cyber-attack, although these are al-
ways the options of choice where available. Traditional means of conflict resolution,
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authorized by law and customary practice, are often precluded by the fact that attacks
on computer systems are by nature covert in execution, unacknowledged by the state or
group sponsor, and silently effective.
However, noncoercive efforts to counter attacks on computer systems and telecommu-
nications networks are also important. Diplomatic action, alone or in concert with al-
lies or international organizations, that might conceivably influence a state or group
considering such a cyber-initiative, should be considered and employed wherever pos-
sible. In 1998, for example, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 53/70, an ini-
tiative of the Russian Federation;6 it called upon member states “to promote at
multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of in-
formation security.”7 The United States supported this resolution, with the following
pertinent comments:
The General Assembly’s adoption of the resolution in plenary session will launch the international
community on a complex enterprise encompassing many interrelated factors which delegates . . . do
not ordinarily address. For example, the topic includes technical aspects that relate to global commu-
nications—as well as nontechnical issues associated with economic cooperation and trade, intellectual
property rights, law enforcement, antiterrorist cooperation, and other issues that are considered in the
Second and Sixth Committees. Further the actions and programs of governments are by no means the
only appropriate focus, for the initiative also involves important concerns of individuals, associations,
enterprises, and other organizations that are active in the private sector.8
Despite such international initiatives focusing on multilateral cooperation, the hope of
outside assistance in protecting secure transmissions and critical systems in circum-
stances where national security is threatened is likely illusory. That burden will most
likely remain exclusively that of the National Command Authorities.
The rules of necessity and proportionality in the information-warfare scenario are given
operational significance through rules of engagement. ROE are directives by which a gov-
ernment may define the circumstances and limitations under which its forces will initi-
ate and continue responses to eliminate a threat, in this case that posed by an attack
through technical or other means on critical communications/information infrastruc-
ture. In the U.S. context, ROE embody the guidance of National Command Authorities
provided through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to subordinate headquarters and de-
ployed U.S. forces both during armed conflict and in crisis short of war.
ROE reflect domestic law requirements and national commitments under international
law. They are impacted by political as well as operational considerations. For American
commanders concerned with threats to communications and command and control
infrastructure, ROE represent limitations, or upper bounds, on how defensive or re-
sponsive systems and forces may be used but do not diminish their authority to protect
critical infrastructure effectively from attack.
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Evolution of United States Rules of Engagement
Techno-violence against a critical U.S. computer system, whether related to informa-
tion, communications, or command and control, represents hostile activity and so may
trigger ROE. Until 1986, the only U.S. peacetime rules of engagement applicable world-
wide were the JCS peacetime rules for seaborne forces. These ROE, which served as the
basis for local rules issued by all commands, were designed exclusively for the maritime
environment. In June 1986, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger promulgated
more comprehensive ROE for peacetime land, sea, and air operations worldwide.9
These rules gave on-scene commanders flexibility to respond to hostile intent, hostile
acts, or unconventional threats, with minimum force necessary to limit the scope and
intensity of the threat. The rationale underlying the 1986 ROE was to terminate vio-
lence quickly, decisively, and on terms favorable to the United States. In October 1994,
Secretary of Defense Les Aspen approved “Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S.
Forces” (SROE), which significantly broadened the scope of national rules.10
The SROE provide that should deterrence fail, crisis response options are to be propor-
tional to the provocation, limit the scope and intensity of conflict, discourage escala-
tion, and achieve political and military objectives. The inherent right of self-defense
establishes the policy framework. The SROE are general guidelines on self-defense ap-
plicable worldwide to all echelons of command. They govern the use of force in ways
consistent with mission accomplishment and are to be used in operations other than
war, in the transition from peace to armed conflict or war, and, in the absence of super-
ceding guidance, during armed conflict.
The national guidance represented in the 1994 SROE has greatly clarified and ex-
panded the flexibility of action available to theater commanders. Issued with the au-
thority of the secretary of defense, they ensure consistency in the way all military
commanders, wherever assigned, address unconventional threats—including the de-
struction or compromise of, or tampering with, advanced command and control sys-
tems or computer networks with adverse effects on the security interests of the nation.
Application of the Law of Targeting to Infrastructure Protection
The SROE, as they relate to information warfare, are implemented through the law of
targeting, a subset of the law of armed conflict. The law of targeting is based upon
three fundamental principles: the right of states to adopt means of injuring the enemy
is not unlimited; prohibition of attacks against civilian population as such; and the ne-
cessity of distinction between combatants and noncombatants, such that noncomba-
tants are spared to the extent possible.11
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Because the law of armed conflict is eminently practical and takes into account military
efficiency, these basic principles are also applicable to responses to such nonviolent but
nonetheless destructive coercive activity as sabotage of defense computer systems.
Moreover, targeting theory is premised upon practical considerations that define the
objects of legitimate and proportional response to various forms of aggression and es-
tablish functional targeting criteria for responsible officials, military or civilian.
The key, then, is to address attacks against critical infrastructure within the scope of the
law of armed conflict. We must think of cyber-aggression as a variant of terrorist activ-
ity. This is precisely the direction in which recent U.S. administrations have proceeded.
President Clinton’s Executive Order (EO) 13010 of 15 July 1996 established the Presi-
dent’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CCIP). The president declared
that certain designated “national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or de-
struction . . . would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of
the United States.”12 The EO designated eight categories of critical infrastructure as re-
quiring a national strategy for their protection: continuity of government, telecommu-
nications, transportation, electric power, banking and finance, water supply, gas and oil
storage and transportation, and emergency services (medical, police, fire, and rescue).
Initially chaired by Robert T. Marsh, a retired Air Force general, CCIP was tasked with
developing a comprehensive national strategy for protecting these critical infrastructures
from electronic and physical threats. On 13 October 1997, CCIP issued an unclassified
version of its report, Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructure. The report
recognized the challenge of adaptation to a changing culture; the existing legal frame-
work, it found, was inadequate to deal with threats to critical infrastructure. The report
itself provided few specifics, but on 22 May 1998 the Clinton administration issued Presi-
dential Decision Directives (PDDs) 62 and 63 to implement its policy framework.
PDD 62, “Combating Terrorism,” was the successor to National Security Decision Direc-
tive 138, signed by President Reagan on 3 April 1984, which determined that the threat of
terrorism constitutes a form of aggression and justifies actions in self-defense.13 PDD 62
was more expansive, addressing a broad range of unconventional threats that included
attacks on critical infrastructure, terrorist acts, and weapons of mass destruction. The
aim was to establish a more pragmatic and systems-based approach to protection of
critical infrastructure and counterterrorism, in which preparedness was the key to ef-
fective consequence management. PDD 62 created a National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism, who would coordinate program man-
agement through the Office of the National Security Advisor.14
PDD 63, “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” directed the National Coordinator, estab-
lished in PDD 62, to initiate immediate action within the public and private sectors to
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ensure the continuity and viability of political infrastructures. The goal of PDD 63 was
to increase significantly the security of government systems and to establish a reliable,
interconnected, and secure information system. A National Plan Coordination Staff
was to integrate the plans developed by the various lead agencies into a comprehensive
National Infrastructure Assurance Plan, to be overseen by a National Infrastructure As-
surance Council, embracing both the public and private sectors. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s National Infrastructure Protection Center, established in February 1998,
would continue to act as a control and crisis-management point, gathering information
on threats to critical infrastructure and coordinating the federal government’s response.15
The New Approach to Infrastructure Protection
The issue remains, however, of what legal remedy can be applied under the law of
armed conflict should the Critical Infrastructure Plan fail, as it did on 11 September
2001. If a response is justified, as it was in Afghanistan after 9/11, what targets in a per-
petrator country are proportional to the threat posed by destruction or compromise of
critical infrastructure? Again, experience in addressing terrorism must be reviewed.
The law of armed conflict provides more salient options against unconventional threats
than does domestic or intelligence law, in cases where national security is at risk.
For example, an unlawful entry into or compromise of a critical national security sys-
tem by individuals can be viewed as criminal activity under the jurisdiction of law en-
forcement officials. The same intrusion by the same individuals could be viewed as
lawful espionage or intelligence gathering, as practiced by all states. If, however, that in-
trusion and its debilitating effect can appropriately be characterized as an attack on vi-
tal U.S. national interests, the range of options in response is greatly increased.16 This is
important because the state or group attempting to compromise our national security
through the calculated sabotage of critical infrastructure is attacking the nation—not
with bombs or bullets but with the intent of destroying equally critical elements of na-
tional well-being and sovereignty. The loss of a power grid or telecommunications net-
work through computer-generated viruses for an extended period of time could place
more Americans at risk than even a sizable military threat.
The United States was jolted into an awareness of the changing character of aggression
in general when its embassy in Tehran was seized on 4 November 1979 by Iranian mili-
tants who enjoyed the support of Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary government.17 A
decade later, in August 1998, U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were the
subject of unconventional warfare attacks, resulting in significant loss of life in Nairobi.
In the case of the 11 September attacks, a U.S. response was possible only because of
the linkage established between bin Laden’s organization and the assault on U.S. per-
sonnel and property.18 The thrust of the new U.S. strategy, outlined in PDD 62 and
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reflected in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, was to reclaim the initia-
tive lost when the U.S. pursued a reactive policy toward unconventional threats and at-
tacks, as represented by inaction in response to the attacks on embassies in Beirut,
Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam, and on the USS Cole (DDG 67).
An examination of authorized responses to techno-violence (and the selection of appro-
priate targets) requires an understanding that it, like other unconventional threats, does
not follow any of the traditional military patterns. In fact, a fundamental characteristic of
such attacks is violation of international law. The only norm for cyber-terrorism, as for
other terrorist attacks, is effectiveness. While traditional international law requires dis-
crimination and proportion, the success of cyber-terrorism is measured by the extent
and duration of destructiveness, with no concern for those affected.
For this reason, there must be an assured, effective reaction that imposes unaccept-
able costs on the perpetrators and those who make possible their activities. For do-
mestic intruders, the criminal law may suffice. Outside the United States, the reaction
must counter the cyber-terrorist’s strategy within the parameters of international law
and PDD 62.
In this regard, no case for response in national self-defense can be persuasive either on
the political or legal level unless a reasonable basis of necessity is perceived and carefully
structured. Those to whom a justification is addressed (that is, other governments or the
public) will consider whether it is well founded; they will not support the use of force as
a purely discretionary act. An important dimension of this question, then, is when the
use of force is necessary to produce adherence to the norm of information security. As
Professor Lauterpacht has pointed out, every state judges “for itself, in the first in-
stance, whether a case of necessity in self-defense has arisen,” but “it is obvious that the
question of legality of action taken in self-preservation is suitable for determination
and must ultimately be determined by a judicial authority or political body.”19 The
United States has long taken the position that each nation is free to defend itself and is
the “judge of what constitutes the right of self-defense and the necessity . . . of same.”20
The decision to respond with force against techno-violence must always focus on the
underlying political purpose of the state or group attacking an element of critical U.S.
infrastructure, whether that element be commercial, communications, intelligence, or
defense related. That purpose must unquestionably be the degradation of critical sys-
tems such that we are unable to defend ourselves militarily or protect ourselves from
political or financial overreaching by adversaries.
Countering this threat requires taking full advantage of the proactive policies repre-
sented in PDDs 62 and 63, and making the fullest use of all the weapons in our arsenal.
These should include not only defensive and protective measures that reduce systems
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vulnerability but also new legal tools and agreements on international sanctions and
collaboration with other governments. While military power should be used only as a
last resort, there will be instances where it is the only alternative. The thrust of this new
strategy must be to reclaim the initiative lost while the United States pursued a reactive
policy to incidents of information warfare that neither deterred cyber-terrorists nor
encouraged successful response. The key to an effective, coordinated policy for the pro-
tection of critical infrastructure is a commitment to hold those accountable responsi-
ble under the law of armed conflict.
Full implementation of the two PDDs should lead to increased planning for protective
and defensive measures and, where deterrence fails, for responses that eliminate the
threat, rather than treating each incident after the fact as a singular crisis provoked by
international criminals. Treating cyber-terrorists and others attempting to destroy crit-
ical infrastructure as participants in international coercion triggers, where clear linkage
can be made to a state actor, the right of self-defense, and coercion (political, eco-
nomic, or military) may be the only proportional response.
This proactive strategy to the threat posed by attacks on our critical infrastructure em-
braces protective, defensive, nonmilitary, and military measures. It attempts for the
first time to define acts designed to destabilize our eight most important infrastructure
systems in terms of “aggression” and asserts the concomitant right of self-defense as a
basis for lawful and effective response. The use of international law, and more specifi-
cally the law of armed conflict, will not only complement the current criminal law ap-
proaches but give pause to those who would target vital U.S. interests.
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Attacks on Foreign Infrastructure That Pose a
Threat to the United States
Computer Network Attack
The fiscal year (FY) 2000 version of the Defense Department’s Unified Command Plan
(UCP), signed on 29 September 1999, marked a new era in operational planning for in-
formation warfare, to include the targeting of an adversary’s computer networks where
necessary to protect vital U.S. or allied interests. The UCP provides planning guidance
and requirements for operational commands.
Significantly, the FY 2000 version transferred responsibility for maintaining and man-
aging the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC), in San Antonio, Texas, to the
U.S. Space Command at Petersen Air Force Base, Colorado.1 JIOC, formerly known as
the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center, provides “full spectrum” information
warfare and information-operations support to commanders worldwide. In effect,
JIOC supports the planning, coordination, and execution of all Defense Department
information-warfare and information-operations missions, and assists in the develop-
ment of related doctrine, tactics, and procedures.
Defining the Debate: The State of Information Warfare
What made the transfer of oversight of JIOC notable was the recent enhancement of its
missions, in August 1999, from command and control to include operations support. The
functions now required of JIOC include psychological operations, security, electronic
warfare, targeting of command and control facilities, military deception, computer net-
work defense, computer network attack (CNA), civil affairs, and public affairs.2
The 2000 UCP was the first to address computer network attack specifically as a planning
requirement for unified commanders (that is, commanders of worldwide functional or
regional command comprising substantial forces from all services).3 This was significant
because, by implication, it recognized the legality of targeting critical foreign computer
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The renewed emphasis on considering critical computer infrastructure as a legitimate
target category arises from recent incidents where it has been threatened by govern-
ment-sponsored intrusions or by individual hackers using sophisticated software.
These incidents have led to the recognition that electronic or physical elimination of
this threat may be necessary to protect our defense capability or ensure the continued
effective operation of other critical infrastructure.
Several incidents beyond those described in chapter 10 are significant. In February
1998, two California teenagers were able to breach computer systems at eleven Air
Force and Navy bases, causing a series of “denial of service” cyber-attacks and forcing
defense officials to reassess the security of their networks.4 The investigation of these
incidents, code-named SOLAR SUNRISE, pales in comparison with MOONLIGHT MAZE,
the investigation of an early 1999 electronic assault involving hackers based in Russia.
These intruders accessed sensitive Defense Department science and technology infor-
mation.5 Computer tracing determined that MOONLIGHT MAZE attacks had originated
from the Russian Academy of Science, a government organization that interacts closely
with the military.6 This raises the possibility of a future asymmetrical attack sponsored
by a nation-state.
These incidents raise important issues for defense planning. How can these threats be
discovered and eliminated? What is the interplay between the role of investigating
agency and that of operational planner? It is clear that while the targeting of these
threats may require a military component, gathering indicators of an imminent threat
requires a far broader participation. It is for this reason that the United States estab-
lished the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) in February 1998.7
NIPC serves as the government’s focal point for threat assessment, warning, investiga-
tion, and response to threats or attacks against critical infrastructures. These include
defense communication networks, telecommunications, energy grids, banking and fi-
nance organizations, water systems, government operations apparatus, and emergency
service organizations.8 NIPC contains an “indications and warning” arm and an opera-
tional arm. The Analysis and Warning Section provides analytical support during com-
puter intrusion investigations and long-term analysis of vulnerability and threat trends.
The Computer Investigations and Operations Section is the operational arm of NIPC.
This section manages computer intrusion investigations conducted by FBI field offices
throughout the country; provides subject-matter experts, equipment, and technical
support to investigators in federal, state, and local government agencies involved in
critical infrastructure protection; and provides an emergency response capability to
help resolve cyber-incidents.9
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Neither JIOC nor NIPC, however, possesses the capability to eliminate a cyber-threat.
Only the operational assets assigned to the various unified commands within the De-
partment of Defense possess that capability, and they may be employed only when the
strict parameters of the law of armed conflict are satisfied.
Legal Constraints on Attacks on Critical Infrastructure
The legal regime available to authorize responding attacks in lawful self-defense on criti-
cal enemy infrastructure includes the UN Charter system and customary international
law. The basic provision restricting the threat or use of force in international relations
is Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter, addressed extensively in previous chapters.
That provision states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”10
The underlying purpose of Article 2, paragraph 4, to regulate aggressive behavior be-
tween states is identical to that of its precursor in the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions. Article 12 of the Covenant stated that the League members were obliged not to
“resort to war.”11 This language, however, left unnoticed actions that, although hostile,
could not be considered acts of war. Thus it was that Article 2, paragraph 4 replaced
term “war” with “threat or use of force,” to include applications of force of a lesser in-
tensity.12 This distinction may be all-important when, for example, a nation’s commer-
cial infrastructure is attacked and it contemplates actions in lawful self-defense that
include targeting critical infrastructure of the adversary, an element of which may have
been used in the initial attack.
When the UN Charter was drafted in 1945, the right of self-defense was the only stated
exception, codified in Article 51, to the prohibition on the use of force. The use of the
word “inherent” in the text of Article 51 suggests that self-defense is broader than the
immediate Charter parameters. During the drafting of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, for
example, the United States expressed its view as follows:
There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the
right of self-defense. That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every
nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or inva-
sion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense.13
Because self-defense is an inherent right, its contours have been shaped by custom and
are subject to customary interpretation. The drafters of Article 51 may not have antici-
pated its use in protecting states through defensive actions using technological means,
but international law has long recognized the need for flexible application.14
When a vital U.S. national interest, such as one of the critical infrastructure systems de-
fined in Presidential Decision Directive 63, “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” is
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threatened or attacked by electronic or other computer-based means, the system gener-
ating the threat may constitute a legally appropriate target for destruction or neutral-
ization by military assets;15 destruction may then be both necessary and proportionate,
under the law of armed conflict, to eliminate the threat perceived.16 If, however, mili-
tary objectives, including computer networks supporting military requirements, are
properly included within target sets, civilians and civilian objects are not.17 Civilian ob-
jects consist of all civilian property and activities other than those used to support or sus-
tain the capability for armed aggression on the part of the attacker.18 Thus, activities
normally considered civilian in character would, when conducted in support of a na-
tion’s aggression to shield an aggressor from identification, or to preclude effective and
lawful response to unlawful attack, become the lawful objects of attack. The point has
been made succinctly by the Defense Department general counsel in a May 1999 trea-
tise on information operations:
If the international community were persuaded that a particular computer attack or a pattern of such
attacks should be considered to be an “armed attack,” or the equivalent to an “armed attack,” it would
seem to follow that the victim nation would be entitled to respond in self-defense either by computer
network attack or by traditional military means in order to disable the equipment and personnel that
were used to mount the offending attack.19
Stated another way, a civilian computer system used either to conduct against critical in-
frastructure an attack tantamount to an armed attack or to shield an aggression from dis-
covery becomes a valid and lawful target if the total or partial destruction, capture, or
neutralization, in the circumstances at the time, offers a definite military advantage.20
From this examination, we see that computer networks are not per se illegal targets
under traditional international law criteria. We must apply the standard law-of-
armed-conflict analysis in every instance to determine whether critical computer infra-
structure of an attacking state or other nonstate aggressor constitutes a valid target. In
that review, as in all reviews of target lists, we must determine whether the specific
computer network or other critical infrastructure system under consideration, by its
nature, location, capability, purpose or use, makes an effective contribution to the mili-
tary capability of the offending state and whether its destruction, capture, or neutral-
ization offers the United States or its allies a definite military advantage.
The fact that a computer system or other critical infrastructure is a valid target does
not mean in itself that it should be attacked, however. The political and strategic impli-
cations may suggest that although a response in kind would be legally justified, refrain-
ing from it may provide greater benefit—producing perhaps a shift in world sentiment,
a movement of certain nations in terms of their allegiances, an opportunity for inter-
national bodies such as the UN to become engaged, and an opportunity to open previ-
ously closed political channels.
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A final concern related to responding to attacks on computer-based critical infrastruc-
ture under traditional international law principles relates to the issue of collateral dam-
age. While collateral damage does not have a different definition in a CNA context,
additional steps may be necessary to show that reasonable precautions were taken to
avoid unnecessary destruction. This arises from the fact that the effects of conventional
weapons and delivery systems are more predictable and the maxim that a weapon must
be targetable and not so indiscriminate that it unnecessarily endangers the civilian popu-
lation of the offending state. Lawrence G. Downs, Jr., explains a related and even more
important consideration for the state using digital data warfare in lawful self-defense:
When the U.S. Army contracted a study to determine the feasibility of developing DDW [digital data
warfare]–type viruses for military use, many people had misgivings that were summed up by Gary
Chapman, program director of Computer Professionals for Professional Responsibility. “Unleashing
this kind of thing is dangerous,” he said. “Should the virus escape, the United States heads the list of
vulnerable countries. Our computers are by far the most networked.”21
From this it is clear that any weapon developed to provide CNA capability must be
both predictable and capable of being armed and disarmed if it is not to threaten un-
duly innocent civilians in the target state or the user state. Downs is correct when he
suggests that weaponeers should, in general, develop a detection and immunization
program in parallel for all viruses they intend to use. In this way, an attack gone wrong
cannot do inadvertent harm to the attacker. In short, users and developers of DDW
need to be aware of risks and the absolute requirement for predictability when devel-
oping code.22
The Impact of International Agreements and Domestic Communications Law on CNA
Another consideration of military planners developing a cyber-defense capability must
be international agreements regulating the use of space through which data used for
CNA must travel. Those agreements include four principal multilateral conventions to
which the United States is party: the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (known as the Outer Space Treaty);23 the 1968 Agreement on the Res-
cue Astronauts, Return of Astronauts, and Return of Objects Launched in Space (the
Rescue and Return Agreement);24 the 1972 Convention on International Liability for
Damages Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention);25 and the 1975 Convention
on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Space Objects Registration
Treaty).26 The four conventions collectively reiterate principles that are so widely ac-
cepted that they are viewed as reflective of customary international law, even between
nonparties. These general principles include the premises that access to space is free
and open to all nations;27 that each user of space must show due regard for the rights of
others;28 that states launching space objects are liable for any damage they may do in
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space, in the air, or on land;29 and that space activities are subject to general principles
of international law.30
The Defense Department general counsel concluded in a 1999 assessment of interna-
tional legal issues related to information operations, however, that the noninterference
principle recited in these and other conventions addressing the right to use space does
not apply during armed conflict:
There appears to be a strong argument that the principle of non-interference established by these
agreements is inconsistent with a state of hostilities, at least where the systems concerned are of such
high military value that there is a strong military imperative for the adversary to be free to interfere
with them, even to the extent of destroying the satellites in the system. As indicated in the discussion
of treaty law in the introduction to this paper, the outcome of this debate may depend on the circum-
stances in which it first arises in practice. Nevertheless, it seems most likely that these agreements will
be considered to be suspended between the belligerents for the duration of any armed conflict, at least
to the extent necessary for the conduct of the conflict.31
Underlying this statement by the Defense Department General Counsel is the obvious
principle that the right of self-defense is in no way abrogated by other international
commitments entered into by a nation.
One significant convention with apparent applicability to U.S. interdiction of foreign
communications infrastructure is the International Telecommunications Convention
(ITC) of 1982. In Article 35, the convention prohibits interference by member states
with the communications of other member states. The convention has an exception for
military transmissions in Article 38, however, which arguably would authorize infor-
mation operations conducted by military forces.32 In fact, the Office of Legal Counsel
in the U.S. Department Justice ruled in July 1994, with respect to planned broadcasts
into Haiti concerning boat operations, that the ITC did not prohibit these broadcasts.33
An older convention that must be considered when discussing cyber operations is the
1907 Hague Convention on Neutrality on Land, which could impact satellite relay op-
erations.34 This convention does not apply to systems that generate information, but it
does apply to relay facilities and requires that those of other states not be disrupted.
While Articles 8 and 9 contemplate only telegraph and telephone cable links, they
would arguably apply to satellite links as well. Since most computer-based systems, and
certainly all that control critical infrastructure, generate information as well as relay
that information, the prohibition against disruption would likely not apply.
Another potential concern is raised by international consortia that lease satellite nodes
for commercial communications. These organizations include INTELSAT, INMARSAT,
ARABSAT, EUTELSAT, and EUMETSAT. The contracts signed by users (those of the re-
spective providers are nearly identical) state that the system must be used exclusively
for peaceful purposes.35 The United States has leased one or more nodes from at least
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one of these providers in the past, but it retains separate satellite capabilities should it
need to defend itself through digital data warfare.
Finally, domestic communications law must also be considered. The United States
Congress passed 47 USC 502 to implement the ITC requirement that member states
enact legislation to prohibit interference with the communications of other members.36
During Haiti operations in 1993, Office of Legal Counsel to the Department of Justice
issued, as it would in July 1994, a written opinion to the effect that Section 502 does
not apply to military actions of the United States executing the instructions of the
president.37 Thus, domestic law will not preclude the appropriate use of CNA by the
United States where it is engaged in an armed conflict or where necessity and propor-
tionality dictate in circumstances short of war.
Analytical Review and Conclusions
From this examination, it is clear that the method of computer network attack first
authorized under the FY 2000 Unified Command Plan, whether it be digital data, ki-
netic, or electronic, does not change the legal analysis. Computer networks critical to
the functioning of enemy infrastructure systems can be, under proper circumstances,
valid military targets under traditional international law principles, and CNA does not
violate applicable international conventions. This follows because military and dual-
use infrastructure are legitimate targets at all times during armed conflict as long as they
meet the two-pronged test that they make an effective contribution to the adversary’s
military effort and that their destruction would offer a definite military advantage.
The analysis under the law of armed conflict that must be followed to determine
whether a military advantage is to be expected requires examination of the nature, lo-
cation, purpose, or use of the offending network and whether it is used to threaten U.S.
or allied interests. Similarly, these same computer networks may constitute a lawful target
in self-defense prior to armed conflict if their neutralization or elimination is a necessary
and proportional response to an attack the planning of which has been completed and
execution ordered. A corollary to this rule is that a particular target’s being valid in a
military sense does not mean it must be attacked. A nation must always analyze any po-
tential target in light of the political, tactical, and strategic implications.
In the target analysis required for CNA, just as for more traditional target sets, reasonable
precautions must be taken to discriminate military targets from civilian networks. This
will be most difficult with regard to those dual-use systems—such as commercial tele-
phone exchanges, which can serve both civilian and military purposes. It is here that the
political implications described above must be most carefully weighed. However, from
our analysis, it is clear that networks serving commercial infrastructure, government
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agencies, and banking and financial institutions can constitute legitimate targets if they
contribute to the enemy’s war-sustaining capability in such a way that their destruction
would constitute a definite military advantage. Conversely, attacks on computer networks
serving infrastructure that is designed solely to support the civilian population, such as
civilian food distribution and civilian water supply, would be prohibited.
International communications law likewise contains no direct or specific prohibition
against the conduct of CNA or other information operations by military forces during
armed conflict or in response to aggression, a fact that underlines the superior position
enjoyed by self-defense in the hierarchy of a nation’s sovereign rights. Moreover, the
practice of nations as established in World War II provides persuasive evidence that tele-
communications treaties are to be regarded as suspended among belligerents during in-
ternational armed conflict. Similarly, domestic communications laws, and specifically 47
USC 502, do not prohibit properly authorized military information operations. It is
clear, then, that CNA, as authorized by the president in the FY 2000 Unified Command
Plan and implemented through the JIOC and the NIPC, can be employed in a manner
consistent with domestic law as well as with customary and conventional international
law principles.
Finally, when CNA is lawfully employed in response to asymmetric attacks on our criti-
cal infrastructure, we must be aware that the international system will tend to ignore
the original aggression (the extent of which we are likely to mask, in order to shield our
resulting vulnerability), while focusing on the more visible defensive response. If, how-
ever, we are to discourage the low-intensity portion of the aggressive attack spectrum,
including cyber-terrorism, a full range of computer network defense and deterrence
measures against cyber attack is essential.
The international legal system can effectively contribute to such deterrence if, but only
if, we make a clear distinction between the treatment of cyber-aggression, on the one
hand, and computer-generated defensive responses, which can and must include CNA,
on the other. That is, we must strengthen the international legal system to condemn
strongly all acts of aggression, whether a cyber-attack such as employed by the Russians
in MOONLIGHT MAZE or the violent acts of war seen in the targeting of the guided-
missile destroyer USS Cole in Aden Harbor and in the 1998 attacks on our embassies in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Just as importantly, the system must be strengthened to sup-
port strongly and embrace legally defensive computer-generated digital-data-warfare re-
sponses to such aggression. Under such a strengthened system, CNA will provide an
important new arrow in our quiver of available responses to aggression under the law of
armed conflict.
1 4 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper Terry\Printer\NPTerry.vp
Friday, October 28, 2005 2:19:34 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Notes
1. U.S. Space Command News Release 20–99,
October 1, 1999, p. 1.
2. Ibid.
3. Unclassified paragraph 22(a)(12) of the FY
2000 UCP provided that USSpaceCom’s re-
sponsibilities include: “In coordination with
the Joint Staff and appropriate CinCs, serving
as the military lead for computer network de-
fense (CND) and, effective 1 October 2000,
computer network attack (CNA), to include
advocating the CND and CNA requirements
of all CinCs, conducting CND and CNA op-
erations, planning and developing national
requirements for CND and CNA, and sup-
porting other CinC for CND and CNA.”
4. See Defense Information and Electronics Re-
port [DIER] (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Defense
Dept., 22 October 1999), p. 1.
5. DIER (Washington, D.C.: 8 October 1999),
p. 1.
6. Ibid.
7. NIPC is located in the Hoover Building in
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Observations and Conclusions
This review of post–World War II conflict resolution has examined the differences be-
tween the interpretive approaches taken by states in their respective claims and coun-
terclaims during international crises. The great importance of examining the facts and
rationale of post–World War II coercion resides in the significance that nations place in
the role of law as a necessary element in gaining political support, both national and
international, for their policies. As is evident, nation-states, including the United States,
have adopted and espoused customary and conventional international principles that
served their desired policy aims. The international legal mechanisms developed to me-
morialize and preserve these policy goals have been developed historically through
multilateral efforts to establish binding international regimes, such as the Hague and
Geneva Conventions, the initiatives leading to the League of Nations after World War I,
and the United Nations Charter.
The fulcrum of this effort has been the contributions to coercion control and collective
security of the Charter of the United Nations. Through the establishment of an effective
Security Council, collective security could, for the first time, be meaningfully substituted
for unilateral action. As part of this process, the establishment of an International
Court of Justice, to which disputes between states could be referred, is equally signifi-
cant. Despite the inadequacies in Charter operation reflected in the case studies in the
preceding chapters, the advance in conflict management represented in the United Na-
tions system is significant.
Critical to this study has been the explication of the right of self-defense. The right of
self-defense was codified in Article 51 of the Charter. Although the drafters of that article
may not have anticipated its use in protecting states from the effects of such terrorist vio-
lence as the United States experienced in September 2001, international law has always
recognized the need for flexible application. Important in this flexibility is the recogni-
tion of the right to counter the imminent threat of unlawful coercion as well as actual at-
tack. This comprehensive conception of permissible or defensive coercion, honoring
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appropriate response to threats of an imminent nature, is merely reflective of customary
international law. It is precisely this anticipatory element of lawful self-defense that has
proven critical to an effective policy to counter terrorist violence under the UN Charter.
Customary international law has long recognized that no requirement exists for states
to “absorb the first hit.” The doctrine of anticipatory or preemptive self-defense, as de-
veloped historically, is applicable only where there is a clear and imminent danger of
attack. The means used for preemptive response must be strictly limited to that re-
quired for the elimination of the danger, and they must be reasonably proportional to
that objective. The authorities now available to American leaders, at a time when ter-
rorist violence has already proven more deadly than major conflict, were developed in
the course of the historical incidents addressed. As we have seen, the threat today has
been recharacterized in terms of deliberate aggression against the United States by
nontraditional actors willing to take suicidal risks to inflict premeditated, brutal sav-
agery on innocent civilians in a manner designed less to force regime change directly as
to induce policy changes.
The commitment to national security, then, must address threats represented by social
and religious systems that foster or at least condone aggressive responses to differing
religious and social values. This has never been more true than in Afghanistan and in
Iraq, following Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Security means more than simply protect-
ing the land on which we live. It embraces a comprehensive understanding of the ap-
propriate response to human aspirations for improved conditions of life, for equality
of opportunity, and for justice and freedom. Where these interests are thwarted for
peoples or groups by armed protagonists representing narrow, restrictive interests, our
response must be one measured by the effective institutionalization of order.
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